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SIXTH ANNUAL SURVEY OF NORTH
CAROLINA CASE LAW*
The Sixth Annual Survey of North Carolina Case Law is designed
to review cases decided by the North Carolina Supreme Court during
the past year t and to supplement past and future Surveys in presenting
developments in North Carolina case law over a period of time.
It is not the purpose of the Survey to discuss all the cases decided
during the period of its coverage. It is intended to discuss only those
decisions which are of particular importance-cases regarded as being
of significance and interest to those concerned with the work of the
Court, and decisions which reflect substantial changes and matters of
first impression in the law of North Carolina. Appropriate references
will appear to those cases, embraced within the period covered by the
Survey, which have already been the subject of comment in articles or
student notes in this Law Review.
Most of the research for and writing of this Survey was accomplished
by selected members of the Student Board of Editors of the Law Review,
working under the supervision of the Faculty of the School of Law of
the University of North Carolina. Some sections, however, represent
the individual work of a faculty member.
Student members of the Law Review and the sections for which they
are responsible are:
E. Osborne Ayscue, Jr. (Civil Procedure (Pleading and Parties)):
Cecil Kenneth Brown, Jr. (Real Property and Wills and Administra-
tion); Richard C. Carmichael, Jr. (Administrative Law, Damages, and
Evidence) ; James S. Dockery, Jr. (Equity, Municipal Corporations, and
Trusts) ; Robert B. Evans (Business Associations, Constitutional Law,
and Contracts); Louis J. Fisher III (Criminal Law and Procedure);
Frances H. Hall (Agency and Workmen's Compensation); Jimmy W.
Kiser (Domestic Relations); Thomas W. Warlick (Conflict of Laws,
Credit Transactions, Insurance, Labor Law, Sales, and Taxation);
Harold L. Waters (Torts).
Throughout this Survey the North Carolina Supreme Court will
be referred to as the "Court" unless it appears by its full title. The
United States Supreme Court will be designated only by its full name.
North Carolina General Statutes will be signified in the text by "G.S."
* The period covered embraces the decisions of the North Carolina Supreme
Court reported in 247 N.C. 528 through 249 N.C. 490.
t The Survey covers the last part of the Spring Term 1958, the whole of theFall Term 1958, and the first part of the Spring Term 1959.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
LICENSES
G.S. §§ 90-71 and -72 make it a misdemeanor for any unlicensed
person to sell drugs or compound prescriptions except as an aid to and
under the immediate supervision of a licensed pharmacist. In Board of
Pharmacy v. Lane,' defendant Baldwin, who was not a licensed pharma-
cist, was employed by defendant Lane in one of three drug stores owned
by the latter in Wilmington. During the temporary absence of the
regular pharmacist, Baldwin filled a prescription by taking the number
of tablets called for in the prescription out of a labeled stock bottle and
putting them into a small container for the customer. On the ground
that this was a violation of G. S. § 90-71, the Board obtained an injunc-
tion2 restraining defendants from doing this or any other act in violation
of Chapter 90 of the North Carolina General Statutes. The defendants
appealed, arguing that there was no violation of the statute since Baldwin
could have telephoned a licensed pharmacist in one of Lane's other
stores. The Court rejected this argument on the ground that it would
necessitate Baldwin being his own judge as to whether he needed assist-
ance, and stated that "under the immediate supervision of a licensed
pharmacist" means in his immediate physical presence and under his
personal supervision. It was agreed that the tablets were a drug within
the meaning of the statute, and therefore the Court said it was irrelevant
that all Baldwin did was take them from one container and put them in
another. However, since the only issue was whether there was a viola-
tion of G.S. § 90-71, the Court held that that part of the injunction re-
straining any act in violation of the entire Chapter was too broad, struck
it from the order, and then affirmed the judgment as modified.
The practice of pharmacy is generally held to include the retailing
of drugs, even those prepared by a manufacturer,3 and such is subject to
regulation by the state in the exercise of the police power.4 The Lane
case goes a long way in requiring a licensed druggist for an almost purely
automatic operation, and is in strong contrast to the North Carolina
decision that so long as an optician performed only mechanical labors,
such as duplicating lenses, replacing frames, or even filling prescriptions
issued by a licensed optometrist, and did not himself attempt to measure
1248 N.C. 134, 102 S.E.2d 832 (1958). This case is also discussed in EQUITY,
Injunctions, and CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, Regulation of Business, infra.
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-85.1 (1958) provides that upon a violation of any pro-
vision of the act, the Board may apply to the superior court for an injunction re-
straining the guilty party from any further violation thereof.
'State v. Wood, 51 S.D. 485, 215 N.W. 487 (1927).
'State v. Donaldson, 41 Minn. 74, 42 N.W. 781 (1889) ; People v. Roemer, 168
App. Div. 377, 153 N.Y. Supp. 323 (1915). See generally, State v. Ballance, 229
N.C. 764, 51 S.E.2d 731 (1948).
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vision or prescribe lenses, he was not practicing optometry and so need
not be licensed.5
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT FINDINGS
In State ex rel. Util. Com'n v. New Hope Road Water Co.,0 the
Court held that evidence that the respondents own water lines, that they
have permitted adjacent property holders to tap in, and that a city
sells water to these property holders through the lines of respondents,
does not support a finding of fact by the hearing commissioner that
respondents are selling water to the public for compensation and are
therefore public utilities.7 The Court said that by statute the courts
of the state may review proceedings before the Commission and can
reverse its decisions where the findings are not supported by competent,
material, and substantial evidence.8
In Brice v. Robertson House Moving, Wrecking, and Salvage Co.,9
the Industrial Commission found as a fact that fees totaling $850 were
reasonable for the claimant's attorneys and approved that amount pur-
suant to G.S. § 97-90, which provides that attorneys' fees are subject to
approval by the Commission. The attorneys appealed to the superior
court, which reversed the Commission and allowed them $1,931.37. The
Supreme Court reinstated the original amount, saying that the Commis-
sion's findings of fact are conclusive upon the courts when supported by
competent evidence, even when there is evidence which would have sup-
ported a contrary finding. The Court said that neither it nor the superior
court can use the evidence to make its own finding. This is in accord
with the previous North Carolina view.10
In Adams v. Board of Educ.," the plaintiff, a twelve year old boy,
was playing tag in a school yard, slipped and fell into a power lawn
mower being operated by the janitor. He brought an action for damages
before the Industrial Commission12 in which he testified that he did not
know why he did not see the mower until it was too late. There was
also evidence that the mower made as much noise as a small motorcycle.
5 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-115 (1958), Palmer v. Smith, 229 N.C. 612, 51 S.E.2d 8(1948).( 248 N.C. 27, 102 S.E.2d 377 (1958). This case is also commented on in
MUNICIPAL CoRporATioNs, Utilities, infra.7 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-65(e) (2) (1950) provides that "the term 'public
utility' . . . includes persons and corporations . . . owning or operating in this
State equipment or facilities for: Diverting ... distributing or furnishing water
to or for the public for compensation."
8N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-26.10 (1950).
S249 N.C. 74, 105 S.E.2d 439 (1958). See also WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION,
Attorneys' Fees, infra.1oPenland v. Bird Coal Co., 246 N.C. 26, 97 S.E.2d 432 (1957).
11248 N.C. 506, 103 S.E.2d 854 (1958). See also TORTS, Negligence, infra.
'=Under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-291 (1958), the Industrial Commission is con-
stituted a court for the purpose of hearing tort claims against the State Board of
Education and other state agencies.
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The Commission found the plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence in
not keeping a proper lookout, thus barring a recovery. Under G.S.
§ 143-293 such a finding is conclusive if supported by competent evi-
dence. The Court sustained a reversal by the superior court, saying
that from the evidence it appeared to be speculative as to how much
noise the mower made and from what distance it could be heard, and
pointed out that the plaintiff slipped on wet grass. Consequently the
evidence was held insufficient to support a finding of contributory neg-
ligence. The Court in this case seems to be doing what it warned the
superior court against in the Brice case, i.e., substituting its judgment
as to what the evidence shows for that of the Commission.
In Davis v. Sanford Constr. Co.,13 the plantiff had lost two teeth
and sought an award -for facial disfigurement under G.S. § 97-31. The
Court held "before and after" photographs of the plaintiff, plus the hear-
ing commissioner's observation of him, to be sufficient evidence to sup-
port the Industrial Commission's finding of a facial disfigurement likely
to reasonably lessen the plaintiff's opportunity for "remunerative em-
ployment."
JUDICIAL REVIEW
In State ex rel. Employment Security Comm'n v. Hennis Freight
Lines, Inc.,' 4 the defendant conducted part of its business by leasing
trucks from others. The lessors either furnished the drivers or drove
the trucks themselves, as the case might be. The question presented was
whether or not these drivers were employees of the defendant lessee with-
in the meaning the Employment Security Law.' 5 The Commission
found that they were, and under G.S. § 96-4 (m), findings of fact which
are supported by competent evidence are binding on the courts. But
the Court said that since the lease itself determines whether they were
employees of the defendant, a question of law was presented which is
reviewable by the Court. It then held that under the terms of the lease
the drivers were not such employees. The case is consistent with the
North Carolina rule that questions of law are subject to judicial review.' 6
ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS
In In the Matter of Virginia-Carolina Chem. Corp.,'7 the state Com-
missioner of Revenue assessed additional income taxes for past years
on the ground that the depletion calculation method used by the corporate
taxpayer was not allowed under state law. Upon examination of the
1' 249 N.C. 129, 105 S.E.2d 425 (1958).
14248 N.C. 496, 103 S.E.2d 829 (1958). This case is also discussed in AGENCY
AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, Agency, and LABOR LAW, Coverage of Employees
Under Trip-Lease Agreements, infra.
"
5 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-8 (1958).
Fairchild Realty Co. v. Spiegel, Inc., 246 N.C. 458, 98 S.E.2d 871 (1957).11248 N.C. 531, 103 S.E.2d 823 (1958).
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statutes the Court concluded that the method used by taxpayer was in
accord with state law, and said that the Commissioner could have made
a regulation covering the matter, but that he could not now make a retro-
active regulation increasing the corporation's tax. This result is in
accord with the federal rule.'8 However, under the federal view if the
Commissioner has in fact made a prior rule which is based on a mis-
taken interpretation of the law, it can be amended with retroactive
effect. 19
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
G.S. § 84-28 authorizes the Council of the State Bar to make rules
for trials before it which shall conform as nearly as possible to hearings
in compulsory reference cases. It also provides the right to trial by
jury. In In the Matter of Gilliland,20 the respondent appealed to the
superior court a judgment by the Council that he be disbarred and asked
for a jury trial. The Bar argued that his failure to demand a jury trial
incident to his appeals from the trial committee to the Council and from
the Council to the superior court waived the statutory right to a jury
trial. The Court held that there was no waiver, saying that the authority
given the Council by G.S. § 84-28 refers to procedure incident to hear-
ings before the Council, not to that incident to appeals to the superior
court.
AGENCY AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
AGENCY
Agent's Authority-Formalities
The original English Statute of Frauds' required the signature of
the party to be charged or his agent authorized in writing, for the vali-
dation of contracts to convey land. In the United States the agent need
not be authorized in writing unless a statute so provides.m 2 In Lewis v.
Allred,3 a suit for the specific performance of an alleged contract to
convey land, the Court pointed out that there is no such requirement in
the North Carolina Statute of Frauds.4 Furthermore, the Court said
an agent may sign the contract to sell or convey in his own name or in
18Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 284 U.S. 370 (1932).
' Cf. Automobile Club v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180 (1957).
20 248 N.C. 517, 103 S.E.2d 807 (1958). This case has additional comment in
CONSTUTIONAL LAW, Trial Procedure and Due Process, infra.
1 1672, 29 Car. 2, c. 3.
28 Am. Jtm. Brokers, § 62 (1937).
'249 N.C. 486, 106 S.E.2d 689 (1959).
'N.C. Gzi. STAT. § 22-2 (1953).
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the name of his principal, and his authority may be shown aliunde or by
parol.5
Independent Contractor
In State ex rel. Employment Security Comm'n v. Hennis Freight
Lines, Inc.,6 the Court was asked to determine whether a lessor-operator
and the drivers he furnished under a trip-lease agreement,7 were employ-
ees of the lessee-franchise carrier within the meaning of the Employment
Security Law.s This law requires certain employers to make contri-
butions to the Employment Security Administration Fund based on
wages paid to employees,9 and provides that employment status is to
be determined according to the common law.' 0 The Court found that
the lease agreement disclosed a business venture on the part of the
lessor, noting that the drivers' employment agreements were entirely
with the lessor. Applying the common law rules of agency, the Court
concluded that the lessor was an independent contractor and therefore,
no part of the lease consideration could be considered as wages paid
to employees." Since the law is applicable only to employers of four
or more persons,12 this decision may narrow its coverage. However,
this appears to be the express intention of the General Assembly.' 3
'The Court cited earlier decisions to the same effect including Wellman v.
Horn, 157 N.C. 170, 72 S.E. 1010 (1911); Hargrove v. Adcock, 111 N.C. 166, 16
S.E. 16 (1892).
6248 N.C. 496, 103 S.E.2d 829 (1958). This case is also discussed under
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, Judicial Review, supra, and LABOR LAW, Coverage of Em-
ployees Under Trip-Lease Agreements, infra.
' Trip lease agreements have been the subject of much litigation because of their
hybrid nature. Under the typical agreement an interstate carrier leases motor
vehicles to operate under its franchise and the lessor agrees to maintain and service
the vehicles and to provide the necessary drivers in consideration for a lump sum
payment. The Court has held that as between the lessor and lessee, the lessor has
the status of independent contractor, but that as between the lessor and its con-
signor, consignee, and third parties generally, the operator of the vehicle is an
employee of the lessee. Newsome v. Surratt, 237 N.C. 297, 74 S.E.2d 732 (1953) ;
Hill v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 235 N.C. 705, 71 S.E.2d 133 (1952). How-
ever, with reference to the Workmen's Compensation Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. ch.
97 (1958), a lessor-operator's dependents as well as a lessor-driver's dependents
have been held to be entitled to death benefits from the lessee. McGill v. Bison
Fast Freight, Inc., 245 N.C. 469, 96 S.E.2d 438 (1957); Roth v. McCord &
Dellinger, 232 N.C. 678, 62 S.E.2d 64 (1950). These decision are based on the
grounds that the operator of the leased vehicle is furthering the business of the
franchise carrier and is, therefore, his employee in respect to the hazards to which
he and the public are sulj-cdted by reason of such operation.
' N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 96 (1958).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-9 (1958).
10 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-8(g) (1950), recompiled as § 96-8(7) (a) (1958).
On similar facts the same conclusion was reached in Harrison v. Greyvan
Lines, Inc., 331 U.S. 704 (1947).
"
2N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-8(6) (1958).
" The original act provided for coverage beyond the common law definition of
master and servant. N.C. Pub. Laws Extra Sess. 1936, ch. 1, § 19(g) (6). N.C.
Sess. Laws 1949, ch. 424, § 5 amended the law to provide for the use of common
law rules in determining employment status.
[Vol. 37
NORTH CAROLINA CASE LAW
Presumption of Agency
In Bivins v. Southern R.R.,14 the Court held that the plaintiffs had
made out a prima facie case of agency by proving that the poisonous
chemicals which damaged their property were sprayed from the de-
fendant's train. The Court said that if unauthorized persons were spray-
ing the defendant's right of way from its trains, this fact would be with-
in the peculiar knowledge of the defendant and it would be under
obligation to so allege and prove.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Abatement and Survival
In Inman. v. Meares,15 a case of first impression, the Court held
that in the absence of provision to the contrary, an employee's right
to compensation for temporary total disability under G.S. § 97-29 is a
vested right which, upon his death from another accident found to be
compensable under G.S. § 97-38, survives and becomes collectible by
his personal representative. The Court noted that the limitation on
the survival of the right to unpaid compensation contained in G.S.
§ 97-3716 applies only to awards made under G.S. § 97-31.17
Attorneys' Fees
The question of the authority of a superior court to make an award
of attorney's fees in a Workmen's Compensation case was presented for
the first time in Brice v. Robertson House Moving, Wrecking & Salvage
Co.'8 Here, a superior court, having found as a fact that the award
allowed for attorneys' fees was inadequate, directed the Industrial Com-
mission to amend the award. On review, the Supreme Court declared
the judgment to be null and void. The Court pointed out that the Indus-
trial Commission is the fact finding body for the administration of the act,
while the superior court's function is to review the record for errors of
law.1 9 Furthermore, the Court noted, the superior court had not found
that the Commission had abused its discretion as was alleged on appeal.
The Court explained that G.S. § 97-90 provides that attorneys' fees
1"247 N.C. 711, 102 S.E.2d 128 (1958).
15247 N.C. 661, 101 S.E.2d 692 (1958).
'
8 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-37 (1958), provides that when an employee entitled
to compensation under G.S. § 97-31 dies from any other cause than the injury for
which he is entitled to compensation, the right to collect the unpaid balance survives.
However, this right is subject to the proviso that there shall be no survival of the
right to any unpaid compensation where the death was due to a cause which is
compensable and the dependents of the deceased are awarded death benefits.
1" This statute contains a schedule of specific injuries including the rate and
period of compensation.
18249 N.C. 74, 105 S.E.2d 439 (1958). This case is also discussed under
ADMINISTr ,vz LAW, Evidence to Support Findings, supra.11 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-84 (1958).
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"shall be subject to the approval of the Commission," and that the word
"approve" implies the exercise of discretion and judgment.
Injury by Accident Required for Recovery
In Holt v. Cannon Mills Co.,20 the Court reversed an award for
hernia on the grounds that there was no evidence in the record to show
that the .work of the employee, at the time he suffered the injury, was
being performed in other than the usual and customary manner. The
employee was performing his regular duties which included moving a
box weighing approximately one hundred pounds from a truck to a
shelf when the injury occurred. The reversal was based on Hensley v.
Farmers Fed'n Co-op.21 and similar decisions. While the majority of
decisions22 in other jurisdictions are to the effect that the injury should
be considered the compensable accident, this jurisdiction usually follows
the minority view that the injury is compensable only when it is the
result of an accident.23
Minimum Weekly Awards
In Kellams v. Carolina Metal Prods, Inc, 24 a case of first impres-
sion, an employee suffered a ten per cent permanent partial disability
to her right leg. The Industrial Commission made an award of $2.75
per week for 200 weeks under G.S. § 97-31(t) as then written. 25 On
appeal, the Court upheld the employee's contention that she was entitled
to the minimum award of $8.00 per week provided by G.S. § 97-29. The
Court pointed out that while G.S. § 97-29 is concerned with total disa-
bility, the minimum award it provides is made applicable to partial dis-
ability by G.S. § 97-31(u) ,26 and that a provision for minimum awards
will inevitably result in the same award for a less serious as for a more
disabling injury.
Rights and Remedies Exclusive
In Lawson v. Highway Comm'n,27 the Court held that an action
could be maintained under the Tort Claims Act28 for the wrongful death
-o 249 N.C. 215, 105 S.E2d 614 (1958).21246 N.C. 274, 98 S.E.2d 289 (1957).
224 SCHNEIMR, WORKMEN'S CoMPZNsATioN LAW § 1240 (3d ed. 1945).
2 See 27 N.C.L. REv. 599 (1949) for a criticism of the minority view and a
discussion of North Carolina cases in which the majority view has been followed.
248 N.C. 199, 102 S.E.2d 841 (1958).
"The Court noted that the Industrial Commission had correctly interpreted the
statute by applying the percentage of disability to the weekly wages rather than to
the number of weekly payments during which the disability is presumed to continue.
This section has since been amended to make the percentage of disability applicable
to the period of payment. N.C. Sess. Laws 1957, ch. 1396, § 2. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 97-31 (t) (1950) has been recompiled as N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-31(19) (1958).
" Recompiled as N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-31(20) (1958).
'=248 N.C. 276, 103 S.E.2d 366 (1958). This case is also discussed under
ToRTs, State Tort Claims Act, infra.
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-291 (1958).
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of a prisoner assigned to work under the supervision of the State High-
way and Public Works Commission. The defendant maintained that be-
cause G.S. § 97-13 (c) confers limited rights to workmen's compensation
to prisoners assigned to such work, the plaintiff's exclusive remedy was
under the Workmen's Compensation Act. G.S. § 97-10 excludes an
employee covered by this act from other rights and remedies against his
employer. In reaching its decision, the Court pointed out that prisoners
were not excepted from the provisions of the Tort Claims Act and that
even if the word "employee," as used in G.S. § 97-10, were interpreted
to include a prisoner, the Tort Claims Act would prevail because it
repealed all laws in conflict therewith. The Court noted, however, that
since the events in the instant case, G.S. § 97-13 (c) has been amended29
to make G.S. § 97-10 applicable to prisoners.
The Court found the claim to be within the purview of the Tort
Claims Act since it was based on a negligent act-placing the prisoner
in an area of hidden danger-rather than on a negligent omission.30
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS
COIPORATIONS
In Caldlaw, Inc., v. Caldwell,' a judgment creditor of a corporation
brought suit in the name of the corporation against one of its officers on
the ground that he had committed a breach of trust in the use of corpo-
rate credit and assets for his own private gain. Suit was brought under
former G.S. § 55-143,2 which provided that a "judgment creditor may
elect to satisfy [an] . . . execution in whole or in part out of any debts
due the corporation .... "
The cause was tried on its merits in the trial court, the jury finding
as a fact that there had been no breach of fiduciary duty by the de-
fendant. The Court dismissed the action on appeal, holding that it was
improperly brought under G.S. § 55-143 inasmuch as the term "debts"
as used in that section refers only to liquidated debts, and not to causes
of action arising ex delicto and not reduced to judgment.3
The proper procedure would be to have a receiver appointed and
suit brought by him for the benefit of creditors.4
23 N.C. Sess. Laws 1957, ch. 809, § 2.2oThe Court has held that the General Assembly by specifying "a negligent
act," did not intend to permit recovery under the Tort Claims Act for negligent
omissions on the part of state employees. Flynn v. Highway Comm'n, 244 N.C. 617,
94 S.E.2d 571 (1956).
1248 N.C. 235, 102 S.E.2d 829 (1958).
Recodified as N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-324.4 (Supp. 1957).Quaere, as to whether a cause of action arising ex delicto, even if reduced tojudgment, would be a "debt" within the meaning of G.S. § 55-143.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-507.1-.11 (Supp. 1957).
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What if a trustee in bankruptcy refuses to bring suit? This prob-
lem arose in Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. Townsend.5 There, a corpo-
ration creditor sought to sue the officers and stockholders directly for
fraudulent depletion and withdrawal of corporate assets, the trustee
having declined to do so. The trial court, on motion of the defendants,
entered an order dismissing the action for want of jurisdiction upon
the ground that the right to bring the action was vested in the trustee
in bankruptcy. Certiorari was granted; the judgment was affirmed.
Plaintiffs in this case likewise relied - erroneously - on a statutory
provision, G.S. § 55-56 (in effect at the time suit was brought), which
stated that officers, directors, managers, and stockholders of a corpora-
tion could be held personally liable for fraudulent conduct to any credi-
tor injured thereby. The Court held that, conceding this right, once
a court acquired jurisdiction of corporate assets in a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding, the superior right to sue on behalf of creditors rests with the
trustee in bankruptcy.
Some cases have held that where the trustee refuses to sue, the
creditor may bring suit to recover assets, making the trustee a nominal
party defendant.0 However, the general rule is that notwithstanding
such refusal, the right of action is in the trustee; the remedy of the
creditor is to petition the court of bankruptcy for an order compelling
the trustee to bring the stuit.7
In Royall v. Carr Lumber Co.,8 an order for liquidation of a corpora-
tion was entered "by consent and in the discretion of the court." It was
under attack by intervening majority stockholders on the ground that
the consenting parties had no authority to represent the corporation.
Intervenors' motion to set aside the order appointing receivers for the
defendant-corporation was denied. On appeal, the Supreme Court
affirmed, taking the position (1) that since the order was in the dis-
cretion of the court under G.S. § 55-125(a) (4), it was immaterial
whether the "consent" was authorized by the corporation, and (2) that
since no specific findings of fact were made or requested, it would be
presumed that the court below had accepted the allegations of the com-
plaint as true.
The apparent consent of the parties was probably the principal factor
influencing the court when the order was entered. Practically speak-
ing, it is doubtful, where the parties draw up a consent order, embody
in it "and in the discretion of the court," and hand it to the judge for
signature, that any real judicial discretion will be exercised beyond de-
r248 N.C. 687, 104 S.E.2d 826 (1958).
0 Casey v. Baker, 212 F. 247 (D.C. Cir. 1914) ; Wright v. H. B. Ehrlich & Co.,
146 Ga. 400, 91 S.E. 412 (1917).7 Glenny v. Langdon, 98 U.S. 43 (1878).S248 N.C. 735, 105 S.E.2d 65 (1958).
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termining that the consent is regular on its face. And, if the failure to
request specific findings of fact is attributable to attorneys who had no
authority to represent the client for whom they spoke, then it would
seem that this failure ought not to be binding on intervenors.
The decision seems to say that an order secured below by consent,
if it also recites that it is "within the discretion of the court," is safe on
appeal from any attack based on lack of authority of the officer or at-
torney to give consent for a litigant party. It should be noted, however,
that this decision does not prejudice intervenors' rights under G.S.
§ 55-128 to petition the court for a discontinuance of the liquidation.
PARTNERSHIPS
The Court determined in Pentecost v. Ray9 that where, pursuant
to a referee's report, receivers are appointed to take inventory and sell
assets of a partnership, the proper procedure in case the plaintiff alleges
that the defendant has retained partnership property as his own is not
to order a new reference, but to send the receivers back for the property
or to have its loss accounted for.
G.S. § 59-39(4) provides: "No act of a partner in contravention of
a restriction on authority shall bind the partnership to persons having
knowledge of the restriction." In National Biscuit Co. v. Stroud,10 de-
fendant advised plaintiff's agent that he would not be personally re-
sponsible for any additional bread sold by plantiff to Stroud's Food
Center. Plaintiff continued to sell bread to the store at the request of
defendant's co-partner. In an action to recover the price of bread sold
after notice was given, held: defendant was not relieved of liability to
pay by virtue of his giving notice.
There is authority to the effect that a partner may restrict his part-
ner's authority to contract in the name of the partnership by giving
actual notice to the third party, on the theory that the implied agency
is terminated." It seems to be well settled in North Carolina, however,
that unless the third party has notice that the terms of partnership are
such as to place special restrictions on the acting partner's authority,
a co-partner cannot, by giving notice as in the present case, restrict it.12
Of course, by express agreement the partners may restrict the authority
of either, or both. But, by virtue of G.S. § 59-48(h), which provides
that differences arising as to ordinary partnership matters may be de-
cided only by a majority of the partners, a co-partner is powerless to
vary the terms of the partnership without the consent of his partner.
0 249 N.C. 406, 106 S.E.2d 467 (1959).249 N.C. 467, 106 S.E.2d 692 (1959).
" De Santis v. Miller Petroleum Co., 29 Cal. App. 2d 679, 85 P.2d 489 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1938). Bank of Bellbuckle v. Mason, 139 Tenn. 659, 202 S.W. 931 (1918).1 Sladen, Fakes & Co. v. Lance, 151 N.C. 492, 66 S.E. 449 (1909); Johnson,
Clark & Co. v. Bernheim, 76 N.C. 139 (1877).
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Since defendant did not allege any agreement restricting the powers
of his partner, he continued to be liable for goods bought in the ordinary
business of the partnership.
It seems that the "restriction on authority" meant by G.S. § 59-39(4)
is such restriction as is (1) set out in the articles of the partnership
agreement, or (2) placed on an acting partner by a majority of the part-
nership.
CIVIL PROCEDURE (PLEADING AND
PARTIES)
PLEADING
Affirmative Defenses
In Mobley v. Broome,' plaintiff was arrested by defendant policeman
on July 6, 1953, and was subsequently convicted of assault and resisting
arrest; but he was acquitted of the drunkenness charge which had been
the reason for the arrest. On appeal the Court held that the arrest
was illegal and reversed the conviction.2 On November 24, 1954, plain-
tiff sued the policeman for false imprisonment and assault. Defendants,
answering, pleaded the statute of limitations and moved for judgment
on the pleadings on the ground that the complaint affirmatively showed
that the applicable statute3 had run as to both causes of action.4  The
trial court granted the motion and dismissed. In affirming, the Court
held that as to the action for false imprisonment the statute ran from
the date of plaintiff's release on bond on the day after his arrest, and
as to the action for assault, from the happening thereof. Thus, the one-
year statute had run two day days before the Court reversed the crim-
inal conviction.5 Secondly, it held that although the bar of the statute
is ordinarily a mixed question of law and fact, where, as here, the bar
is properly pleaded in the answer and all facts with reference thereto
1248 N.C. 54, 102 S.E.2d 407 (1958).
'State v. Mobley, 240 N.C. 476, 83 S.E2d 100 (1954).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-54(3) (1953). This statute applies to both false im-
prisonment and assault.
' Counsel for the plaintiff stated in open court that the theory of the action
was false arrest or imprisonment, and not malicious prosecution or abuse of process.
Had the latter two been the grounds for the suit the applicable statute, G.S. §
1-52(5), would not have run.
The Court stated that by the weight of authority an action for false imprison-
ment will lie irrespective of the termination of the prosecution in which the im-
prisonment occurred, citing 35 C.J.S. False Imprisonment § 49 (1943). The up-
shot of this would seem to be that where a conviction growing out of resisting
arrest is appealed on the grounds that the arrest was illegal, any contemplated
action against the person making the arrest should be brought within one year
of the release from imprisonment, and a continuance requested if the civil suit is
called for trial before final disposition of the criminal conviction.
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appear affirmatively on the face of the complaint and are admitted, the
question becomes a matter of law on which the trial court may rule
on motion for judgment on the pleadings.6
Amendment
In Thompson v. Seaboard Air Line R.R.,7 plaintiffs sued for diminu-
tion of the value of their property resulting when defendant, in altering
its right of way, raised the level of a public street outside its right of
way so as to impair access to plaintiff's building. After the evidence was
in, plaintiffs amended to allege that this was done for the sole use and
benefit of defendant. Defendant appealed an adverse verdict and judg-
ment, contending that this was a material amendment stating a new
cause of action, for which it was entitled to additional time to prepare
its defense and offer evidence on the issue thus raised. After extensive
consideration of the pleadings and the evidence the Court concluded
that since the defendant did not plead governmental immunity in justi-
fication or prove that it acted under the authority of the municipality,
the issue was not raised. Thus, the amendment added nothing to the
complaint, 8 and no prejudice to defendant resulted.
Plaintiff in Woody v. Pickelsime&9 bought corporate stocks from
'The position of the Court here is a practical one. The language of the cases
on this matter would seem to indicate that it feels that if any technical violence is
done to the rule that the question of limitations may be raised only by answer, the
appellate court is justified in not reversing because the appellant cannot possibly
have been prejudiced, since it affirmatively appears that the action is barred. See
Latham v. Latham, 184 N.C. 55, 113 S.E. 623 (1922) ; Ewbank v. Lyman, 170 N.C.
505, 87 S.E. 348 (1915) ; 1 M.INToSir, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 373 (2nd ed., 1956).
This type of procedure was first allowed in Underwood v. Dooley, 197 N.C.,
100, 147 S.E. 686 (1929). In that suit judgment on the pleadings was granted
because of a prior action pending. It has been utilized for that purpose, to raise
the question of limitations as in the principal case, and to raise the failure to comply
with G.S. § 1-25 as a condition precedent to suit. Nowell v. Hamilton, 249 N.C.
523, 107 S.E.2d 112 (1959). In these limited situations the Court has created a
procedure which is in effect the equivalent of the motion for summary judgment
under Federal Rule 56.
Distinguish this situation from that wherein the question of the bar of the statute
is raised by demurrer before answer. G.S. § 1-15 clearly forbids this procedure.
Stamey v. Rutherfordton Elec. Membership Corp., 249 N.C. 90, 105 S.E.2d 282(1958), wherein the Court rejected the use of demurrer to raise the question of
the statute of limitations, will be treated in an article in a later volume of this
LAW REVIEW.
For discussion of Overton v. Tarkington, 249 N.C. 340, 106 S.E.2d 717 (1959),
involving the defensive use of a counterclaim, see Counterclaims under PLEADING
AND PARTIES.
7248 N.C. 577, 104 S.E.2d 181 (1958). This case is also discussed under
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, Eminent Domain, infra.
' Defendant's exceptions from the denial of nonsuit and from the judge's instruc-
tion that the jury find that the railroad was ultimately responsible for the altera-
tion were overruled on the same grounds, i.e. that the defense of governmental im-
munity had not been pleaded or proved.
0 248 N.C. 599, 104 S.E.2d 273 (1958). This case is also discussed in WILLs
AND ADMINISTRATION, Executors and Administrators, infr.
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the defendant, who was both devisee of a share in them and executrix
of the estate of which they were a part. Plaintiff had stated on trial
that he bought from the defendant as an individual, but he proved that
he had paid considerably more than the value of defendant's life interest
in the stocks as devisee and that defendant had endorsed them as
executrix. The trial court refused to allow him to amend to allege that
he had dealt with the defendant in both capacities and refused to tender
such an issue to the jury. On appeal, the Court reversed on the ground
that since it could be inferred, from the fact that the conveyance could
not have full effect without reference to defendant's power over the
property as ,executrix, that plaintiff dealt with defendant in both capaci-
ties , such an issue should have been presented to the jury. Amendment
to this effect was, therefore, improperly refused since it did not change
the effect of the allegation.10 But the Court did not consider the refusal
of the amendment prejudicial in itself since the pleadings, construed
liberally according, to the mandate of G.S. § 1-151, already alleged facts
that would give rise to this inference. Its reversal was based instead
on 'the failure of the trial- court to present the proper issue to the jury.
Demurrer
Plaintiff sued A 'and B for personal injuries arising from an auto-
mobile accident in Howze v. McCall." The complaint alleged that A
negligently left his automobile parked on the pavement at night and
that when plaintiff came upon it and slowed suddenly, B ran into him
from behind. On motion, plaintiff was awarded judgment by default
and inquiry against A. A's motion to be allowed to answer was denied
by the trial court, as was his demurrer ore tenus to the complaint.
Plaintiff appealed the amount of damages awarded, and A demurred
ore tenus in the Supreme Court on the ground that the complaint did
not state a cause of action. The Court sustained the demurrer. It
stated that failure to make this objection by answer or demurrer before
answer does not waive it.' 2 Since the effect of the judgment by default
is, among other things, to establish a right of action of the kind properly
pleaded in the complaint, 13 if the complaint does not state a cause of
action the default judgment will not cure the defect and demurrer will
lie at any time before final judgment.14
1" Since the trial court refused to allow the amendment in that it did not con-
form to the evidence, the refusal, ordinarily discretionary and not subject to
review, was reviewable because it was made as a matter of law.
11249 N.C. 250, 106 S.E.2d 236 (1958). This case is also discussed under
TORTS, Proximate Cause, infra.
"
2 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-134 (1953).
"
3 DeHoff v. Black, 206 N.C. 687, 175 S.E. 179 (1934).
"' The Court did not discuss the propriety of the demurrer ore tenus below
since appeal does not lie from a demurrer ore tenus overruled by the trial court.
Hamilton v. Hamilton, 242 N.C. 715, 89 S.E.2d 417 (1955). But it would appear
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Allegations of Fact and Conclusions of Law
In Auto Fin. Co. v. Simmons,'5 defendant counterclaimed, alleging,
among other things, that plaintiff and the original creditor conspired
and, by common plan and design between them, charged and attempted
to collect interest in excess of that allowed by law. Upon demurrer
to the counterclaim, the Court found a good counterclaim for the statu-
tory penalty of usury,16 but disallowed a further claim for damages in
excess of this penalty.17 Conspiracy was a prerequisite to recovery on
this further claim and, in the absence of allegations of facts alleging
conspiracy, the pleading of the word "conspiracy" was a mere con-
clusion to be disregarded on demurrer.
The defendant in Etheridge v. Carolina Power and Light Co.'8
pleaded assumption of risk as an affirmative defense in the following
manner:
That... plaintiff is barred from a recovery herein under the doc-
trines of Assumed Risk and of volenti non fit injuria, in that
plaintiff's intestate knew or should have known of the existence
of said electric line . . . and ... he . . . exposed himself to the
dangers then and there existing and he thereby assumed all the
risks of injury which confronted him, and the defendant hereby
that the same considerations would apply there.
The plaintiff in Auto Fin. Co. v. Simmons, 247 N.C. 724, 102 S.E.2d 119(1958), demurred ore tenus in the Supreme Court to defendant's counterclaim. The
Court interpreted the counterclaim of the defendant, written in narrative fashion,
to state four separate causes of action. The demurrer, though in form addressed
to the counterclaim as a whole, stated grounds applicable to only one of the
causes of action. The Court quoted from Griffin v. Baker, 192 N.C. 297, 134S.E. 651 (1926), to the effect that where a general demurrer is filed to a petition
as a whole, and any count of the pleading is good, the demurrer should be over-
ruled. It found three good causes of action stated but found the fourth defective.
As was intimated by the Court, the proper procedure would seem to be for plaintiff
to move to strike the offending portion of the counterclaim, or to demur specifically
to the defective cause of action. For treatment of other aspects of this case, see
CIVn. PROCEDURE (PLEADING AND PARTIES), Fact Pleading, infra; CREDITS, Con-
ditional Sales, infra; and TRIAL PRACTICE, County Court-Effect of Counterclaim,
infra. Other cases within the volumes covered by this survey dealing with de-
murrer for failure to state a cause of action will be dealt with in an article in a
later volume of this LAW REviEw, and are consequently omitted here. They are:
Stamey v. Rutherfordton Elec. Membership Corp., 249 N.C. 90, 105 S.E.2d 282(1958) ; Perrell v. Beaty Service Co., Inc., 248 N.C. 153, 102 S.E.2d 785 (1958) ;
Adams v. Flora MacDonald College, 247 N.C. 648, 101 S.E.2d 809 (1958); and
Stamey v. Rutherfordton Elec. Membership Corp., 247 N.C. 640, 101 S.E.2d 814(1958).
1247 N.C. 724, 102 S.E.2d 119 (1958). For treatment of other aspects of this
case, see CIvn. PROCEDURE (PLEADING AND PARTIES), Demurrer, supra; CREDITS,
Condtional Sales, infra; and TRIAL PRACTICE, County Court-Effect of Counter-
clain, infra.
"
8N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-2 (Supp. 1957).
"' Interest in any amount was unlawful at common law. Thus interest and the
penalties for usury are governed exclusively by statute. Smith v. Old Dominion
Bldg. and Loan Ass'n, 119 N.C. 249, 26 S.E. 41 (1896).
18249 N.C. 367, 106 S.E.2d 560 (1959). For treatment of another aspect of
this case see Third Party Practice under PLEADING AND PARTIES.
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pleads that (sic) the aforesaid doctrines of Assumption of Risk
and volenti non fit injuria in bar and defense of a recovery here-
in.1 9
The lower court struck the quoted matter; and the Supreme Court
affirmed, stating that parties are not permitted to defeat recovery by a
cognomen or phrase designed to indicate in a general way the character
of the action or defense.20
In Stamey v. Rutherfordton Elec. Membership Corp.,21 the plaintiff's
intestate was working on a new power line as an employee of the
company defendant had hired to erect the line. At one point the new
line passed in the immediate proximity of a live line of defendant. While
the deceased was aloft, the two lines came in contact and he was electro-
cuted. Plaintiff alleged that the negligence of the defendant consisted,
inter alia, of failing to cut off the current in the live wire while deceased
was working in the vicinity, of failing to post warning signs, and of
failing to erect sufficient circuit breakers, all when it knew or should
have known that the two lines passed very near each other at one point.
The Court sustained a demurrer ore tenus on the ground that sufficient
facts were not alleged to show that the defendant's negligence was the
proximate cause of the accident, pointing out that the complaint did not
show how the two wires came in contact with each other. It may be
argued that the Court could have taken a more liberal approach here
in view of the usual rule that gives the pleader the benefit of facts well
pleaded and any reasonable inferences arising therefrom and the man-
date of G.S. § 1-151 that the pleadings be liberally construed. It would
seem that at least an inference of proximate cause can be drawn from the
pleadings. 22
249 N.C. 367, 370-71, 106 S.E2d 560, 563-64.
"0 The Court specifically refers to G.S. § 1-135 which calls for a statement of
the facts "in ordinary and concise language, without repetition." The court below
struck this allegation on its substantive merits, and the briefs are directed to the
substance, and not the form of the allegation.
Although defendant pleaded its defenses in terms of a label, it also alleged
that plaintiff's intestate knew or should have known of the existence of the
danger and voluntarily exposed himself to it. It may be argued that in the
face of this factual allegation the Court's ruling was unnecessarily strict.
In Allen v. Seay, 248 N.C. 321, 103 S.E.2d 332 (1958), defendant alleged in
his answer that any claim in favor of plaintiff "was barred by the three-year and
six-year statute of limitations." The Court in reversing for substantive errors
pointed out that although neither brief debated the form and sufficiency of the
plea, it alleged no facts showing the lapse of time between the date the cause of
action accrued and the date on which the suit was instituted.
1247 N.C. 640, 101 S.E.2d 814 (1958). For treatment of another aspect of
this case see the article in a later volume of this LAw REviEw.2 It is difficult to see what the additional allegation in Essick v. City of Lexing-
ton, 232 N.C. 200, 60 S.E.2d 106 (1950), distinguished by the Court from the case
at bar, contributes towards establishing proximate cause. The allegation was that
plaintiff's intestate himself caused a sheet of metal he was carrying to come into
contact with defendant's live wire, a fact that would seem to weaken rather than
strengthen the inference of proximate cause.
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Motion to Strike
In Edwards v. Jenkins,23 defendant, in answer to plaintiff's allega-
tion of injuries, alleged that in spite of his repeated efforts to obtain
information from the plaintiff regarding any injury, he had been un-
lawfully denied the information so that he could not answer properly;
but that notwithstanding the effort to frustrate and confuse him the
allegation was untrue and exaggerated and was therefore denied. The
Court affirmed the striking of all this argumentative pleading except the
bare denial.
In considering a motion to strike pleadings as irrelevant 4 the Court
in Batts v. Batts25 drew on the rule established in Hinson v. Britt.26
At hearing on plaintiff's motion for subsistence pendente lite and at-
torney's fees, defendant had moved to strike all the material allegations
of plaintiff's "petition and affidavit" for alimony without divorce.27 The
petition, covering some twenty pages and forty-five paragraphs, alleged
various acts of cruelty as remote as 1919. The trial court struck some
of the matter in question and awarded alimony pendente lite and at-
torney's fees. Defendant appealed. The Court found sufficient allega-
tions of acts of cruelty not too remote to be relevant and affirmed the
lower court's award over defendant's demurrer. But it found that the
allegations more remote than those relating to the 1950's (the next in
point of time being those relating to the 1930's) were too remote to be
relevant and ordered them stricken from the pleadings before final hear-
ing on the merits. It stated that the basic test of revelancy was whether
the pleader would have the right to introduce in evidence the facts to
which the allegation related, but that denial of the motion to strike was
not reversible error unless it affirmatively appeared (1) that the matter
was irrelevant or redundant, and (2) that its retention in the pleadings
would cause harm or injustice to the moving party.
23247 N.C. 565, 101 S.E.2d 410 (1958). For other aspects of this case, see
CiviL, PROCEDURE (PLEADING AND PARTIEs), Counterclaims, infra, and EviDENcE,
Prior Acquital, infra.
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-153 (1953).
248 N.C. 243, 102 S.E2d 862 (1958). For another aspect of this case
see Prolixity in the Pleadings under PLEADING AND PARTIES.
2 232 N.C. 379, 61 S.E.2d 185 (1950). For a detailed treatment of the two
lines of authority as to the propriety of striking pleadings before trial see -Brandis
and Bumgarner, The Motion to Strike Pleadings it North Carolina, 29 N.C.
L. Ray. 3, 6 (1950).
" By court interpretation, subsistence and attorney's fees may not be awarded
pendente lite in a suit for alimony without divorce under G.S. § 50-16 unless the
court finds that plaintiff's complaint in the main action states a cause of action.
Ipock v. Ipock, 233 N.C. 387, 64 S.E.2d 283 (1951), The trial court in this case,
therefore, properly considered the sufficiency of the complaint (which plaintiff
labelled a "petition and affidavit") at the hearing on the preliminary motion.
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Prolixity
In Batts v. Batts,28 discussed in the preceding section, the Court in
remanding the case for trial directed that the plaintiff be given a reason-
able time to redraft her pleadings so as to reduce them from twenty
pages to a "plain and concise statement of facts" as required by G.S.
1-122-and assisted the process by ordering that all but a few of the
allegations be stricken as irrelevant and remote. 2
9
Theory of the Pleadings
After reading the pleadings to the jury, the plaintiff's attorney in
Hill v. Parker"0 informed the court that his action was for rescission.
Defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings, and the trial court
granted the motion. On appeal the Supreme Court agreed that no cause
of action for rescission was stated, but it found a cause of action for
breach of warranty and reversed. It stated that if the complaint stated
a good cause of action and if the plaintiff had not been put to his election,
the plaintiff's attorney's inexact designation of the nature of the cause of
action should not be fatal. The Court quoted at length from a prior
case3l to the effect that a motion for judgment on the pleadings is in
the nature of a demurrer in that its function is to raise an issue of law
on the pleadings. Thus, if in any respect the pleading was good as it
was here, the motion should be denied.
Variance
In Spaugh v. City of Winston-Salem, 2 plaintiff stated a cause of
action for permanent nuisance (stream pollution), but the court, ap-
parently accepted the evidence of defendant city that the pollution was
only temporary, charged the jury only on the issue of temporary dam-
ages. Plaintiff excepted to this but later abandoned the exception. After
judgment for the plaintiff, defendant appealed, assigning as error the
court's refusal to grant its motion for involuntary nonsuit for material
variance. The Court affirmed. It found nothing in the record that
would indicate that the plaintiff abandoned or failed to prove its theory
of the action. In this situation defendant was in no position to complain.
Although the Court cited no authority, this position is plainly well taken.
G.S. § 1-168 requires as an element of material variance that the op-
28248 N.C. 243, 102 S.E.2d 862 (1958).
2In Davis v. Griffin, 248 N.C. 539, 103 S.E2d 728 (1958), the Court, in re-
manding on other grounds, suggested that a petition for partition of numerous tracts
of land would be less confusing if the tracts in which the same fractional owner-
ship rights were alleged were grouped together for pleading purposes, rather than
being set out separately.
20248 N.C. 662, 104 S.E.2d 848 (1958). This case is also treated in TIAL
PRAcricE, Attorney and Client, infra, and SALES, Express Warranty, infra.
"' Erickson v. Starling, 235 N.C. 643, 71 S.E.2d 384 (1952).
2249 N.C. 194, 105 S.E.2d 610 (1958). For another aspect of this case, see
DAMAGES, Nuisance, infra.
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ponent be misled. Here, since the court adopted defendant's contentions
and gave judgment in accordance with them, it clearly was not misled.
In Wilkes Poultry Co., Inc. v. Clark Trailer and Equip. Co.,3 3 plain-
tiff alleged a cause of action for negligent workmanship in improperly
welding a towing gear on a tractor-trailer combination. The gear had
parted, causing the truck to wreck. At trial plaintiff proved that de-
fendant had not done the welding. It proved, in substance, a breach of
contract to repair in that defendant had contracted to put the trailer in
first class condition and that had it inspected the trailer properly it would
have discovered the then-existing flaw. The Court affirmed the trial
court's nonsuit for variance.3 4
In two automobile cases 5 in which the material facts alleged varied
from those proved, the Supreme Court affirmed nonsuits. In Lucas v.
Whiter plaintiff alleged that the car of defendant A approached the
car of defendant B, in which plaintiff was riding, in a straight line on
its own side of the road until it suddenly swerved into the car of de-
fendant B. At trial plaintiff attempted to prove that A's car was
wobbling as it approached, so that B should have been on notice of the
impending collision and acted to avoid it. The Court affirmed the non-
suit below for failure to prove B's negligence. It stated that the evidence
which varied from the allegations should be ignored on motion to non-
suit. In Moore v. Singleton,37 plaintiff alleged that defendant X stopped
to make a left turn without making a turn signal and that plaintiff, in
order to avoid hitting him from behind, skidded left into the path of
defendant Y who was approaching from the opposite direction. He
alleged that Y was negligent in not pulling off the road to avoid him.
He proved, however, that the collision actually occurred on his own side
of the road, Y having crossed over to avoid X who was turning left
into his lane, and that the collision occured when plaintiff was still 134
feet away from where X was turning. Relying on the Lucas case the
Court held that the material variance made nonsuit as to Y proper.
COUNTERCLAIMS
In Edwards v. Jenkins,3 8 defendant answered a complaint for
28247 N.C. 570, 101 S.E.2d 458 (1958).
"It would seem that amendment in this case under G.S. § 1-163 would have
raised serious questions as to changing the essence of the claim. FED. R. CIV. P.
15(b) would allow plaintiff to amend its pleadings here at any time to conform
to the evidence, and, indeed, had no objection been raised on trial to the proof
offered, would treat any claim for relief proved as having been pleaded.
" Moore v. Singleton, 249 N.C. 287, 106 S.E.2d 214 (1958); Lucas v. White,
248 N.C. 38, 102 S.E.2d 387 (1958).
-0248 N.C. 38, 102 S.E.2d 387 (1958).
37249 N.C. 287, 106 S.E.2d 214 (1958).
-8247 N.C. 565, 101 S.E.2d 410 (1958). For another aspect of this case, see
CIVIL PROCEDURE (PLEADING AND PARTIES), Motion to Strike supra, and EvmENCE,
Prior Acquittal, infra.
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assault, with a counterclaim for abuse of process, alleging that plaintiff
had had him arrested in the civil suit subsequent to criminal acquittal.
The Court found that no cause of action was stated in the counterclaim.
Then in dictum it cited a case in which a counterclaim for abuse of
process was denied in a suit on a contract,30 quoting from it at length
but making no comment other than to indicate from the context that the
counterclaim in the instant suit was erroneously joined.40
In Overton v. Tarkington,41 the Court reaffirmed prior holdings42 that
the statutory cause or action for usury48 may be used defensively against
an action on the debt by the creditor. In the instant case the plaintiff
was an assignee of the contract and, as such, was subject to the defenses
existing against his assignor at the time of the assignment.44 The Court
held that the defense was validly asserted to defeat the claim of the
assignee. Defendant also asserted the right to pursue its statutory
double recovery for interest paid against the original creditor in the
same action, and to that end joined him as additional defendant 4 5 The
Court applied to this joinder of an additional defendant on the counter-
claim the usual rule, based on G.S. § 1-73, governing the joinder of
additional parties. It held that the trial court had ruled correctly that
the creditor was not a party necessary to the complete determination
of the controversy so as to make his joinder mandatory. It found, as did
the trial court, that the additional defendant was a proper party whose
joinder the trial court could have allowed or refused to allow in its dis-
cretion. Its refusal, being discretionary, was not subject to review.40
JOINDER OF CAUSES AND PARTIES
The plaintiffs in Dixon v. DiXon,47 devisees under a will, alleged
that defendant H, another devisee, having settled the estate as executor,
"9 Life Ins. Co. of Virginia v. Smathers, 211 N.C. 373, 190 S.E. 484 (1937).
o It would seem that the inference to be drawn from this is that the Court
does not consider that this is a cause of action arising out of the transaction set
forth or connected with the subject of the action. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-137 (1953).
In a technical sense this interpretation is perhaps justified, but one may validly
ask whether or not it is in keeping with the spirit of Smith v. French, 141 N.C. 1,
53 S.E. 435 (1906), and with the therein cited policy of the Code that all matters
in controversy should be settled in one action as far as this may be done con-
sistent with right and justice.
"1249 N.C. 340, 106 S.E.2d 717 (1959).
" Commercial Credit Corp. v. Robeson Motors, Inc., 243 N.C. 326, 90 S.E2d 886
(1956) ; Waters v. Garris, 188 N.C. 305, 124 S.E. 334 (1924).
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-2 (Supp. 1957). "N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-57 (1953).
'
5 Defendant, having defaulted on the first payment due after the assignment,
had paid no interest to plaintiff. Thus his defense against plaintiff was to cancel
the unpaid interest. On the other hand, under the statute he had a claim against
the original creditor for twice the pre-assignment interest paid, and he was trying
to assert this claim in plaintiff's action.
"Auto Fin. Co. v. Simmons, 247 N.C. 724, 102 S.E.2d 119 (1958), dealing with
counterclaims exceeding the court's jurisdictional amount, is dealt with in County
Court . . . Effect of Counterclaim under TRIAL PRACTICE.
"' 248 N.C. 239, 102 S.E.2d 865 (1958).
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continued by mutual agreement to handle the property of all the devisees;
that plaintiffs gave him permission to sell one piece of property at a cer-
tain price; that H sold it for $3,000 less than this price to a third party
who reconveyed to H's wife, W; and that $6,000 of the price paid by W
was money H withdrew from the estate funds for this purpose. Plain-
tiffs prayed (1) for an accounting of the whole estate being managed by
H and (2) for either a reconveyance to them of that proportion of
the property in question represented by the part of the purchase price
paid with estate funds or for an accounting of rents, profits and in-
creases in this property since the date of its purchase, together with
the $6,000. The trial court sustained defendant's demurrer for mis-
joinder of a cause of action against H for an accounting with one against
W for a reconveyance. In reversing, the Supreme Court held that the
complaint presented one cause of action, a connected story of a series
of transactions forming one dealing, all tending towards one end, an
accounting by H as trustee or agent for the plaintiffs. This is in line
with the liberal North Carolina rule in this type of case. 48
In Bryant v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.,49 plaintiff had been injured
in a fall from a boxcar of defendant railroad, his employer, onto a piece
of machinery on the siding of a construction company. He sued only
the railroad, but amended to allege causes of action against the railroad
under the Federal Employer's Liability Act and against the construction
company, joined on his motion, for common law negligence. The lower
court dismissed as to the construction company. The Court regarded
its decision in Wilson v. Massagee,8 0 denying the right to combine a
wrongful death action with an FELA action, as binding precedent that
this joinder could not be allowed. Although the attempted joinder in
that case was on motion of the defendant under G.S. § 1-240, the con-
trolling consideration in both cases, and the one on which the Court
relied, was that since the plaintiff did not have a common legal right of
action against both defendants, they were not joint tortfeasors in the
sense that they could be joined as defendants in one suit.51
' sThis rule is a continuation and extension, under the Code's single form of civil
action, of the old equity practice. It is dealt with in Brandis, Permissive Joinder
of Parties and Causes in North Carolina, 25 N.C.L. REy. 1 (1946), and in Brandis
and Graham, Recent DeveloPnents in the Field of Permissive Joinder of Parties
and Causes in North Carolina, 34 N.C.L. Rnv. 405 (1956).
In Pollander v. Hamlin, 248 N.C. 557, 103 S.E2d 725 (1958), plaintiff stock-
holder petitioned to have an election of directors set aside and for appointment of
a receiver, alleging that defendants had wrongfully captured and controlled the
corporation, mismanaged it, dealt with themselves, and denied plaintiffs an audit.
The Court held that a demurrer for misjoinder of parties and causes was properly
overruled, since only one cause of action, wrongful capture and control of the
corporation, was alleged and only one relief, the placing of control in the hands
of a receiver, was prayed.
'o248 N.C. 43, 102 S.E.2d 393 (1958). 50 224 N.C. 705, 32 S.E.2d 335 (1944).
' The brief of defendant railroad, asking the Court to overrule Wilson v.
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THIRD-PARTY PRACTICE
In Etheridge v. Carolina Power and Light Co.,5 2 plaintiff sued de-
fendant power company for the death of her intestate, a construction
worker who was killed while working on an addition to a fertilizer
factory. The fertilizer company had arranged for defendant to string
a new line to provide electricity for the building crew. The deceased was
electrocuted when he came in contact with this line while working on
a tower that was being built. Defendant made the fertilizer company
an additional defendant, alleging its negligence in instructing defendant
to place the line in close proximity to the site of the tower, and relying
on alternative allegations of primary and secondary liability of joint tort-
feasors not in pari delicto5" and of contribution among joint tortfeasors
in pari delicto.54 The lower court granted additional defendant's motion
to strike the allegations against him. The Supreme Court reversed, find-
ing that defendant stated a good cause of action for contribution under
G.S. § 1-240.55
In Hannah v. House,56 defendant had previously procured a judg-
ment for his own injuries sustained in the automobile wreck that was
the subject of the present suit, against the party he attempted to join
for complete indemnity. Defendant asked the Court to overrule Kimsey
v. Reaves57 which held that joinder of additional parties on cross-actions
by defendants should be allowed only on allegations of primary and
secondary liability or claims for contribution. 8 The Court refused and
Massagee, pointed out that the inability to settle such controversies in one suitpaves the way for two or pdrhaps three separate litigations, with the attendant
possibility of inconsistent results, every time the liability of a defendant is statutory.
2249 N.C. 367, 106 S.E.2d 560 (1959). For another aspect of this case see
Fact Pleading v. General Allegations and Conclusions of Law under PLEADING
AND PARTIES.
"' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-222 (1953).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-240 (1953).
" The Court also held that since the original defendant becomes a plaintiff as to
the additional defendant, the additional defendant's motion to strike the allegations
against it is, in effect, a demurrer to the cause of action for contribution so that
direct appeal will lie. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-277 (1953).
*'247 N.C. 573, 101 S.E2d 357 (1958).
"¢242 N.C. 721, 89 S.E.2d 386 (1955).
" The original defendant cannot force plaintiff to sue the additional defendant by
bringing him into the suit on an allegation of sole liability. Thus there is no ground
for judgment in favor of plaintiff against the new party. If he is adjudged solely
liable the original defendant is not liable and has no claim against the additional
defendant. Bringing him in is futile, and the Court refuses to allow it.
Federal Rule 14(a) originally allowed impleader of an additional defendant on
an allegation of sole liability. In experience this privilege proved illusory since
the original defendant's inability to force the plaintiff to sue the new party resulted
in the aforementioned dilemma. In 1946 the rule was amended to require the
original defendant to state a cause of action for partial or total liability of the
new party to him. See 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 14.01 (1948).
By analogy decisions under Federal Rule 13(g) require that a cross-claim by
one defendant alleged a right of contribution or indemnity as between the co-
defendants and refuse to allow a cross-claim alleging sole liability of a co-defendant.
3 MooiR, suPra § 13.34.
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affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the cross-action.
In Clark v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc.,59 defendant claimed complete
indemnity from the additional defendant under an implied contract of
indemnity. The trial court refused to allow joinder of the additional
defendant. In affirming, the Court cited Montgomery v. Blades60 to the
effect that G.S. § 1-222 permits the determination of the question of
primary and secondary liability between joint tortfeasors, but does not
authorize cross-actions among defendants as to matters not connected
with the subject of plaintiff's action. Since plaintiff in the present suit
was not a party to any contract between the original defendant and the
additional defendant, litigation of their differences could not properly
be engrafted onto plaintiff's suit.
In Bell v. Lacey,61 the Court once against found it necessary to
justify its cross-claim rule, which prevents co-defendants from litigating
among themselves any causes of action they may have against one
another growing out of the same set of circumstances as the plaintiff's
cause of action. Plaintiff sued two defendants, A and B, for personal
injuries, alleging that the car of defendant A came out of a driveway
and collided with the car of defendant B, causing B's car to strike
plaintiff's car. A filed a cross-action for contribution against B; and B
replied with a cross-action against A, seeking recovery for his own prop-
erty damage and personal injuries. The Court held that A's demurrer to
B's cross-action was properly sustained. In its opinion, the Court gave
a summary review of the rules governing the usual forms of third-party
actions.
PARTIES
Necessary and Proper Parties
In three cases 62 involving title to land, the Court found that a party
necessary to complete determination of the action was not joined and
sent the cases back for retrial. In Town of Morganton v. Hutton &
Bourbonnais Co.,63 plaintiff town sought a declaratory judgment to de-
termine title to land which it claimed under a condemnation decree
entered against the defendant and another. Defendant defended the case
at trial as if it were sole owner, claiming under a deed to it from the
other owner subsequent to the condemnation. On appeal on other
grounds defendant asserted that although it had had its day in court,
247 N.C. 705, 102 S.E.2d 252 (1958).60217 N.C. 654, 9 S.E.2d 397 (1940).
61248 N.C. 703, 104 S.E.2d 833 (1958).
Britt v. The Baptist Children's Homes, 249 N.C. 409, 106 S.E.2d 474 (1959);
City of Hendersonville v. Salvation Army, 248 N.C. 52, 102 S.E2d 416 (1958);
Town of Morganton v. Hutton & Bourbonnais Co., 247 N.C. 666, 101 S.E.2d 679(1958).
a247 N.C. 666, 101 S.E.2d 679 (1958).
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the former co-owner had now come forward, asserting that the deed from
himself to defendant did not include whatever rights he had in the land
in question.6 4 The Court found that the other party was necessary to
the determination of the issue and remanded for joinder.0 5 In doing so
the Court remarked that the clause in G.S. § 1-260 to the effect that
no declaration shall prejudice the rights of persons not parties should
not be construed to allow the court to proceed to judgment in a declara-
tory judgment proceeding without joinder of parties necessary to a final
determination. 06
The original owner of land moved to set aside a judicial sale for
improper service by publication in the original proceeding in City of
Hendersonville v. Salvation Army.6 7 The present owners, innocent
purchasers from defendant city, were not pleaded into the case or given
notice. On appeal on other grounds the Court on its own motion re-
manded with instructions to join the present owners, since, although the
object of the proceeding was to regain possession of the property they
held, they would not be bound by the decision and could later assert
defenses not available to the defendant city.
In Britt v. The Baptist Children's Homes0 8 plaintiff sued for spe-
cific performance of a contract to sell land, the defendant having refused
to accept the conveyance, alleging that plaintiff had only a defeasible
fee. The Court, again on its own motion, noted that plaintiff's grantor,
who under defendant's interpretation of the deed retained rights in the
land, was not a party. Since he would not be bound by the decision, his
presence was necessary to a final determination of the controversy, and
the Court remanded with instructions to join him as a party.
CONFLICT OF LAWS
FOREIGN DIVORcE DECREE-INCREASE IN SUPPORT ALLOWANCE
In Thomas v. Thomas,' three minor children, domiciled in Vir-
ginia, brought suit against their father by their mother, also domiciled
", The Court refused to consider the brief filed by the third party because
it was not supported by exception or appeal.
" The Court stated that it could raise the question ex inero vzotu, apparently
in answer to appellee's contention that the appellant could not raise the question
not based on an exception or appeal. This applies to declaratory judgment actions
the same rule applied to other civil actions under G.S. § 1-73.
"'The Court cited Edmondson v. Henderson, 246 N.C. 634, 99 S.E.2d 869(1957). This seems to be the usual rule, although there is some authority to the
contrary. C.J.S. Declaratory Judgments §§ 121-22 (1956).0"248 N.C. 52, 102 S.E.2d 416 (1958).
08249 N.C. 409,,106 S.E.2d 474 (1959).
2248 N.C. 269, 103 S.E.2d 371 (1958). This case is discussed under DoMEsTIc
RELATIONS, Modification of Divorce Decrees, infra.
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in Virginia, as next friend. The mother had earlier obtained a valid
Nevada divorce from the father. Defendant was a North Carolina
resident, and personal service was obtained upon him in this state. It
was held that all parties were properly before the North Carolina court,
and that it had authority to increase the payments required of defendant
for the support of the minor children of the marriage even though a
support order had been incorporated into the Nevada decree.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action was upheld by the
Court. The statutory obligation of a man to support his children fol-
lows him wherever he goes; and where jurisdiction is obtained over him,
that obligation may be enforced regardless of where his children may
be domiciled.2 Non-residents have a right to bring suit in our courts
as one of the privileges guaranteed to citizens of the several states by
the Constitution of the United States.3 Likewise, it was held that the
North Carolina court had jurisdiction to increase the amount of monthly
benefits payable even though such a change, in effect, modified the sup-
port provision of the Nevada decree. Normally, the courts of one state
may not modify the decrees of the courts of a sister state because the
matters determined therein are res judicata, and full faith and credit
must be given to the decree as it stands.4 Nevertheless, it is well recog-
nized that a state, upon gaining jurisdiction over the husband in per-
sonam, may enter an order increasing the amount payable under a for-
eign divorce decree when the divorce court itself has the power to do
so.8 A foreign decree is not entitled to any greater effect outside the
state where it is rendered than it would be entitled to within the state.6
Apparently, however, the courts of both the state of the forum and
the state rendering the decree in question must have power to modify
decrees for the support of minors.7 In this case, both the Nevada and
North Carolina9 courts had statutory authority to modify such decrees.
Finally, it must be determined that there has been a sufficient change in
circumstances to warrant a modification of the decree. A decree for
child support is deemed res judicata so long as the facts and circum-
stances of the parties remain the same as when the decree was rendered.10
2 Goodman v. Goodman, 15 N.J. Misc. 716, 194 Atl. 866 (Ch. 1937).
2 U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 2(1). See Howle v. Twin States Express, Inc., 237
N.C. 667, 75 S.E.2d 732 (1953).
'U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1. See Lopez v. Avery, 66 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 1953).
'Lopez v. Avery, stepra note 4; Goodman v. Goodman, 15 N.J. Misc. 716, 194
Atl. 866 (Ch. 1937) ; Setzer v. Setzer, 251 Wis. 234, 29 N.W.2d 62 (1947).
' Lopez v. Avery, 66 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 1953).
17A Am. JUR. Divorce and Separation § 982 (1957).8 NEv. REv. STAT. § 125.140 (1957).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13 (1950).
"0 Minick v. Minick, 111 Fla. 469, 149 So. 483 (1933) ; Goodman v. Goodman,
15 N.J. Misc. 716, 194 Atl. 866 (Ch. 1937); Setzer v. Setzer, 251 Wis. 234, 29
N.W.2d 62 (1947).
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LOCAL DIVORCE DECREE-EFFECT OF FOREIGN COMMUNITY PROPERTY
LAW ON INTERPRETATION OF ALIMONY PROVISIONS
In Kinross-Wright v. Kinross-Wright,1 it was held that a husband,
who had been ordered in an alimony judgment to pay a certain per cent
of his "gross income" to his former wife, must continue to pay that
same per cent of his total earnings even though he later remarries in a
community property state (Texas) where a married person's legal
"gross income" consists of only one-half of the total amount which he
produces.12 The Court interpreted the term "gross income" according
to North Carolina law rather than Texas law. This case has been
fully analyzed in a note in this volume of the Law Review."8
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
CIVIL RIGHTS
Suffrage-Literacy Test
In Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections,1 plaintiff ap-
pealed from a denial of permission to register as a voter following her
refusal to read portions of the Constitution of North Carolina as re-
quired by G.S. § 163-28. She contended that the literacy test as pre-
scribed by that section and article VI, section 4 of the North Carolina
Constitution was invalid for two reasons: (1) in that article VI pro-
vides for the exception of certain electors from the test under the un-
constitutional "grandfather clause, ' 2 and (2) in that the test itself is con-
trary to the guaranties against discrimination and disenfranchisement of
the fourteenth, fifteenth, and seventeenth amendments of the United
States Constitution.
The Court summarily dismissed the latter objection as already having
been settled in Allison v. Sharps which expressly upheld the literacy test
as constitutional.
11248 N.C. 1, 102 S.E.2d 469 (1958).
"- This result obtains since, in a community property state, only one-half of
the earnings of a spouse becomes his sole property.
"1 See Note, 37 N.C.L. REv. 329 (1959).
1248 N.C. 102, 102 S.E.2d 853 (1958), prob. juris. noted, 358 U.S. 916 (1958),
aff'd, 27 U.S.L. Week 4405 (U.S. June 8, 1959).
'The pertinent provision provides: "But no male person who was, on January
1, 1867, or at any time prior thereto, entitled to vote under the laws of any state
in the United States wherein he then resided, and no lineal descendant of any such
person, shall be denied the right to register and vote at any election in this State
by reason of his failure to possess the educational qualifications herein prescribed:
Provided, he shall have registered in accordance with the terms of this section prior
to December 1, 1908." N.C. CoNsT. art. VI, § 4.
Substantially the same clause was held to be invalid in Guinn v. United States,
238 U.S. 347 (1915).
8 209 N.C. 477, 184 S.E. 27 (1936).
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Plaintiff's first argument, centered about the "grandfather clause"
and the indivisibility clause of article VI, was less easy of solution.
Plaintiff contended that since the suffrage article was adopted "as one
indivisible plan for the regulation of suffrage," the parts of which were
to "stand or fall together," 4 the presence of the unconstitutional "grand-
father clause" vitiated the article and the statute based on it in their
entirety.5
The Court was of the opinion, however, that the indivisibility clause
was no longer of any effect inasmuch as article VI had been amended in
1945, with the result that those provisions relative to the qualifications
of voters were incorporated by reference, but the indivisibility clause
was not.6 Thus, the legislature was free to amend G.S. § 163-28 so as to
provide for a literacy test without a "grandfather clause."
In addition, said the Court, under the firmly established doctrine
that "a State Constitution is in no matter a grant of power," such a
legislative act is entirely correct as a manifestation of the will of the
people where the constitution contains no express prohibition against it.
On plaintiff's appeal to the United States Supreme Court, this de-
cision was affirmed. 7
'N.C. CoNsT. art. VI, § 5.
" In Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915), the Court recognized obiter
dictum that "the literacy test considered alone . . . was but the exercise by the
State of a lawful power vested in it.. . and indeed, its validity is admitted." Id.
at 366. However, in the case before them, the Court determined that the two
clauses were to stand or fall together. The Court reasoned that since it was
expressly provided "that the persons embraced in the [grandfather clause] . . .
should not be under any conditions subjected to the literacy test," this legislative
command "would be virtually set at naught if on the obliteration of the one
standard by the force of the Fifteenth Amendment the other standard should
be held to continue in force." Id. at 367. Thus, the literacy test fell with
the grandfather clause.
But it does not follow that because the indivisibility clause is gone, that
the various remaining provisions are automatically separable. If the grandfather
clause is in fact inextricably a part of the literacy test, the mere removal of a
formal assertion of indivisibility will not save the latter. However, the fact
that the grandfather clause, by virtue of its self-effacing proviso, see note 2 Mtpra,
is no longer of any practical consequence, would seem to indicate rather clearly
that the two clauses are no longer interdependent.
"Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 27 U.S.L. WEEK 4405
(U.S. June 8, 1959). Action for declaratory judgment had initially been
brought by plaintiff in the federal court. The action was stayed pending the
exhaustion of administrative remedies in the state court, and jurisdiction was re-
tained. Lassiter v. Taylor, 152 F. Supp. 295 (E.D.N.C. 1957). The Supreme
Court, noting that no actual discrimination concerning the application of the
literacy test had been alleged in the state court action, pointed out that the
present affirmance of the state court decision would not affect plaintiff's rights
to raise this question in the federal court action. Actual discrimination may yet
be raised. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
It should be noted that literacy clauses have been upheld except in those
cases where they have been so ambiguously drawn as to be patently open to abuse.
See Davis v. Schnell, 81 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ala. 1949), aff'd per curiam, 336
U.S. 933 (1949), holding that although it is the states' right to "prescribe the
qualifications for the exercise of the franchise" including the literacy tests for
1959]
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Trespass
In State v. Cooke,8 the defendants, seeking to enforce their right to
play golf on a municipal golf course, proceeded to play after being denied
access, and were arrested and convicted of criminal trespass. The Court
upheld the verdict of guilty, notwithstanding that a Federal Court in
a prior civil action had adjudged the defendants entitled as of right to
play the course.0 The Court stated that it was not obliged to take
judicial notice of the prior civil case, since the judgment roll of that ac-
tion had not been made a part of the record in the trespass action.10
EMINENT DOMAIN
Interest As Additional Just Compensation
In DeBruhl v. State Highway and Public Works Comm'n," peti-
tioners' property had been condemned by respondent, the petitioners
being physically ejected in 1952. Through no fault of respondent, com-
pensation was not awarded until 1957. The Court held that petitioners
were entitled not only to the fair market value of the property at the date
of the taking, but also to interest at the legal rate of six per cent as an
additional sum awarded for the respondent's delay in making payment,
the interest being deemed an element of the just compensation guaran-
teed petitioners by both the North Carolina and the federal constitu-
tions.12 The same result had been reached earlier in Miller v. City of
Asheville.18
electors, still a state could not prescribe a test requiring an applicant to "under-
stand and explain" the Constitution, such words being "so ambiguous, uncertain,
and indefinite in meaning that they confer upon [the registrars] ... arbitrary
power to register or to refuse to register whomever they please." Id. at 876,
877. The North Carolina test reads simply that each voter must be able to read
and write the Constitution of North Carolina in English and that "it shall be the
duty of each registrar to administer the provisions of this section." N.C. G8N.
STAT. § 163-28 (Supp. 1957).
8248 N.C. 485, 103 S.E.2d 846 (1958), further consideration postponed until
hearing on the merits, 358 U.S. 925 (1959). This case is discussed under
CRIMINAL LAW, Former Jeopardy, infra.
Simkins v. City of Greensboro, 149 F. Supp. 562 (M.D.N.C. 1957). "A de-
cree will be entered declaring that these plaintiffs have been denied on account
of their color equal privileges to use the golf course owned by . . . the City of
Greensboro . .. and permanently restraining the defendants from discriminating
against plaintiffs and other members of their race . . . ." Id. at 565.
" "Because the judgment in the case of Simkins v. Greensboro was not
in evidence, the court had no knowledge in a legal sense of any facts there de-
termined, and could make no pronouncement of law with respect to facts which
were not in evidence. Judge Hayes' published opinion was available. That
opinion is a declaration of the law on the facts which Judge Hayes found." 248
N.C. at 494, 103 S.E.2d at 853.
11247 N.C. 671, 102 S.E.2d 229 (1958). This case is also treated under DAM-
AGEs, Eminent Domain, infra.
12 N.C. CoNsr. art. I, § 17; U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV.
" 112 N.C. 759, 16 S.E. 762 (1893). The Court in DeBruhl pointed out that
that part of the Miller case dealing with this question was omitted from the
state reprint in 1922 of the original volume of the North Carolina reports, and
that consequently one must refer to the fifth headnote of the Miller case.
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Change in Grade of Street Not Made Under City Immunity
In Thompson v. Seaboard Airline R.R.,' 4 defendant wished to re-
locate one of its tracks. This necessitated a fill on its right-of-way,
raising it over three feet above the existing street level. In compliance
with its permit, it also filled and repaired the street approaches to the
right-of-way. Plaintiff alleged that the additional fill in the approaches
materially impaired the access from its property to the street, with a
resultant loss in value to the property. The jury so found, and judgment
for $30,000 was awarded the plaintiff.
The defendant contended that although it paid for the filling of
the approaches, it did so for the city, which would not be liable ;15 hence,
it should not be liable itself.
.The Court, in affirming the judgment for plaintiff, stated that regard-
less of defendant's supposed gratuity in filling the approaches, it did not
alter the fact that it had the ultimate duty to restore the street to a use-
ful condition after undertaking to alter a portion of it for its own bene-
fit.' If, in fulfilling this obligation, any diminution in value to abutting
property is caused, it is uniformly held that the damaged party is en-
titled to just compensation.' 7
FEDERAL AND INTERSTATE QUESTIONS
Service of Process
Beatty v. International Ass'n of Asbestos Workers'8 and Shepard v.
Rheem Mfg. Co.'9 were concerned with the validity of service of process
on a non-resident unincorporated association and a non-resident corpo-
ration, respectively. In the Beatty case, the contention that G.S. §
1-97(6)20 was unconstitutional was considered abandoned on appeal,
and the Court deemed the finding of the trial court - that the de-
fendant union was performing acts for which it was formed within the
state - well supported by the evidence and sufficient therefore to sustain
service of process.2 1
14248 N.C. 577, 104 S.E.2d 181 (1958). The case is discussed further in
CIVIL PROCEDURE (PLEADING AND PARTIES), Ainendinen, supra.15 When a city acts for the public convenience (under the authority granted
it by the legislature) in changing the grade of a street, any diminution of access
to abutting property is damnun absque injuria. Jenkins v. City of Henderson, 214
N.C. 244, 4 S.E2d 902 (1938).1 0N.C. GEN. STAT. § 60-37(6) (1950).
17 Powell v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 178 N.C. 243, 100 S.E. 424 (1919).
18 248 N.C. 170, 102 S.E.2d 763 (1958). This case is commented on in LABOR
LAW, Unincorporated Labor Unions, infra, and in TRIAL PRACTICE, Process, infra.
10249 N.C. 454, 106 S.E.2d 704 (1959). The case is discussed in TRIL& PRAC-
TicE, Process, infra.
20 This section provides for service upon the Secretary of State on unincorpo-
rated associations failing to appoint an agent for service of process and who are
doing business in this state by performing acts for which they were formed.
"Extensive reliance was placed on the control of the international union over
the local unions as manifested by its charter provisions. Membership, finances,
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The decision in the Shepard case likewise hinged on whether the
defendant foreign corporation had such contacts and dealings within the
state so as to be amenable to process. The trial court found that de-
fendant pursued a "regular, systematic and continuous" course of deal-
ing through independent wholesalers throughout the state amounting to
a dollar volume of over one million, six hundred thousand dollars a
year. This was held on appeal to be sufficiently within the requirements
of G. S. § 55-145 (a) (3)22 so as to give the North Carolina forum juris-
diction over the defendant.
G.S. § 55-145(3) (a) has been subjected to interpretation several
times within the past few years, and on two occasions has been held
unconstitutional. 23  The reason for this result is that the statute is so
broadly written that it has been construed to purport that in personam
jurisdiction may be asserted over foreign corporations having less than
the "minimum contacts" within the state thought necessary: "such that
the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.' "24
In the Shepard case, the "contacts" were found to be substantial.
The Court treated this finding as curing the defect in the statute, and
thus held it constitutional as applied to the particular facts of this case.
State Tax on Income Derived from Interstate Business
In Eastern Tennessee & WNC Transp. Co. v. Cserrie,25 the Court
correctly presaged a subsequent United States Supreme Court holding 20
on the vital matter of state tax on the corporate net income of an inter-
state business which is attributable to its earnings in the taxing state.
Albeit that both courts found ample authority to hold that a nondiscrim-
inatory tax properly apportioned to activity done within the state is not
a burden on interstate commerce, two vigorous dissenting opinions in
forms of bargaining agreements, etc., were completely under the control of the
international.
' This section provides for service on a foreign corporation not transacting
business within the state on a cause of action arising out of, inter alia, "the pro-
duction, manufacture, or distribution of goods by such corporation with the
reasonable expectation that those goods are to be used or consumed in this
State . .. !"
"'Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir.
1956), and Putnam v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 245 N.C. 576, 96 S.E.2d 445
(1957). The statute was upheld as constitutional in Painter v. Home Fin. Co., 245
N.C. 576, 96 S.E.2d 731 (1957). For a valuable discussion of these cases and the
topic involved herein, see Note, Service of Process-Jurisdiction Over Foreign
Corporations, 35 N.C.L. REv. 546 (1957).
"This is the broad test laid down in International Shoe Co. v. State of Wash-
ington, 326 U.S. 310, at 316 (1945).2r248 N.C. 560, 104 S.E.2d 403 (1958), aff'd, 359 U.S. 28 (1959). This case
is also discussed in TAXATION, Net Income Tax on Corporations Engaged Ex-
clusively in Interstate Commerce, infra.
" Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
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the United States Supreme Court case concluded otherwise.27 Their
protest was that the majority went beyond precedent - which they (the
dissenters) construed to authorize taxation only of locally derived
revenues - and held for the first time that revenue derived solely from
interstate commerce may be taxed.
Just how valid this distinction may be and what the ultimate con-
sequences of these decisions will be, cannot properly be discussed here.
It is manifest, however, that the presently allowable taxation on inter-
state business has already created serious problems. Diverse apportion-
ment systems, added legal and bookkeeping expenses, and just plain
"red tape" - all have greatly increased the price of doing business across
state lines. If the present decision enlarges the problem, as the minority
contends, it only points more strongly to the need for comprehensive
uniform legislation.28 That each state has the right to make industry
"pay its way" should not obscure the fact that where such right is en-
forced in fifty different ways by as many states, practical - if not
theoretical - burdens are being heaped upon the nation's economy.
DuE PROCESS
Right to Jury Trial in Disbarment Cases
The procedure in a disbarment proceeding, as provided for by G.S.
§ 84-28(3), "shall conform as near as may be to the procedure now
provided by law for hearings before referees in compulsory references."
In order to preserve his right to a jury trial in a compulsory reference
proceeding, a party must preserve his exceptions to the referee's deter-
mination by tendering issues and demanding a jury trial.
In the case of In re Gilliland,29 the respondent in a disbarment action,
after an adverse decision by a trial committee of the Bar Council and
affirmance by the Council itself, moved for a trial of his case in a superior
court. When the cause came on for trial, respondent then moved for a
jury trial. The complainant (Bar Council) objected to the motion on
the ground that respondent had failed to tender issues and demand a
jury trial as provided by G.S. § 84-28(3). The trial court sustained
the objection and proceeded to try the case without a jury. Judgment
disbarring the respondent was entered.
On appeal, the Court reversed. Noting that the statute, in addition
to directing that the hearing be conducted according to the procedure
used in a compulsory reference, also provided that on appeal to the
superior court "the accused attorney shall have a right to a trial by a
jury of the issues of fact arising on the pleadings" limited by "the writ-
Id. at 470, 477.
See Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion, id. at 474.
2 248 N.C. 517, 103 S.E.2d 807 (1958). This case is discussed under ADMIN-
Is AAnE LAW, Administrative Procedure, supra.
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ten evidence taken before the trial committee or council," the Court con-
cluded that the compulsory reference provision related solely to the for-
mulation of rules of procedure incident to hearings before the Bar Council
or its trial committee, and in no way precluded respondent from demand-
ing a jury trial in the Superior Court.
The appeal of the accused attorney, then, is essentially a trial de
novo, but limited to the written evidence taken before the Bar Council.
In two other cases concerning the right to trial by jury, the Court
decided: (1) that since it is a denial of due process to exclude system-
atically members of defendant's race from the grand jury returning an
indictment against him, it was error to deprive the defendant of a reason-
able opportunity to procure evidence in support of alleged discrimina-
tion,3 0 and (2) that a defendant in a criminal case being tried before
a recorder's court could not request a jury of twelve in face of a
statute3 ' providing that such trials will be before a jury as is provided
in actions before a justice of the peace, namely a jury of six.3 2
Right to Communicate with Counsel and Friends
The inquiry in a Post Conviction Hearing Act03 proceeding is limited
to a determination of whether petitioner was denied a constitutional
right, such as the right to be represented by counsel, the right to have
witnesses, or the right to a fair opportunity to prepare and present his
defense. In State v. Wheeler,"4 the facts tended to show that the three
petitioners had been arrested and placed in separate jails, had not been
allowed to communicate with one another, and had been frustrated in
their attempts to contact relatives and a material witness. They were
jointly tried without the benefit of counsel and without having been
able to prepare for 'their defense, were convicted, and then sentenced
to long prison terms.
The reviewing court found that petitioners had not been denied the
right to communicate with each other and concluded that, inasmuch as
petitioners were mature persons and were not strangers to the courts,
they had not been deprived of any constitutional rights.
On appeal, the Court ordered a new trial, holding that the evidence
did not support the conclusions of the court below. First, G.S. § 15-47
expressly provides that the arrested person is to be allowed to com-
municate with counsel and friends "immediately." The state was unable
to refute petitioners' claim that this right was withheld. Second, the
three petitioners were entitled to confer together as to their joint de-
" State v. Perry, 248 N.C. 334, 103 S.E.2d 404 (1958).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7-204 (1953). See also N.C. GEN. STATr. § 7-150 (1953).
"* Roebuck v. City of New Bern, 249 N.C. 41, 105 S.E.2d 194 (1958).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15-217 to -222 (Supp. 1957).
31249 N.C. 187, 105 S.E.2d 615 (1958). See treatment under CRIMINAL LAW,
Right to Counsel and Communication, infra.
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fense to the joint charge. The record showed, however, that the pe-
titioners were neither informed as to the charge nor allowed to confer
together until brought in for trial. Third, no waiver of rights would
be presumed for failing to complain, where petitioners, without counsel,
relative, or friend, "were led into court [and] . . . confronted by the
State's prosecutor, ready for trial with his investigators and witnesses."
Under the circumstances, it was not surprising that petitioners were
overwhelmed and failed to complain to the court at their arraignment.
Search and Seizure
An illegal "fishing expedition" was cut short by the Court in State
ex rel. Hooks v. Flowers.3 5  Prior to the principal action, defendant's
building had been padlocked as a nuisance, having been used for the
illegal sale of whiskey.8 6 A safe in the building had been opened at that
time and searched for intoxicating liquor; none was found. In the
action leading to the present appeal, the state obtained an order com-
pelling the defendant to re-open the safe so that its contents could be
inventoried and a list of its contents given to others, not parties to the
action (representatives of the United States Treasury Department,
among others). There was nothing in the record to show that de-
fendants had notice of the proposed order; nor was it shown what the
safe contained, or that anything contained therein was material to the
case.
The Court set aside the order, pointing out that it was well settled
that an affidavit supporting such an order must show two things: (1) a
sufficient designation of the writings expected to be inventoried, and
(2) the materiality of the writings to the immediate issue in contro-
versy.3 7 Since the safe bad already been searched concerning the issue
in controversy - illegal whiskey - and there was no showing as to
what writings were to be inventoried, the order could not stand.
REGULATION OF BUSINESS
The Court has recently held, with respect to the regulation of busi-
ness, that: (1) a statute applicable to one county alone, which attempts
to regulate professional racing rather than racing in general, is void as
a local act regulating labor or trade ;88 (2) a statute regulating the prac-
tice of pharmacy is constitutional as within the state's power to protect
--247 N.C. 558, 101 S.E.2d 320 (1958). This case is also discussed under
EQUITY, Injunctions, infra.
" "Whoever shall ... maintain ... any... place used for the purpose of ...
illegal sale of whisky ... is guilty of nuisance, and the building [where the illegal
sale is conducted] . . . shall be enjoined and abated . . ." N.C. GEx. STAT. § 19-1
(1953).
", Thomas v. Trustees of Catawba College, 242 N.C. 504, 87 S.E.2d 913 (1955).
" Orange Speedway, Inc. v. Clayton, 247 N.C. 528, 101 S.E2d 406 (1958), 36
N.C.L. RFv. 537.
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public health, and a provision therein, providing that violators may be
enjoined as well as criminally prosecuted, is legal since penal sanctions
may be insufficient to insure continued enforcement thereof;39 (3) an
ordinance requiring a railroad to construct and repair overpasses is un-
constitutional as an unreasonable exercise of the police power where
it is invoked to compel reconstruction of an overpass to accommodate
a widening of street below, public safety not being involved;40 (4) an
ordinance authorizing a municipality to engage in the selling and placing
of markers in the municipal cemetery is unconstiutional insofar as it
places a private competitor at a disadvantage by placing a special addi-
tional charge on any of his markers used in the municipal cemetery ;41
(5) an act exempting from taxation those persons who purchase in-
surance policies from Farmers Mutual Fire Insurance Associations, but
which imposes a tax on purchasers of the same type of policy from other
companies, is discriminatory and unconstitutional.42
CONTRACTS
ACCORD AND SATISFACTION
Executory Accord as a Bar to an Action on Original Claim
At common law, an executory accord was no defense to an action
brought on the original claim, even though satisfaction was prevented by
the creditor's refusal to accept tender of performance by the debtor.' The
modern view, however, is that the debtor may obtain relief in the alterna-
tive either through a counterclaim for damages occasioned by the breach,
or by asking specific performance of the accord.2 If the latter relief is
given, the original claim is extinguished.3
Bizzell v. Bizzell 4 presented an excellent example of this modern
trend concerning executory accords. The facts disclosed that plaintiff
and several others held undivided interests in rental properties which
" North Carolina Bd. of Pharmacy v. Lane, 248 N.C. 134, 102 S.E.2d 832(1958). See treatment of this case under ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, Licenses, supra;
Eouiry, In unctions, infra.
'o City of Winston-Salem v. Southern R.L, 248 N.C. 637, 105 S.E.2d 37 (1958),
37 N.C.L. REv. 187 (1959).
"' State v. McGraw, 249 N.C. 205, 105 S.E.2d 659 (1958). This is treated also
under MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, Miscellaneous, infra.
"'American Equitable Assur. Co. v. Gold, 249 N.C. 461, 106 S.E.2d 875(1959). This case is fully discussed in TAxATION, Insurance Policy Prenims
Tax, infra.
' State Bank v. Littlejohn, 18 N.C. 563 (1836). 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
§ 1843 (rev. ed. 1938).
'6 WILLI so N, CONTRAcrs § 1845 (rev. ed. 1938); RESTATEMENT, CONTRAcrS
§ 417(d) (1933).
'Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Imsland, 91 F.2d 365 (8th Cir. 1937).
'247 N.C. 590, 101 S.E.2d 668 (1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 938 (1959).
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defendant had been managing for several years. Plaintiff became dis-
satisfied with the management of the properties and demanded a larger
share of the income. As a result of the dispute which followed, the
interested parties executed agreements which were to be a complete
settlement of all their controversies. By contract, defendant, inter alia,
was to acquire title to certain business property and after making im-
provements thereon was to convey the property to plaintiff and another
as tenants in common; in turn, defendant was to be given a deed to cer-
tain other business property. Shortly after execution of the agreements,
plaintiff repudiated and refused tender by defendant. This action was
instituted for an accounting of rents and profits wherein defendant inter-
posed the contract of "accord and satisfaction" as a bar.
At the trial of the case, it appeared that the deed tendered by de-
fendant was defective in a material particular. However, the court over-
came this difficulty by making an interlocutory ruling to the effect that
the agreement would constitute a good plea in bar if defendant could
perform in full. Accordingly, -the cause was retained for further hearing
at a subsequent term. At the final hearing, defendant proved a tender
of performance in full; the court, pursant to defendant's election, decreed
specific performance of the accord. On appeal, the judgment was
affirmed.
While the procedure followed and the result reached are certainly
sound, it does not seem overly critical to point out that it is misleading
to say, as the Court does, that "if defendant could not prove that he had
fully performed the agreement, his plea in bar ... would constitute no
defense. . . ." (Emphasis added.) 5  Defendant here could not prove
performance since plaintiff had prevented it. Tender, except in limited
situations, is not performance.6 The above language obscures the
rationale of this type of case which is that because the creditor breaks
the agreement for the accord, the breach prevents performance and
leaves the original obligation still undischarged, so the debtor is said
to acquire rights in the alternative against the defaulting creditor either
at law for damages or in equity for specific performance.7  Tender by
the debtor and a refusal to accept or perform by the creditor are
sufficient grounds to invoke the aid of the court.8
Evidence of Accord Irrelevant
The principle of accord and satisfaction was used by the trial court
in instructing the jury in Koonce v. Atlantic States Motor Lines,9
r 247 N.C. at 602, 101 S.E.2d at 676.
'WmLsTox, CoNTRAcrs §§ 1817, 1843 (rev. ed. 1938).
7 Dobias v. White, 239 N.C. 409, 80 S.E.2d 23 (1953).8 Ibid.
0249 N.C. 390, 106 S.E.2d 576 (1959).
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although defendant had not set up such plea in bar. In response to the
plaintiff's allegation that the back salary sued for had been allowed to
accrue on defendant's books by oral agreement, the defendant denied
the agreement and alleged payment in full. At the trial, defendant pro-
duced checks made out to and cashed by the plantiff, each of which re-
cited that it was given "in full settlement of all amounts of every nature
due the payee named herein to the date specified." The court's instruc-
tion was to the effect that the payee is not concluded from showing that
in fact the check was not in full, "unless under the principle of accord
and satisfaction there had been acceptance of the check in settlement of
a disputed account." Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed on appeal.
By the better view, an accord and satisfaction may be entered into
with reference to a liquidated or undisputed claim, and not necessarily
a disputed claim. 10 The issue that the trial court adverts to in its
charge, is not whether the amount paid in each check represents a com-
promise on a disputed or undisputed claim, but whether, as a matter of
the intent of the parties, as to sums nat included in the check, the "in
full settlement" provision is actually intended to apply. An instruction
to this effect, without reference to accord and satisfaction, would have
been sufficient.
BROKERS' CONTRACTS
Construction
In Bonn v. Summers," the contract provided for an exclusive agency
to sell vendor's farm, to last for ninety days and thereafter until ten
days' written notice of revocation was delivered to the broker. It fur-
ther provided that if "within three days after this listing expires" the
broker furnished a list of prospects shown the land, plaintiff would be
entitled to his commission should any. of the prospects purchase the
property "within ninety days after expiration of this listing." After
the ninety-day period had elapsed, but before any written revocation
by the defendants had been given, plaintiff supplied a purchaser. De-
fendants refused to sell. This action was instituted to recover the
broker's commission allegedly due under the contract.
In reversing the trial court's judgment as of nonsuit, the Court re-
futed the defendants' contention that the agreement was ambiguous and
therefore unenforceable since it apparently provided for automatic ex-
piration on the one hand, yet called for affirmative revocation on the
other. It was held that, in any event, the contract required affirmative
action on the part of the defendants to effect its cancellation.
'0 In re Dillon's Estate, 269 Pa. 234, 111 AtI. 234 (1920) ; 11 Am. Jun. Accord
and Satisfaction § 2 (1937).11249 N.C. 357, 106 S.E.2d 470 (1959).
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The decision, of course, is sound. What is remarkable is the fre-
quency of litigation arising out of the real or imagined ambiguity of this
type of contract.12 It is submitted that if the term "revoke" were sub-
stituted for the term "expire," this would bring home more clearly to
the prospective vendor his obligation to take affirmative action in order
to effect a cancellation.
MORTGAGES
Termination of Mortgage Debt on Death of Mortgagee
In Walston v. Twiford,13 a provision in a deed of trust that any
amount remaining due on the note secured by the deed of trust would
be considered paid on the death of the payee-grantee was held to be an
enforceable contractual obligation entered into by the parties when the
loan was made, entitling plaintiffs to enjoin foreclosure by the payee's
personal representative.
The weight of authority is in favor of enforcing such agreements. 14
Emphasis is usually placed on the fact that the creation of the debt, the
giving of the security, if any, and the promise that all liability be ter-
minated by the death of the payee are all part of the same bargain, sup-
ported by the same consideration.' 5
CREDIT TRANSACTIONS
MATERIALmEN's LIENs
In Ranlo Supply Co. v. Clark,' a contract was made to build a house.
Plaintiff, who was not a party to the contract, furnished materials to the
contractor for the house. It was held that plaintiff was not entitled to a
materialmen's lien under G.S. § 44-1 because plaintiff had no contract
with the defendant owners, express or implied.2 The fact that the lender
of the money for the financing of the construction issued a voucher pay-
1 See C.J.S. Brokers § 16(b) (1938).
1-248 N.C. 691, 105 S.E.2d 62 (1958). This case is also discussed under
CREDITs, Deeds of Trust and Mortgages, infra.
", Miller v. Allen, 339 Ill. App. 471, 90 N.E.2d 251 (1950) ; Annot., 127 A.L.R.
634 (1940). Contra, Juneau v. Dethgens, 200 Wis. 360, 228 N.W. 496 (1930)
(invalid testamentary disposition). The distinction should be made that a con-
tractual obligation is a present, enforceable and binding right over which promisor
has no control without promisee's consent, whereas the testamentary disposition
operates prospectively and is subject to change at the testator's whim until his
death. In re Lewis' Estate, 2 Wash. 2d 458, 98 P.2d 654 (1940).
" Bergman v. Ornbarn, 33 Cal. App. 2d 680, 92 P.2d 654 (Dist. Ct. App. 1939).
1247 N.C. 762, 102 S.E2d 257 (1958).
2 The relationship of debtor and creditor which will support a materialmen's
lien may be created by either express or implied contract with the owner.
Boykin v. Logan, 203 N.C. 196, 165 S.E. 680 (1932); Honeycutt v. Kenilworth
Dev. Co., 199 N.C. 373, 154 S.E. 628 (1930). Absent such a contract, it is well
settled that no lien attaches under this section. Wilkie v. Bray, 71 N.C. 205 (1874).
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able jointly to the plaintiff, one of the defendants, and the contractor,
which was endorsed by that defendant and the contractor and delivered
to the plaintiff, was not sufficient to establish a contract between plain-
tiff and defendants. The law of North Carolina on this general ques-
tion is well settled3 and is in accord with the weight of authority.4
Since plaintiff relied upon G.S. § 44-1, it was held estopped to assert
a lien as a subcontractor under G.S. § 44-6.1 Moreover, the Court in-
dicated that even if plaintiff had relied upon the latter statute it could not
have recovered, since it made no demand on defendant for payment until
after the original contract price had been paid to the contractor. This
is clearly covered by the statute which recognizes the injustice of re-
quiring the owner to pay the subcontractor after already having paid
the contractor in full.6
CONDITIONAL SALES
In Auto Fin. Co. v. Simmons,7 plaintiff, assignee of a conditional
sale contract, sued the conditional vendee upon default for the balance
due. Defendant made three allegations in his defense and counterclaim.
In the first he charged that the transaction was actually a cash sale
with a trade-in. Defendant, pointing out that he was illiterate, alleged
that if he signed a conditional sale contract, it was by the trick or fraud
of the dealer in representing to him that he was signing title papers.
On demurrer ore tenus it was held that defendant had stated a good
cause of action for rescission based on fraud,8 and since it was fraud
in factum, the plea was equally good against the dealer and the assignee
of the conditional sale contract, the latter being an innocent party.9
Secondly, defendant demanded forfeiture of all interest, alleging
a conspiracy between plaintiff and the automobile dealer to collect usuri-
ous interest from him. The Court held that even without an allegation
of conspiracy a good cause of action had been stated against both parties,
because a note tainted with usury retains that taint in the hands of a
subsequent holder. 0  However, the holding seems to conflict with the
Mere knowledge that work is being done or material furnished on one's prop-
erty does not enable the person furnishing the labor or material to obtain a lien."
Brown v. Ward, 221 N.C. 344, 346, 20 S.E.2d 324, 326 (1942). See also Norfolk
Bldg. Supplies Co. v. Elizabeth City Hosp. Co., 176 N.C. 87, 97 S.E. 146 (1918);
Clark v. Edwards, 119 N.C. 115, 25 S.E. 794 (1896).
' See Stout v. McLachlin, 38 Kan. 120, 15 Pac. 902 (1887).
Cf. Economy Pumps, Inc. v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 220 N.C. 499, 17 S.E.2d
639 (1941) ; Doggett Lumber Co. v. Perry, 212 N.C. 713, 194 S.E. 475 (1937).
' See Clark v. Edwards, 119 N.C. 115, 25 S.E. 794 (1896).
7247 N.C. 724, 102 S.E.2d 119 (1958). See treatment under TRIAL AND Ap-
PELLATE PAcTicz, County Court-Effect of Counterclaim, and CIVIL PRoCEDURE
(PLEADING AND PARTIES), Allegations of Fact and Conclusions of Law, both
infra.8 Cf. Edney v. Motor Sales & Serv., Inc., 210 N.C. 569, 187 S.E. 758 (1936).
'M. & J. Fin. Corp. v. Rinehardt, 216 N.C. 380, 5 S.E.2d 138 (1939).
"
0Faison v. Grandy, 126 N.C. 827, 36 S.E. 276 (1900) ; Ward v. Sugg, 113 N.C.
489, 18 S.E. 717 (1893).
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settled rule in North Carolina and a majority of other states that charges
in a sale contract, as distinguished from a loan or forbearance of money,
do not constitute usury; thus, reservation of what would otherwise be
an illegal rate of interest in a conditional sale transaction generally is
not considered to be a usurious act."
Thirdly, defendant claimed that as a result of the conspiracy for
usury he had been embarrassed, harrassed, and mentally disturbed to his
damage. He also sought punitive damages for malice. The Court here
held that no cause of action had been stated since one cannot superadd
to usury counts claims for damages in excess of statutory penalties.
This seems to accord with the weight of authority.12
In Presley E. Brown Lumber Co. v. Textile Banking Co.,'8 by con-
tract it was provided, inter alia, that the creditor was to retain title to
raw materials which he furnished to a manufacturer, with authority to
sell the finished items partially composed of the raw materials in ques-
tion. It was further provided that the creditor Should own his pro-
portionate share of the accounts receivable or cash realized from the
sales. Held, despite the language of the agreement, the contract was
in reality a conditional sale with permission to resell, and the creditor
received only a contractual right to an assignment of the proceeds.
The result was that upon the manufacturer's assignment of the ac-
counts receivable to a factor, the factor's lien prevailed over the credi-
tor's equitable assignment of the accounts receivable despite the fact that
the creditor's contract with the manufacturer had been registered.
A discussion of this decision, accompanied by an analysis of the
problems existing in this field of credit transactions, appears in this
issue of the Law Review.14
LANDLORDS' CROP LIENS ON PROCEEDS OF INSURANCE
In Peoples v. United States Fire Ins. Co.,15 a landlord sued under
G.S. § 42-15 to enforce on the proceeds of hail insurance a landlord's
statutory crop lien for advancements made in order to grow tobacco on
the landlord's land. The tenant, individually, had taken out hailstorm
insurance on his crop and had paid the premiums. The landlord had
nothing to do with the taking out of the insurance, and in fact had
1 Hogg v. Ruffner, 66 U.S. 115 (1861) ; Gilbert v. Hudgens, 92 Colo. 571, 22
P2d 858 (1933) ; Van Asperen v. Darling Olds, Inc., 93 N.W.2d 690 (Minn. 1958);
Berger, Usury in Instalment Sales, 2 LAw & CoNrzzp. PROB. 148 (1935).
" "[The constitution] ... creates a new right, not known at common law, and
declares the remedy, and under these provisions, the debtor can resort to no other
form of redress or mode of procedure, those ganted by the Constitution being ex-
clusive." Anderson v. Tatro, 44 Okla. 219, 223, 114 Pac. 360, 362 (1914). See
Lindberg v. Burton, 41 N.D. 587, 171 N.W. 616 (1918).248 N.C. 308, 103 S.E.2d 334 (1958).
1, See Note, 37 N.C.L. Rav. 489 (1959).
15248 N.C. 303, 103 S.E.2d 381 (1958).
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opposed having the crop insured. Nevertheless he claimed the proceeds
of the policy to the extent of advancements made. It was held that
the tenant was entitled in full to the proceeds.16
This situation may be compared to that where, absent any covenant
in the mortgage with regard to insurance, a mortgagor insures the mort-
gaged premises for his own benefit. The mortgagor will be entitled
to the full proceeds of the insurance policy upon loss.11 Of course, this
does not extinguish the mortgage debt.
DEEDS OF TRUST AND MORTGAGES
Stipulation for Satisfaction on Death of the Secured CreditorIn Walston v. Twviford,18 plaintiff and his wife borrowed a sum of
money from her mother. This debt was evidenced by a note and secured
by a deed of trust which, in addition to being in the usual form, contained
the provision: "It is specially agreed... that any balance of either the
principal or interest due on the amount herein secured at the time of the
death of said [mother] . . . is herewith positively to be treated . . . a
gift to said grantors ... and the note secured by this deed of trust together
with deed of trust shall be marked paid and satisfied by the personal
representative of the payee."' 9 Only one interest payment was made
during the five year period before the mother died. The plaintiff, claim-
ing that the debt had been discharged, sought perpetually to enjoin a
threatened foreclosure of the deed of trust. The Court, in reversing a
judgment for defendant, held that the provision was a valid contractual
obligation between the parties. Arguments that it was void as an inter
vivos gift or a testamentary disposition of property were dismissed.
This decision is clearly in accord with the law of North Carolina 20
and with that of other states generally.21 It seems that this problem
" A very similar situation with an analagous holding is found in the case of
Batts v. Sullivan, 182 N.C. 129, 108 S.E. 511 (1921). There, the undivided cropshad been stored in the tenant's barn. The tenant insured them against fire for his
sole benefit. It was held upon loss that the tenant was entitled to the full proceeds
of the policy as against the landlord.
"1 Vandegraaff v. Medlock, 3 Port (Ala.) 389 (1836). See generally Note, 2
BROOKcLYN L. REV. 262 (1933), and specifically, 19 VA. L. REv. 508 (1933).
18248 N.C. 691, 105 S.E.2d 62 (1958). This case is also treated under CoN-
TRAcrs, Mortgages, supra.1 Id. at 692, 105 S.E.2d at 63.
28 Moore v. Brinkley, 200 N.C. 457, 157 S.E. 129 (1931) ("[deceased] . .. agrees
to release them absolutely from any and all indebtedness they may be under to her
or her estate at the time of her death.").
"Miller v. Allen, 339 Ill. App. 471, 90 N.E.2d 251 (1950) ("Should the mort-
gagee die before such payments are completed, the said note of this mortgage shall
be considered as fully paid on the death of the mortgagee.") ; Hollis v. Hollis, 84
Me. 96, 24 Atl. 581 (1891) ("if the said [mortgagee] . . . should die before this
note is paid, then this deed and note are null and void") ; Kline v. McElroy, 296
S.W.2d 664 (Mo. App. 1956) ("In the event of my death before the makers of
the note, I request and direct that this note and Deed of Trust be cancelled and
released of record") ; cf. Jones v. Darling, 94 Ga. App. 641, 95 S.E.2d 709 (1956) ;
In re Smith's Estate, 244 Iowa 866, 58 N.W.2d 378 (1953) ; De Lapp v. Anderson,
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might have been avoided had the agreement stated that the note and
deed were given in express consideration not only of the money loaned
but of payee's promise to release debtors from all obligation upon payee's
death.
Absolute Deeds As Security
In Perkins v. Perkins,22 an action to remove a cloud on title, de-
fendant contended that an absolute deed to plaintiff, defendant's wife,
from defendants brother was actually a mortgage from defendant to his
wife to secure an indebtedness. The plaintiff-wife demurred on two
grounds: (1) the defendant nowhere alleged that the defeasance or
redemption clause was omitted from the deed by reason of fraud, mis-
take, undue advantage, or ignorance, and (2) the grantor in this deed,
the defendant's brother, is not a party to the action, and defendant was
not a party to the instrument. It was held that the demurrer should
have been sustained on both counts.
It is a well settled point of law in North Carolina that a deed abso-
lute on its face cannot be converted into a mortgage without allegation
and proof that the redemption clause was omitted by reason of ignorance,
mistake, fraud, or undue advantage.23 That this highly restrictive ruling,
which is often productive of hardship, has been abandoned in the vast
majority of states is also unquestioned. 24
North Carolina also requires that the intent that the deed be a
security for indebtedness "must be established, not merely by proof of
declarations, but by proof of facts and circumstances, dehors the deed,
inconsistent with the idea of an absolute purchase."2 5
As to the second ground of demurrer, the Court stated that relief
by reformation of a written instrument will be granted only to the
original parties thereto, and to those claiming under or through them in
privity.2G It was held that no privity existed between the husband and
wife in this situation. Thus, defendant could not have recovered even
if he had shown that the defeasance was omitted due to mistake, igno-
rance, fraud, or undue advantage.
305 Ky. 336, 203 S.W.2d 389 (1947) ; Dillard v. Dillard, 269 S.W.2d 769 (Mo. App.
1954) ; Brock v. Lueth, 141 Neb. 545, 4 N.W.2d 285 (1942); Farmer v. Farmer,
195 Va. 92, 77 S.E.2d 415 (1953).
2-249 N.C. 152, 105 S.E.2d 663 (1958).
" With the lone exception of Fuller v. Jenkins, 130 N.C. 554, 41 S.E. 706
(1902), more than twenty North Carolina cases have sustained this point. See,
e.g., Poston v. Bowen, 228 N.C. 202, 44 S.E.2d 881 (1947). See also Note, 16
N.C.L. RFv. 416 (1938).
2 Hobbs v. Rowland, 136 Ky. 197, 123 S.W. 1185 (1909). See also Note,
26 N.C.L. REv. 405 (1948) ; 1 GLEN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES
§ 299(a) (rev. ed. 1940); 1 GLEN, MORTGAGES § 11 (1943).
2 Sowell v. Barrett, 45 N.C. 50, 54 (1852). This has been reiterated in many
later cases. See, e.g., Davenport v. Phelps, 215 N.C. 326, 1 S.E.2d 824 (1939).
" Hege v. Sellers, 241 N.C. 240, 84 S.E.2d 892 (1954); Sills v. Ford, 171
N.C. 733, 88 S.E. 636 (1916).
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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
CRIMINAL LAW
Homicide
In State v. Knight,' a case of first impression in North Carolina,
the Court held that where deceased died from fear, anger, or severe
exertion proximately resulting from an unlawful battery committed upon
him, his attacker was guilty of involuntary manslaughter even though
the injuries alone would not have caused death. Thus, this state aligns
itself with the modern rule that death from shock induced by fear or
anger may be the natural result of an unlawful act, and may therefore
constitute criminal homicide.2
A conviction of first degree murder with recommendation for mercy3
was reversed in State v. Denny,4 when it appeared that the trial court,
pursuant to an opening statement by the solicitor, instructed the jury,
that the "charge of murder in the first degree is no longer in this case,
but the charge of murder in the first degree with recommendation for
mercy is in the case." 5 Though it is well-settled in this jurisdiction that
the jury has unbridled discretion to make a binding recommendation
for mercy in a first degree murder conviction,6 this is apparently the
first case in which prejudice has been found where the jury recom-
mended mercy. The North Carolina position now seems to be that
the defendant has a substantive right in the jury's unrestricted discre-
tion to recommend mercy, and prejudice is conclusively presumed when
the trial court or counsel suggest standards or limitations impinging on
that discretion.7 It would seem, however, that the prosecutor still may,
with impunity, request a jury to recommend mercy or not, so long as
the request does not appear to limit the jury's discretion, and is argued
in a proper manner.8 A solicitor's ability to compel a recommendation
'247 N.C. 754, 102 S.E.2d 259 (1958).
'Ex parte Heigho, 18 Idaho 566, 110 Pac. 1029 (1910); 40 CJ.S. Homicide
§ 11 (1937). See also Hubbard v. Commonwealth, 304 Ky. 818, 202 S.W.2d 634
(1947).8
"[M]urder in the first degree ... shall be punished with death: Provided, if
at the time of rendering its verdict in open court, the jury shall so recommend,
the punishment shall be imprisonment for life in the State's prison, and the court
shall so instruct the jury.. .. " N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1953).
'249 N.C. 113, 105 S.E.2d 446 (1958).
'Record, p. 39.
'State v. Cook, 245 N.C. 610, 96 S.E.2d 842 (1957); State v. Adams, 243
N.C. 290, 90 S.E.2d 383 (1955) ; State v. Carter, 243 N.C. 106, 189 S.E.2d 789
(1955) ; State v. Conner, 241 N.C. 468, 85 S.E2d 584 (1955) ; State v. Dockery,
238 N.C. 222, 77 S.E.2d 664 (1953); State v. McMillan, 233 N.C. 630, 65 S.E.2d
212 (1951).
'Ibid. Previous decisions seemed to indicate that the error was prejudicial
only where the jury failed to recommend mercy. See e.g. State v. McMillan, 233
N.C. 630, 633, 65 S.E.2d 212, 213 (1951) : "Any instruction, charge or suggestion
as to the causes for which the jury could or ought to recommend is error sufficient
to set aside a verdict where no recommendation is made." (Emphasis added.)
'An argument by prosecuting counsel requesting the death penalty was held
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for mercy seems limited to the situation where he, with court approval,
accepts a defendant's plea of guilty as provided by G.S. § 15-162.1.
In State v. Knight,9 the evidence tended to show that defendant
brutally assaulted the deceased when she resisted his attempt at rape;
he then placed her, in a dying condition, in his car, took her to some
woods, hid her, and left her to bleed to death. The trial judge charged
the jury that under the felony-murder statute' ° they could find the de-
fendant guilty of first degree murder if they found the killing occurred
in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of rape or kidnapping."1
Conviction of first degree murder was reversed, the Court holding ex
mero nzotu that the evidence was "insufficient to show a taking and
carrying away of the deceased as an element of the crime of kidnap-
ping."' 2
Rape
In State v. Jones,'8 defendant was convicted of carnal knowledge of
a female under the age of twelve under our rape statute.' 4 Physicians'
testimony that the prosecutrix, a child of eight years, had gonorrhea
some six days after the alleged attack was held competent for the pur-
pose of corroborating the testimony of the child that she had been
abused, and so establish the corpus delicti.15 There was no evidence
that the defendant had gonorrhea.
Public Drunkenness
In State v. Dew,'8 defendant attacked the constitutionality of a pun-
ishment imposed under G.S. § 14-335(12), pursuant to a conviction
improper, where counsel stated that under the North Carolina parole system there
was no such thing as life imprisonment. State v. Dockery, 238 N.C. 222, 77 S.E.2d
664 (1953).
248 N.C. 384, 103 S.E.2d 452 (1958).
"o"A murder .. .which shall be committed in the perpetration or attempt to
perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, burglary or other felony, shall be deemed
to be murder in the first degree." (Emphasis added.) N.C. GaN. STAT. § 14-17(1953).
lAlthough kidnapping is not defined by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-39 (1953), it
has been held that the common law definition is not applicable, State v. Harrison,
145 N.C. 408, 59 S.E. 867 (1907) ; an approved definition seems to be: "To carry(anyone) away by unlawful force or by fraud, and against his will, or to seize
and detain him for the purpose of so carrying him away." State v. Witherington,
226 N.C. 211, 212, 37 S.E.2d 497, 498 (1946), quoting Webster's dictionary.1 248 N.C. at 390, 103 S.E.2d at 445. When a trial court allows the jury to
rest its verdict of guilt on two alternative theories, and one of the theories is not
supported by the evidence, conviction will be reversed unless it can be shown that
the jury rested its verdict on the supported theory. State v. Knight, 248 N.C. 384,
103 S.E.2d 452 (1958).18249 N.C. 134, 105 S.E.2d 513 (1958).
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-21 (1953).
"Evidence tending to establish the corpts delicti, i.e., fact that the crime
charged has been committed, is necessary to a conviction, and is not inadmissible
merely because it does not identify defendant as the perpetrator of the crime.
State v. Cope, 240 N.C. 244, 81 S.E.2d 773 (1954).18248 N.C. 188, 102 S.E.2d 774 (1958).
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for public drunkenness under G.S. § 14-335.17 Defendant contended that
since the punishment provided in subsection (12) applied only to three
counties, it was a public-local statute in conflict with a general law
prohibiting public drunkenness.' 8 The trial court accordingly set aside
the conviction and the state appealed. In reversing, the Court held that
there is no general law in this state making public drunkenness, per se,
a crime. G.S. § 14-335, although affecting 78 counties, is merely a codi-
fication of local statutes, and G.S. § 18-5119 was held, under the doc-
trine of ejusdem generis, to be limited to drunkenness at public places
similar to athletic contests.2 0
Illegal Possession of Taxpaid Liquor
A concurring opinion by Justice Higgins in State v. Welborn,21
seems to question the reasonableness of previous decisions22 which held
that under G.S. § 18-1123 a private dwelling loses its private character
when separated by a wall or floor from a part of the building used for
business purposes. Officers found five pints of taxpaid liquor in de-
fendant's bedroom which was connected to a one-room store. The
Court upheld a conviction of unlawful possession, though it carefully
avoided the issue of the private character of the bedroom by basing its
decision on a purported stipulation by defendant's counsel, to the effect
that the liquor was found in the store.2 4 In the opinion of the con-
' "If any person shall be found drunk or intoxicated on the public highway, or
at any public place or meeting, in any county, township, city, town, village, or other
place herein named, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor . . " N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-335 (1953).
" Where the punishment provided in a public-local statute is at variance with
the punishment in a general public statute relating to the same crime, the local
statute is unconstitutional in that it denies equal protection of the law under N.C.
CONST. art. 1 § 7, by granting to a locality an exemption or privilege which the
rest of the state does not enjoy. State v. Fowler, 193 N.C. 290, 136 S.E. 709(1927).
S"[I]t shall be unlawful for any person or persons to be or become intoxicated
or to make any public display of any intoxicating beverages at any athletic contest
or other public place in North Carolina." (Emphasis added.) N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 18-51 (1953).2 Quaere what would constitute a "public place similar to an athletic contest."
"249 N.C. 268, 106 S.E.2d 204 (1958).
" That such private character is lost is indicated in State v. Carpenter, 215
N.C. 635, 2 S.E.2d 34 (1939) (bedroom attached to one-room store); State v.
Hardy, 209 N.C. 83, 182 S.E. 831 (1935) (bedroom and kitchen attached to filling
station).
3 "But it shall not be unlawful to possess liquor in one's private dwelling while
the same is occupied and used by him as his dwelling only, provided such liquor is
for use only for the personal consumption of the owner thereof, and his family
residing in such dwelling, and of his bona fide guests when entertained by him
therein." (Emphasis added.) N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18-11 (1953).
" During testimony of an officer to the effect that the liquor found in the
bedroom was a certain brand name, defendant's counsel, manifestly to speed up
the proceedings, interrupted with: "Your Honor, we will stipulate that is the
whiskey he had in his store." (Emphasis added.) Record, p. 6. Though this
seemingly innocent statement was completely ignored by both parties and the trialjudge, the Court seized it as a peg upon which to hang the decision.
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curring Justice, the evidence, absent the stipulation, was insufficient to
go to the jury.
Entrapment
The defense of entrapment was pleaded in State v. Caldwel,2 5 where
defendants, members of the Ku Klux Klan, were indicted for con-
spiracy and attempt to dynamite a Negro school.26 The evidence tended
to show that the Charlotte police department placed an agent in the
Ku Klux Klan, paid his initiation dues, and told him of a $1,000.00
reward for conviction of dynamiters in the Charlotte area. The agent,
familar with explosives, used his car in two trips to procure the dyna-
mite, paid for the dynamite, helped make the bomb, and drove the de-
fendants to the school. The Court held that since there was evidence
that the plan originated in the defendants, this was not entrapment as
a matter of law, and although the "case does not disclose a wholesome
picture" the issue was properly submitted to the jury. 7
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Right to Counsel and Communication
Proceeding under the North Carolina Post Conviction Hearing Act,28
three petitioners, jointly indicted and convicted 29 of armed robbery,3 0
contended that they were held incommunicado between arrest and'trial,
thereby denying them adequate opportunity to prepare their defense, as
required by due process of law.3 1 From an order dismissing the peti-
tions, certiorari was granted by the Court. Evidence at the hearing
tended to show that the petitioners, for a period of two months were
separated and shuffled from one jail to another; were not allowed to
communicate in any respect with each other, nor with relatives ;32 were
promised by an S.B.I. agent that he would contact various witnesses
for them, which was never done. The Court held that denying peti-
tioners the right to communicate with each other was in itself denial
of due process of law,3 3 and granted a new trial.
"249 N.C. 56, 105 S.E.2d 189 (1958). " N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-49 (1953).
"' "If the officer or agent does nothing more than afford to the person charged
an opportunity to commit the offense, such is not entrapment." 249 N.C. at 59, 105
S.E.2d at 191.28N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15-217 to -222 (1953).
"State v. Wheeler, 249 N.C. 187, 105 S.E.2d 615 (1958). This case is also
discussed under CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, Trial Procedure and Due Process, supra.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-87 (1953).
8 N.C. CoNsT. art. I, §§ 11, 17.
"The only evidence of communication was testimony of a jailor who stated that
one of defendants was permitted to phone her sister, though he was not sure
whether this was before or after trial.
" "This right is neither withdrawn nor abridged by reason of fear on the
part of the investigating officers that from a conference they may evolve a bogus
defense." 249 N.C. at 194, 105 S.E.2d at 621. Nor was their right waived by
failure to object at trial, notwithstanding the petitioners were "not altogether
strangers to court proceedings."
19591
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It is significant that the Court, in dicta, cited a portion of G.S. § 15-
47,34 and though this statute appears merely to subject an officer to
criminal liability for failure to allow a prisoner to communicate, the
Court strongly infers that the statute indicates a substantive right of
defendants,3 5 opportunity to prepare for hearing being a requisite of
due process. It should also be noted that the statute as interpreted by
State v. Exum3 6 requires that opportunity to communicate need be
given only upon request of prisoners ;87 dictum in the principal case
seems to suggest a duty of officers to notify relatives of a prisoner
charged with a serious crime, whether requested or not.
Search and Seizure
Where officers, before serving a search warrant, peeped into the
window of a private home so as to obtain additional evidence, the ad-
missibility of such evidence was not commented on by the Court,88
perhaps in deference to a prior decision 9 holding that while the practice
is not approved of, the admission of such evidence would not justify a
new trial.
Former Jeopardy
Former jeopardy was claimed in State v. Cooke,40 where defendants
had been convicted of trespass in a trial de novo in superior court on
appeal from the Greensboro Municipal-County Court. The conviction
was reversed 41 because the warrant had been materially amended in
the superior court, this being improper as the superior court in this
instance had only derivative jurisdiction.42 Defendants were then con-
victed on a municipal-county court warrant similar to the prior amended
warrant. In affirming the conviction, the Court pointed out that since
the first conviction was in a court without jurisdiction, it was a nullity
and did not constitute jeopardy.
Defendant's motion to quash an indictment of perjury on grounds
of former jeopardy was held properly denied in State v. Mercer.43 A
""[I]t shall be the duty of the officer making the arrest to permit the person
so arrested to communicate with counsel and friends immediately, and the right
of such persons to communicate with counsel and friends shall not be denied."
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-47 (1953).
" "The rights of communication go with the man into the jail, and reasonable
opportunity to exercise them must be afforded by the restraining authorities."(Emphasis added.) 249 N.C. at 192, 105 S.E.2d at 620.
'N 213 N.C. 16, 195 S.E. 7 (1938).
See also State v. Thompson, 224 N.C. 661, 32 S.E.2d 24 (1944).
State v. Smith, 249 N.C. 212, 105 S.E.2d 622 (1958).
8 State v. Harrison, 239 N.C. 659, 80 S.E.2d 481 (1954), commented on in
Survey of North Carolina Case Law, 33 N.C.L. REv. 157, 190 (1955).
'0 248 N.C. 485, 103 S.E.2d 846 (1958), further consideration postponed until
hearing on the merits, 358 U.S. 925 (1959).
"' State v. Cooke, 246 N.C. 518, 98 S.E.2d 885 (1957). See Note, 36 N.C.L.
REv. 80 (1958).
"' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7-64 (1953). "249 N.C. 371, 106 S.E.2d 866 (1959).
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grand jury being an investigatory and not a trial body, the finding of
no true bill in one instance does not preclude the same grand jury from
subsequently finding a true bill on an identical indictment.44
Sufficiency of Indictments and Warrants
In two cases, the Court endeavored to aid law enforcement officers
in drawing up warrants and indictments under the liquor laws.45 In
State v. May,45 the warrant charged defendant with the unlawful posses-
sion of "intoxicating liquors on which the taxes imposed by the Congress
of the United States and by the State of North Carolina had not been
paid . . . . 47 This was a conglomeration of G.S. § 18-2 (unlawful
possession or sale of intoxicating liquors), and G.S. § 18-48 (unlawful
possession of alcoholic beverages upon which federal and state taxes
have not been paid). The Court, summarizing the statutes, pointed out
that intoxicating liquor" and alcoholic beverage"9 are not synonymous
and require different modes of proof,50 and expressed the hope that here-
after warrants and indictments be drawn to fit the offense intended to
be charged.51
In State v. Pitt,2 a model indictment under G.S. § 18-48 is set out.
Indictments in three cases were held fatally defective where the
crimes were charged in the words of the statutes.5 8 In State v. Banks,r
an indictment for a statutory unlawful burning5 5 charging defendant
with burning a filling station and restaurant56 did not particularize the
crime so as to allow defendant to adequately prepare his defense, nor
identify the crime so that it could be pleaded in bar of a further prosecu-
tion.5" Similar reasoning was used in striking down indictments which
"This is apparently the first case to apply the strong dictum of State v.
Lewis, 226 N.C. 249, 37 S.E.2d 691 (1946), concerning a grand jury's consideration
of identical indictments.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 18-1 to -152 (1953).
48248 N.C. 60, 102 S.E.2d 418 (1958).
7 Record, p. 2. (Emphasis added.)
"' Beverage containing one half of one per cent or more of alcohol by volume.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18-1 (1953).
" Beverage containing more than 14% alcohol by volume. N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 18-48 (1953).
8 In the principal case the parties and trial court treated the warrant as re-
ferring to N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18-48 (1953).
'. Manifestly, much of the existing confusion could be remedied by a much-
needed re-organization of the liquor statutes, in form, if not substance.
"248 N.C. 57, 102 S.E.2d 410 (1958).
For a general discussion of alleging offenses in the words of the statute see
Note, 35 N.C.L. REv. 118 (1956).
" 247 N.C. 745, 102 S.E.2d 245 (1958).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-62 (Supp. 1957).
" "[N]o doubt there are hundreds of buildings . . . which answer to the
general description of the building mentioned in the indictment." 247 N.C. at 748,
102 S.E.2d at 247.
" The Court also stated that the indictment must show that the building comes
within the class designated in the statute, though manifestly the indictment was
adequate as to this requirement.
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failed to particularize conduct in disturbance of a registrar in the per-
formance of her duties,58 and for failure to allege any facts showing that
defendant fraudulently attempted to obtain narcotics."
Trial
It is well settled that evidence based on smell is admissible to show
alcoholic content of a beverage.60 The Court in State v. Sinith6 ' stated,
however, that such testimony, as a practical matter, is totally unneces-
sary as a prima facie case can be created under G.S. § 18-48 merely
by showing that the containers in which the alcoholic beverage was
found bore no revenue stamps.62
Sentencing
In State v. Robinson,6 3 the Court, apparently for the first time, de-
cided that a defendant's breach of a suspended sentence condition need
not be wilful in order for the court to activate the sentence,64 and stated
the rule to be:
[A] ll that is required to revoke a suspension of a sentence in a
criminal case, and to put the sentence into effect is that the evi-
dence shall satisfy the judge in the exercise of his sound discretion
that the defendant has violated, without lawful excuse,65 a valid
condition upon which the sentence was suspended and that the
judge's findings of fact in the exercise of his sound discretion are
to that effect. 6
The Court also concluded that evidence of the breach need not be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.67
8 State v. Walker, 249 N.C. 35, 105 S.E.2d 101 (1958) (concerning violation of
N.C GEN. STAT. § 163-196(4) (1953)).
State v. Helms, 247 N.C. 740, 102 S.E.2d 241 (1958). Note that N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 90-106 (1953), which the indictment quoted verbatim, provided for four
crimes: obtaining, attempting to obtain, procuring, attempting to procure, narcotic
drugs. The Court inferred that had defendant aptly made a motion to quash
on grounds of charging separate offenses disjunctively in one count such motion
should have been sustained.6o See Evidence of Smell under EVMENCE, infra, for a discussion of this point.
81249 N.C. 212, 105 S.E.2d 622 (1958).
0""The General Assembly ...has made it so easy and simple to make out a
prima facie case ... it is difficult to understand why the statutory procedure is so
often and well-nigh universally ignored." Id. at 214, 105 S.E.2d at 623.0-248 N.C. 282, 103 S.E.2d 376 (1958).
"In previous decisions dicta has been found indicating that wilfulness of
breach might have previously been considered a requisite. See, e.g., State v.
Barrett, 243 N.C. 686, 688, 91 S.E.2d 917, 918 (1956) : "Whether the defendant had
wilfully violated the conditions upon which the sentence of imprisonment was
suspended presents questions of fact for the judge, and not issues of fact for ajury." See also State v. McMillan, 243 N.C. 775, 779, 92 S.E.2d 205, 208 (1956).
"The opinion cites with approval cases which hold that physical or economic
inability to carry out the conditions of the suspended sentence constitute a "lawful
excuse"; there is no indication, however, that mere negligence would be such an
acceptable excuse.00248 N.C. at 287, 103 S.E.2d at 380.
"7For a general discussion of the law pertaining to suspended sentences, see
Note, 31 N.C.L. REv. 195 (1953).
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When a defendant is a male over the age of eighteen and commits
an assault on a female, he may be sentenced for a general misdemeanor;
if under eighteen, imprisonment may be no longer than thirty days. 68
In State v. Courtney,69 the Court held that where the defendant gave
uncontroverted testimony that he was over eighteen at the time of
alleged assault, jury determination of this collateral matter was unneces-
sary, and a sentence of twelve to eighteen months imprisonment was
upheld, notwithstanding that neither the indictment"° nor the verdict
mentioned defendant's age. The effect of this decision is to expressly
modify a previous case7 ' holding that under somewhat similar cir-
cumstances jury determination of defendant's age was necessary. The
wisdom of the holding of the principal case is strongly questioned in
a dissent by Justice Parker :72
In my opinion, the Court is not empowered by law to go back
of the verdict into the record to uphold a sentence of imprison-
ment . . . for an offense higher in degree or grade than that of
which the jury convicted him. Where will such a holding lead
us? Doesn't it impair, if not destroy, a person's constitutional
right to a trial by jury ?7
DAMAGES
WRONGFUL DEATH
In Armentrout v. Hughes,' plaintiff sought damages for the death of
his wife, who at the time of death was eighty years old and had a life
expectancy in excess of five years. Defendant admitted liability and
his conviction of second degree murder, but denied that the deceased
had any earning capacity. Under G.S. § 28-174 the measure of dam-
ages for wrongful death is such damages as constitute a fair and just
compensation for the pecuniary injury resulting from the death. The
jury awarded plaintiff nothing, and he appealed, claiming that he was
entitled to at least nominal damages, which would entitle him to costs.
But the Court held that since the cause of action for wrongful death
is wholly statutory,2 the statute must also govern the extent of the
" N.C. GEr. STAT. § 14-33 (1953).09248 N.C. 447, 103 S.E.2d 861 (1958).
"0 The indictment was for rape, but a verdict of assault on a female was per-
missible; since defendant's age relates only to punishment, and is not an element
of the crime of assault, it need not be mentioned in the indictment. Ibid.1 State v. Grimes, 226 N.C. 523, 39 S.E.2d 394 (1946) ; see Note 36 N.C.L. REv.
80 at 82 (1958).
" Justice Higgins concurred in the dissent.
"3248 N.C. at 461, 103 S.E.2d at 871.
1247 N.C. 631, 101 S.E.2d 793 (1958).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-173 (1957 Supp.).
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recovery, and that as it does not provide for nominal damages in the
absence of pecuniary loss, plaintiff is not entitled thereto. This decision
is in accord with the North Carolina rule as previously enunciated.3 The
dissenting opinion cited Hicks v. Love,4 where the defendant argued
that since there was no direct evidence of the deceased's earning capacity,
the recovery should be limited to nominal damages. But the Court
held that direct evidence of pecuniary damage was not necessary in
order for the plaintiff to get more than nominal damages. The dissent
interpreted Hicks as implying that a plaintiff in a wrongful death
action can get at least nominal damages.
NUISANCE
In Spaugh v. City of Winston-Salem,5 plaintiffs sought permanent
damages for a nuisance created by defendant's pollution of a stream
which ran across plaintiffs' land. Defendant introduced evidence that
any damage would soon be abated by the construction of a new sewer
plant, and consequently, the trial judge limited any recovery by plain-
tiffs to temporary damages. Defendant then moved for a nonsuit on the
grounds of a variance between plaintiffs' allegations and proof. The
motion was denied, and after a verdict in favor of plaintiffs, defendant
appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court,
saying that whether plaintiffs are entitled to permanent or temporary
damages, the basis of the recovery was the damage to their land on
account of the nuisance, and that the lower court could proceed on the
theory that the greater allegation included a claim for the lesser if
plaintiffs should be restricted to such.
The Court had previously held in Clinard v. Town of KernersvilleO
that when a landowner sues a municipality for maintaining a continuous
nuisance, a demand for permanent damages by either party converts"
the action into one in the nature of a condemnation proceeding, and
that the plaintiff is then entitled to permanent damages. There is an
apparent inconsistency between this case and the result reached in the
Spaugh case, and in Spaugh the Court dodged the issue on the ground
that since the only question presented in the appeal was the correctness
of the ruling on the defendant's motion for nonsuit, it was not called
upon to determine whether plaintiffs were entitled to have submitted
an issue as to permanent damages. There is nothing in the opinion to
indicate that plaintiffs objected to the restriction of any recovery to
temporary damages.
ILamm v. Lorbacher, 235 N.C. 728, 71 S.E.2d 49 (1952).
'201 N.C. 773, 161 S.E. 394 (1931).
r249 N.C. 194, 105 S.E.2d 610 (1958). For another aspect of this case, see
CIvIL PRO EDURE (PLEADING AND PARTIES), Variance, .supra.6215 N.C. 745, 3 S.E.2d 267 (1939).
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EMINENT DOMAIN
On May 7, 1952, petitioners' house and lot were appropriated for
highway purposes. Being unable to agree with the Highway Commis-
sion on the amount of compensation for the taking, petitioners insti-
tuted a proceeding under G.S. § 136-197 in order to obtain a judicial
determination. At the third trial of DeBruhl v. State Highway & Pub.
Works Comm'n,8 almost five years after the land was taken, the trial
judge instructed the jury, in effect, that petitioners were entitled (1)
to the fair market value of the property when it was taken, plus (2)
additional compensation for the delay involved in making the award.
However, the trial court failed to give the jury any guide for assessing
this additional amount. Upon appeal, the Court reversed, holding
that the owners were entitled to additional compensation as a matter of
right, and to be computed by a fixed standard.9
After a thorough review of case authority, the Court held as a
matter of law, in accord with the majority view,10 that the legal rate
of interest (six per cent in North Carolina), not compounded, applied
to the fair market value of the property at the time it was taken, would
be the correct criteria in determining the additional compensation.
In City of Winston-Salem v. Wells," the city had condemned a
part of respondents' property. The commissioners appointed for the
purpose fixed compensation at $2,860, and the city deposited that amount
with the clerk. However, respondents thought this an inadequate
amount, and subsequent trial and judgment increased it to $10,000.
The question presented was whether respondents were entitled to in-
terest, and if so, on what amount and from what date. Relying on
the DeBruhl case, supra, the Court held that interest on $10,000 from
the date of the taking was due. The Court said that respondents did
not have to accept the $2,860, and pointed out that had they, they would
have been held to have accepted it as payment in full and the whole
question of compensation would have been settled. This is in accord
with the past North Carolina rule.'2
'This section provides for the bringing of actions for compensation for lands
taken under condemnation proceedings.8247 N.C. 671, 102 S.E.2d 229 (1958). This case is also discussed under
CoNsTiTuTioNAL LAW, Eminent Domain, supra.
'Although the matter is well settled in other jurisdictions, this seems to be the
first clear-cut holding by the Court that the jury is to determine interest as addi-
tional compensation as a matter of legal right and not as a matter of discretion.
The Court however cited the fifth headnote of Miller v. City of Asheville, 112 N.C.
759. 16 S.E. 762 (1893) as being in accord. See comments of the Court, 247
N.C. at 685, 102 S.E.2d at 239. Cf. Raleigh, Charlotte & So. R.R. v. Mecklen-
burg Mfg. Co., 166 N.C. 168, 82 S.E. 5 (1914) ; Abernathy v. Southern & W. R.R.,
159 N.C. 340, 74 S.E. 890 (1912).
10 Annot., 36 A.L.R.2d 337, at 435 (1954).
11249 N.C. 148, 105 S.E.2d 435 (1958).
"Highway Comm'n v. Pardington, 242 N.C. 482, 98 S.E.2d 102 (1955).
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In Robinson v. Highway ComnZ.'n,13 defendant had condemned a
strip of plaintiff's land. The trial judge instructed the jury that they
were to arrive at the damages by determining first the difference be-
tween the fair market value of the entire property immediately before
the taking and the fair market value of what is left immediately after
the taking, and then subtracting from that difference the value of any
special or general benefits accruing to plaintiff by reason of the taking.
The Court held the charge incorrect, saying that any special or general
benefits are themselves elements to be considered in determining the
fair market value of what is left immediately after the taking. Under
the trial court's instruction, defendant would in effect get the benefit
of a double deduction.
ADDITUR
In Caudle v. Slwanson,14 plaintiff brought an action to recover on a
building contract. The trial judge considered the jury's verdict in favor
of plaintiff inadequate, and with the consent of defendants added $500
to the recovery. The plaintiff excepted to the judgment, contending
that this deprived him of his right to a jury trial.'5 The Court affirmed,
on the ground that the action of the lower court was analogous to the
remittitur practice. This case is discussed in detail in this volume of the
Law Review, at page 169.16
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
ADOPTION
The 1955 amendments' to the adoption statutes 2 contained an ex-
press provision3 that they were to apply to adoptions whether granted
before or after the effective date of the amendments. In Bennett v.
Cain,4 the Court applied the statute to an adoption granted in 1923, and
allowed the adopted child to take property from the adopting parent's
brother. Although this result is squarely contra to that reached under
the 1947 amendments, 5 it complies with the legislative intent to give the
--249 N.C. 120, 105 S.E.2d 287 (1958).14248 N.C. 249, 103 S.E.2d 357 (1958).
"
5 N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19.
10 See also Note, 13 N.C.L. REv. 514 (1935).
1 N.C. Pub. Sess. Laws, 1955, ch. 813.
2 N.C. Gen. Stat §§ 28-149.10, 29-1.14, and 48-23 (1950).
'N.C. Pub. Sess. Laws, 1955, Ch. 813 § 6. This provision was apparently put
in to obviate the possibility of a repeat of the result reached in Wilson v. Anderson,
232 N.C. 212, 59 S.E.2d 836 (1945).
'248 N.C. 428, 103 S.E.2d 510 (1958).
'Wilson v. Anderson, 232 N.C. 212, 59 S.E.2d 836 (1945). See Fairly, In-
heritance Rights Consequent to Adoptions, 29 N.C.L. Rlv. 227, 232 (1951), and
Note, 30 N.C.L. RFv. 276 (1952) for a discussion of the law under the 1947 amend-
ments.
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child the same legal status as he would have had if he were born the
legitimate child of the adoptive parent.6
GUARDIANSHIP
In Phillips v. Gilbert,7 the Court was faced with the competing rights
of reimbursement of a guardian for expenses of his ward over and above
his receipts as a guardian, and the rights of a remainderman upon the
death of the holder of a life estate. In that case the guardian had leased
the ward's life estate in farm lands to the tenant for the 1957 crop year s
on a share crop basis. The ward died on December 28, 1956, and the
remainderman demanded immediate possession.9 When the remainder-
man brought this action for the immediate possession of the farm land
and for the landlord's part of the proceeds arising from the sale of the
1957 crops, the guardian filed a counterclaim' ° for reimbursement of
expenses" incurred during the ward's last illness and prayed that the
judgment be declared a lien on the property superior to the rights of
the remainderman. Denying this counterclaim, the trial judge granted
plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Court affirmed,
stating that the ward
never had anything more than a life estate in the premises in-
volved in this action, and upon his death the life estate was ex-
tinguished and the title to the premises passed to the plaintiff in
fee simple, free from the obligations of the life tenant, except as
to the rental agreement for the 1957 crop year. It follows, there-
fore, that since the rent for the crop year 1957 did not accrue un-
der the terms of the agreement 2 until after the death of the life
'See 33 N.C.L. Rv. 521 for a discussion of the amendments.
"248 N.C. 183, 102 S.E.2d 771 (1958).
" The crop year is said to run from "December first to December first." N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 42-23 (1950). There was no indication in the report of the case
that the parties had intended any term other than this statutory term.
'A lease executed by the owner of a life estate terminates upon his death, and
the estate of the remainderman at once begins. King v. Foscue, 91 N.C. 116
(1884). However, by a statute made specifically applicable to the county (Jones)
in which this action was brought, the farm lessee may continue his occupation to
the end of the current year; provided that he pay a proportionate part of the
rent to the remainderman. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-7 (1950).
" The guardian had filed his final account and been discharged, but his claim
for reimbursement exceeded the value of the ward's estate. Hence, at the time of
this action, the claim remained unsatisfied.
" In passing on the accounts of a guardian, natural guardians (parents) will
be allowed disbursements credit if they were made in good faith and would have
been authorized by the Court, Maryland Cas. Co. v. Lawing, 225 N.C. 103, 33
S.E.2d 609 (1945); other guardians are allowed disbursements credit beyond the
income of their wards only when they are justifiable, Tharrington v. Tharrington,
99 N.C. 118 (1887); Caffey v. McMichael, 64 N.C. 507 (1869). Expenditures
for maintenance and education, without first getting the court's permission, were
held to be unjustified in Tharringeon and Caffey, while expenditures for health
reasons were held to be justified in Long v. Norcum, 37 N.C. 354 (1842). Since
the expenditures involved in the principal case were for medical and funeral ex-
penses, it would seem that the guardian had a right to reimbursement. Cf. N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 33-6 and -42 (1950).
" The only terms which appear in the record indicate that the tenant was to
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tenant, such rent became the property of the owner of the re-
version, to wit, the plaintiff.13
SUPPORT
Allowances to Family
Although the parent's duty to support ends when the child comes
of age,14 the clerk of the superior court may order the guardian of a
"nonsane" person, who has not made a will,15 to make advancements
to the married or adult children "for their better promotion in life."' 6
However, the clerk must withhold or secure such advancements from
persons who might waste them. 7 In Ford v. Security Nat'I Bank,18
the Court applied the advancement statutes and "for the first time in-
terpreted the meaning of secs. 22 and 26."19 Rejecting the guardian's
contention that the evidence demonstrated that advancements made
would be wasted and therefore payment would not be for the better pro-
motion or advancement in life of any child, the Court affirmed the trial
judge's adoption of the clerk of court's findings of facts20 that the ad-
vancement would operate for the promotion and advancement of the
children. "All that is required is an honest and sincere effort to ascer-
tain the facts. If future events should demonstrate that the court made
an erroneous finding, that does not invalidate a fact found after a full
hearing and sincere consideration of all the evidence." 2'
Enforcement of Alimony Payments
It is well settled that alimony payments may be enforced in con-
pay "one third of all crops made to the guardian . . . , subject to the payment of
one-third of the fertilizer bills by the guardian." It is to be noted that the lease
had run for twenty-eight days before the ward died. Should not that entitle his
personal representative to approximately one-twelfth of the "landlord's share?"13248 N.C. at 188, 102 S.E.2d at 774.
1, Wells v. Wells, 227 N.C. 614, 44 S.E.2d 31 (1947). The precise holding of
this case was that the wife had stated a cause of action against the husband for
the recovery of necessaries furnished by her to an incompetent adult son. After
citing and quoting with approval from out of state authorities, the Court said,
In the light of the public policy of this State, and in keeping with the
dictates of humanity, the principles of law enunciated in these authorities are
persuasive and convincing. Hence, we hold that ordinarily the lav presumes
that when a child reaches the age of twenty-one years he will be capable of
maintaining himself, and in such case the obligation of the father to provide
support terminates.
Id. at 619. See Notes, 30 N.C.L. Rav. 417 (1952) (support of minor children),
and 26 N.C.L. Rav. 202 (1948) (support of incapacitated adult children).
15 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 35-20 and -21 (1950). These statutes provide for ad-
vancements out of excessive income and excessive corpus respectively.
" N.C. Gx. STAT. § 35-22 (1950. This is the exclusive grounds for grant-
ifig advancements to married or adult children not incapacitated.
17 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-26 (1950).
18249 N.C. 141, 105, S.E.2d 421 (1958).
I91d. at 143, 105 S.E.2d at 424.
The findings were that incompetent was permanently insane, that he had not
made a will, that his assets and income were in excess of his needs, and that his
adult children were in desperate financial condition.
249 N.C. at 144, 105 S.E.2d at 424.
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tempt proceedings,2 2 but the North Carolina cases show that it is not
so clear whether the proceedings are to be brought under the civil or
the criminal contempt statutes. In Basnight v. Basnight,23 a contempt
proceeding to enforce alimony payments was brought under the crim-
inal contempt statute. With no indication that the proceeding was im-
proper, the Court held that the confinement to jail must be limited to
thirty days. However, when the Court has been confronted with the
precise question as to the nature of the proceedings, whether civil
or criminal, the answer has been that it is civil and that confinement
to jail can be for an indefinite period.24 In Smith v. Smith,25 the Court
said that the proceeding was civil in nature; set out the distinction be-
tween civil and criminal contempt ;26 stated that the facts in Basnight,
Dyer, and Smith make for civil contempts; quoted, without comment
from American Jurisprudence 27 that "it is, however, a civil, and not a
criminal, contempt for a person to fail to comply with an order of a
court requiring him to pay money for his wife's support * ** *.,28 Em-
phasis added.) ; and explained Basnight, again with no indication that
the proceeding was improper, on the ground that the "question as to
the nature of the contempt, whether civil or criminal"'2 9 was not raised.
But the Court did not overrule Basnight, nor did it make an express
statement that the criminal statute can't be used to enforce the payments.
It would appear that more than the quotation from AMERICAN JURIS-
PRUDENCE and a mere explanation of Basnight would have been in
order if the Court had intended to rule that the criminal contempt statute
was not to be used for the enforcement of alimony payments.A0 Conse-
" Yow v. Yow, 243 N.C. 79, 89 S.E2d 867 (1955) ; Dyer v. Dyer, 213 N.C.
634, 197 S.E. 157 (1938); Green v. Green, 130 N.C. 578, 41 S.E. 784 (1902).
23242 N.C. 645, 89 S.E.2d 259 (1955), 34 N.C.L. REv. 221, 223 (1956).
"Dyer v. Dyer, 213 N.C. 634, 197 S.E. 157 (1938). See Yow v. Yow, 243
N.C. 79, 89 S.E.2d 867 (1955), 35 N.C.L. Ryv. 227 (1956). This is in accord with
many other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Henderson v. Henderson, 86 Ga. App. 812,
814, 72 S.E.2d 731, 733 (1952). See also, 12 Am. JuR. Contempt § 6 (1938).
That it is the better view, see Note 34 N.C.L. REv. 221, 224 (1956).
"248 N.C. 298, 103 S.E.2d 400 (1958). In both Smith and Dyer, the proceed-
ings were brought under the civil contempt statute. (The Smith case is also
discussed in EQurrY, Contempt, infra.)
""Criminal contempt is a term applied where the judgment is in punishment of
an act already accomplished, tending to interfere with the administration of jus-
ice.... Civil contempt is a term applied where the proceeding is had 'to preserve
and enforce the rights of private parties to suits and to compel obedience to orders
and decrees made for the benefit of such parties." Id. at 301, 103, S.E.2d at 402,
quoting from Dyer v. Dyer, 213 N.C. 634, 197 S.E. 157 (1938). Two concurring
Justices would make a further distinction between a past completed act and a
"present and continuing contempt." Id. at 303, 103 S.E.2d at 403.
112 Am. Jtm. Contempt § 6 (1938).
"8 248 at 300, 103 S.E.2d at 402.
20 Id. at 302, 103 S.E.2d at 403.
"' The Court's definition of criminal contempt, supra note 5, does not exclude
refusals to pay alimony. When the husband refused to pay the money in the past,
it was an act in defiance of the court order, and an act already accomplished.
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quently, in spite of the cases which say that the proceeding is civil in
nature, there is also a case on the books which allows a criminal pro-
ceeding. Hence, it is not clear that the Court would disallow a future
proceeding to enforce alimony payments brought under the criminal
contempt statute.31
MODIFICATION OF DIVORCE DECREES
In Thomas v. Thomas,3 2 the Court overruled defendant's demurrer
to an action brought by his minor children, residents of Virginia, to
modify the support provision of a separation agreement incorporated
into a Nevada divorce decree. The case is discussed in CONFLICT OF
LAWS, Foreign Divorce Decree-Increase in Support Allowance, sapra.
A North Carolina alimony judgment may be modified on the applica-
tion of either party, even though neither is now a resident of this state.33
ALIMONY WITHOUT DIVORCE
In an action for alimony without divorce, allegations of cruelties
and indignities occurring some twenty and thirty years ago will be
stricken as being too remote.
3 4
EQUITY
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
The Court, in American Equitable Assur. Co. v. Gold,' approved
the use of declaratory judgment to test the constitutionality of the Fire-
men's Pension Fund Act,2 which required payments to the Commis-
sioner of Insurance. Declaratory judgment is a proper procedure for
testing the constitutionality of a statute, unless jurisdiction has been
withdrawn by some other provision of law.3 The Pension Fund Act
did not provide an exclusive remedy of payment under protest and suit
" Since the wife would ordinarily bring the suit for the purpose of coercing
the husband into paying the alimony-rather than for the purpose of punishing
him for disobedience of a court order-as a practical matter, the criminal contempt
statute is likely to be infrequently used in this situation.
32248 N.C. 269, 103 S.E.2d 371 (1958).
" Kinross-Wright v. Kinross-Wright, 248 N.C. 1, 102 S.E.2d 469 (1958), 37
N.C.L. REV. 329 (1959). For further treatment of this case, see CONFLICT OF LAws,
Local Divorce Decree-Effect of Foreign Community Property Law on Interpreta-
tion of Alimony Provisions, supra.
" Batts v. Batts, 248 N.C. 243, 102 S.E.2d 862 (1958). This case is discussed
in CIVIL PROCEDURE (PLEADING AND PARTIES), Motion to Strike, supra.
'248 N.C. 288, 103 S.E.2d 344 (1958). See TAXATION, Inmsrance Policy
Premiums Tax, supra, for additional comment on this case.
'N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 118-1 through -37 (1958).
' See Bragg Dev. Co. v. Braxton, 239 N.C. 427, 79 S.E.2d 918 (1954) ; Pru-
dential Ins. Co. v. Powell, 217 N.C. 495, 8 S.E.2d 619 (1940).
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to recover in lieu of injunction; and apparently the Court did not regard
the Pension Fund payments, although later held to be taxes,4 as being
subject to the payment under protest, suit to recover, and ban on in-
junction provisions of the general tax statutes.5 Therefore, the Court
held that jurisdiction for declaratory judgment had not been with-
drawn. Although the declaratory judgment act itself does not require
a showing of irreparable injury and inadequate remedy,6 the Court em-
phasized these factors in this case. It is not clear whether the Court
means that since a declaration of unconstitutionality would have the
effect of an injunction,7 the equity requirements of irreparable injury
and inadequate remedy are imposed on the declaratory judgment pro-
cedure here,8 or whether it is referring to the doctrine that one may not
challenge the constitutionality of any statute unless he is harmed or
threatened by it. The case, in any event, must be limited to similar
situations, and not construed to mean that irreparable injury and in-
adequate remedy are requirements of declaratory judgment generally.
CONTEMPT
The basic distinction between civil9 and criminal ° contempt is that
the former is imposed to preserve and enforce the rights of the parties
whereas the latter is imposed to vindicate the authority of the court."
In Smith v. Smith,12 the Court held that where the husband is pres-
ently able to pay alimony and wilfully refuses, it is civil contempt.1
Two Justices, in a concurring opinion,x4 advise the bar that they at least
will consider it criminal contempt where the husband is not presently
able to pay the amount overdue, but was able earlier and wilfully refused
when the payments became due.' 5 The distinction drawn is that the
'American Equitable Assur. Co. v. Gold, 249 N.C. 461, 106 S.E.2d 975 (1959).
5 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-267 (Supp. 1957), and §105-406 (1950).
BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 239 (2d ed. 1941).
"While the plaintiff does not seek injunctive relief a judgment favorable to it
would have, of necessity, the effect of restraining defendant from proceeding further
in its efforts to collect from plaintiff the contributions . . . ." Prudential Ins. Co.
v. Powell, 217 N.C. 445, 500, 8 S.E.2d 619, 622 (1940).8But see E. B. Ficklen Tobacco Co. v. Maxwell, 214 N.C. 367, 199 S.E. 405
(1938) where declaratory judgment was used, and its propriety undiscussed, to test
a tax statute.
o N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5-8 (1953). 10 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 5-1 (1953).
" Galyon v. Stutts, 241 N.C. 120, 123, 84 S.E.2d 822, 825 (1954); Note, 34
N.C.L. Ray. 221 (1956). See also, Dyer v. Dyer, 213 N.C. 634, 197 S.E. 157
(1938). The distinction is important regarding the length of imprisonment; in
civil contempt defendant may be kept in jail until he complies with the order;
whereas in criminal contempt imprisonment is limted to 30 days. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 5-4 (1953).
12248 N.C. 298, 103 S.E.2d 400 (1958). The case is also discussed in DomEsTic
Rzr.rroNs, Enforcement of Alinwny Payments, supra.
"Doubt had been cast on this point by Basnight v. Basnight, 242 N.C. 645, 89
S.E.2d 259 (1955), criticized in Note, 34 N.C.L. Rv. 221, 223 (1956).14248 N.C. 298, 302, 103 S.E.2d 400, 403 (1959).
This remains an open question. The distinction was not necessary to the
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present ability and wilful refusal is a continuing contempt, while the
other is a past contempt, or act already accomplished.1 6
RECEIVERSHIP
In Lambeth v. Lambeth,'7 a case of first impression in an appellate
court of the United States, where plaintiff showed that the realty of
the deserting husband being held in receivership was not producing
enough income to pay alimony and expenses of receivership, it was held
that the receiver may be authorized to sell the unprofitable part of it
and re-invest in legal investments. Permission to sell had been denied
below for lack of precedent. The Court found authority, in addition to
its equity powers and control over receivers, in G.S. § 1-505 which
authorizes court approved sales by receivers for the best interests of
creditors, and for this purpose the Court decided that a wife's right to
alimony makes her a creditor.' 8
INJUNCTIONS
Where the wife was seeking modification of a custody order con-
cerning their child in a Domestic Relations Court, it was declared in
In the Matter of Davis' that the husband could not have such proceeding
enjoined by the superior count for lack of jurisdiction because a motion
to dismiss 20 in the Domestic Relations Court was an adequate remedy,2 '
if in fact that court did lack jurisdiction.
Although the "padlock injunction" statutes22 are far reaching, the
Court held in State ex rel. Hooks v. Flowers,23 that after defendants'
safe had been searched and found to contain no liquor when their
premises were padlocked as a place for illegal sale of liquor, Flowers
case, and was only espoused by two Justices, one of whom, Justice Johnson, has now
retired.
"No North Carolina case has been found resting the distinction between civil
and criminal contempt on this ground, although mention is made of the point in
prior cases. Dyer v. Dyer, 213 N.C. 634, 635, 197 S.E. 157, 158 (1938); Cromartie
v. Commissioners of Bladen, 85 N.C. 211, 215 (1881).
17249 N.C. 315, 106 S.E.2d 491 (1959).
"BIn respect to imprisoning the husband for contempt for failure to pay ali-
mony, the wife is not regarded as a creditor within the meaning of the constitu-
tional provision against imprisonment for debt except for fraud. Pain v. Pain, 80
N.C. 322 (1879). And, by one line of cases, a wife is not regarded as a creditor
in respect to a spendthrift trust for the benefit of her husband. 2 Scorr, TausTs
§ 157.1 (1956).19248 N.C. 423, 103 S.E.2d 503 (1958).
" This remedy was suggested in Amazon Cotton Mills Co. v. Duplan Corp.,
245 N.C. 496, 500, 96 S.E.2d 267, 270 (1957). As to enjoining proceedings in other
North Carolina courts, see Johnson v. Jones, 75 N.C. 206 (1876). See also Note,
19 N.C.L. Rzv. 86 (1941), criticizing Boone v. Boone, 217 N.C. 722, 9 S.E,2d 383(1940).
"This is in accord with the weight of authority. 43 C.J.S. Injunctions § 40 (1)
(1945).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 19-1 through -8 (1953).
247 N.C. 558, 101 S.E2d 320 (1958). This case is also treated in CoNSH-
TUTIONAL LAW, Trial Procedure and Due Process, supra.
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could not constitutionally be ordered to re-open the safe without notice
of the order and without a showing that its contents were material to
the abatement. This case arose on appeal from an ex parte order made
after the original padlock order, but before trial, ordering the re-opening
of the safe for an inventory for the parties and tax officials.
In Board of Pharmacy v. Lane,24 the defendants committed a mis-
demeanor by practicing pharmacy without a license.25 Upholding the
constitutionality of the statute,26 which authorized an injunction, and
regarding the criminal prosecution as inadequate to protect the public
health, the Court enforced an injunction against the criminal conduct.27
However, that part of the order restraining defendants from performing
"any thing or act in violation of the provisions of General Statutes,
Chapter 90" was stricken, and the order modified to enjoin only the
acts complained of.
EVIDENCE
EVIDENCE OF PRIoR ACQUITTAL
When a defendant is acquitted of assault in a criminal action, may
he use the acquittal as evidence of innocence in a subsequent civil action
based on the same act? In Edwards v. Jenkins,' the Court said by way
of dictum that he may not. Although there is no North Carolina case
involving the precise situation, the point made is in accord with the
majority rule.2 The basis generally given for the rule is the difference
in proof required, criminal actions requiring proof beyond a reasonable
doubt while civil actions require only a preponderance of the evidence.
Under the majority rule, evidence of a prior conviction is likewise in-
admissible,3 and although there is no case in point, North Carolina
would probably be in accord.4
21248 N.C. 134, 102 S.E.2d 832 (1958). For a more complete statement of the
facts, see AgImmSTRAIvE LAW, Licensing, supra. See also CoxsrnuTTIoN A
LAW, Regulation of Business, supra.
" N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-71 and -72 (1950).
u N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-85.1 (1950).
* See State v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 92 N.W.2d 103 (Minn. 1958) (defendant
chain store enjoined without statutory authorization from the unlawful sale of
Bufferin, Anacin, Bromo-Seltzer, Ex-Lax, etc. on open shelves). See also, State
ex rel. Seawell v. Carolina Motor Club, Inc., 209 N.C. 624, 184 S.E. 540 (1936)
(unlawful practice of law enjoined pursuant to statutory authorization).
1247 N.C. 565, 101 S.E.2d 410 (1957). For other aspects of this case, see
Cnrm PRocEDuRE (P.ADING AND PARTIES), Counterclaims and Motion to Strike,
supra.
'Powell v. Wiley, 125 Ga. 823, 54 S.E. 732 (1906) ; Richard v. Neault, 126 Me.
17, 135 At. 524 (1926) ; Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 1287, 1315 (1951).
' Girard v. Vermont Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 103 Vt. 330, 154 AtI. 666 (1931);
Interstate Dry Goods Stores v. Williamson, 91 W. Va. 156, 112 S.E. 301 (1922);
Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 1287, 1290 (1951).
"Cf. Swinson v. Nance, 219 N.C. 772, 15 S.E.2d 284 (1941), where evidence of
1959]
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SAFETY CODES As EVIDENCE
In order to show that the defendant was negligent in failing to
maintain proper clearance between certain power lines, the plaintiff
sought to introduce into evidence the National Electrical Safety Code,
published by the United States Department of Commerce, which,
according to the plaintiff, contained the clearance requirements. In
Sloan v. Carolina Power & Light Co.,5 the Court held such evidence
inadmissible, considering it at best the expert opinion of the authors,
who were not under oath. The Court pointed out that this code had
not been adopted by the legislature, thus distinguishing an earlier case8
admitting certain provisions of the National Electrical Code which had
been given the force of law.7
EVIDENCE OF SMELL
Though it is well settled that evidence based on smell is admissible
to show alcoholic content of a beverage,8 only an expert may testify,
on the basis of smell, that an alcoholic beverage is "not ABC whiskey,"
the inference that such beverage is nontaxpaid going to the weight and
not the competence of the evidence.
In State v. Smith0 a conviction of illegal possession of nontaxpaid
liquor was reversed where the only evidence that the beverage was
nontaxpaid was the testimony of a non-expert officer based on smell.
But in State v. Pitt,0 where the officer had been employed by the ABC
Board for eleven years, he was admitted as an expert and his testimony
based on smell was allowed to show that the beverage was not ABC
whiskey.
STATEMENTS BY AGENTS
In Cordell v. Grove Stone & Sand Co.," the Court affirmed its
earlier decisions' 2 to the effect that extra-judicial statements of an
alleged agent may not be admitted into evidence unless the fact of agency
a prior conviction arising out of the same act was held inadmissible when offered
for purpose of impeachment.
5248 N.C. 125, 102 S.E.2d 822 (1958).
'Lutz Indus., Inc. v. Dixie Home Stores, 242 N.C. 332, 88 S.E.2d 333 (1955).TN.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-138(b) (1958).
'State v. May, 248 N.C. 60, 102 S.E.2d 418 (1958) (the jury was allowed to
smell the beverage after testimony by an officer that according to his smell it
contained over 14% alcohol). Accord, State v. Fields, 201 N.C. 110, 159 S.E.
11 (1931) ; State v. Buck, 191 N.C. 528, 132 S.E. 151 (1926) ; State v. Sigmon,
190 N.C. 684, 130 S.E. 854 (1925). State v. May, supra, is also discussed under
CRIMINAL LAW, Sufficiency of Indictments and Warrants, supra.0 249 N.C. 212, 105 S.E.2d 622 (1958).
10248 N.C. 57. 102 S.E.2d 410 (1958). This case is also discussed under
C ImiNAL LAw, Sufflciency of Indictments and warrants, supra.
11247 N.C. 688, 102 S.E.2d 138 (1958).
"Norfolk So. R.R v. Smitherman, 178 N.C. 595, 101 S.E. 208 (1919); Morgan
v. Royal Benefit Soc'y, 167 N.C. 262, 83 S.E. 479 (1914) ; Rumbough v. Southern
Improvement Co., 112 N.C. 751, 17 S.E. 536 (1893).
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appears from other evidence, and unless it appears from other evidence
that the statements were made within the agent's authority or apparent
authority. In this case the plaintiff sought to introduce declarations of
the defendant's general manager to the effect that the defendant had
abandoned its mineral leasehold. The Court found no evidence in the
record that the general manager had any authority other than to per-
form the duties incident to the actual operation of the company and
it did not appear that such duties would ordinarily include the authority
to bind the principal with respect to real estate transactions.'3
INSURANCE
HAIL INsURANCE-MEASURE OF DAMAGES UNDER A "VALUED POLICY"
In Williford v. Southern Fire Ins. Co.,' plaintiff had annual per-
centage crop-hail insurance on his growing tobacco to the extent of three
hundred dollars per acre.2 Plaintiff alleged that after twenty per cent
of his crop had been harvested, he suffered wind and hail damage to
the remainder of approximately one-third to one-half of its value. The
trial judge in his charge to the jury stated that the measure of damages
"would be the difference between the market value of plaintiff's tobacco
crop immediately before the damage by hail . . . and its value immedi-
ately thereafter."
On appeal, it was held that the trial judge erred in so charging the
jury. He correctly stated the measure of damages for an "open policy,"
whereas in this case a "valued policy" was involved.8 Here, the policy
"According to the general rule, the president of a corporation has no implied
authority to sell the corporation's property unless authorized by the board of di-
rectors. However, officers of a corporation created primarily to buy and sell real
estate may have such implied authority. Tuttle v. Junior Bldg. Corp., 228 N.C.
507, 46 S.E.2d 313 (1948).
248 N.C. 549, 103 S.E.2d 804 (1958).
'The pertinent policy provision was as follows: "Determination of Loss. Un-
less otherwise provided, the amount payable hereunder shall not exceed the same
percentage of the insurance applying per acre at date of loss as the ascertained
percentage of insured loss per acre at such date, but not exceeding the actual loss
sustained by the insured."
'In a "valued" policy the parties agree as to the value of the insured property,
and agree to use this contractual valuation in computing recovery in case of loss.
Sometimes this stipulated valuation is used only in case of total loss, excluding,
in that event, all consideration of actual loss. This is true of the ordinary valued
fire policy, required by statute in some states. (In case of partial loss under such
a policy, the recovery is limited to the actual loss suffered by the insured, the
agreed valuation figure being completely ignored.)
The hail insurance contract here involved, however, differs significantly from
the valued fire policy in two respects. First, it is provided that in no event should
recovery exceed actual loss. Second, the agreed value was to be the basis upon
which recovery was to be computed whether loss was total or partial, subject to
the limitation stated in the preceding sentence. The agreed valuation here was
$300.00 per acre. In case part of the crop was harvested before the loss, this
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itself specified the method of computing the loss, 4 fixing as the amount
recoverable a sum not in excess of a certain amount per acre without
regard to the total value of the crop.5 Should the loss be less than
total, the amount recoverable is the percentage of loss per acre which
such percentage bears to the amount of insurance per acre.6
It is uniformly held that "in the absence of statute, the method of
computing the loss under a policy of hail insurance .. . is governed
by the provisions of the policy."17
ACCIDENT INSURANCE
Interpretation
In Roach v. Pyramid Life Ins. Co.,8 decedent-insured was covered
by an accident policy issued by defendant. The applicable policy pro-
vision allowed recovery "if such injury shall be sustained ... (c) by
being struck, knocked down or run over by [an] . . . airplane." In
actuality, the insured was not struck by an airplane itself; rather, he was
burned to death when a jet plane struck the garage in which he was
working, causing burning fuel to be thrown on the insured.
It was held that the plaintiff-beneficiary was entitled to recover since
insured's death resulted from an accident covered by the terms of the
policy. The rationale of the decision was that, as the gasoline in the
plane was essential to its operation, being struck by it was the equiva-
lent of being hit by the plane itself.9
The Court bases its decision on the general rule that where a pro-
valuation figure was reduced accordingly. In case of total loss, recovery would
be the full amount of the insurance applicable ($300.00 per acre less any reduction
resulting from partial harvest of the crop before the loss). In case of partial
loss, recovery would be that portion of the insurance applicable represented by
percentage of the unharvested crop which was lost.
" The Court itself has outlined the formula for determining the damages in
this case. First, determine the percentage of the original coverage in effect at
the time of the loss. Here, since twenty per cent of the crop had been harvested,
only eighty per cent of the original coverage per acre was still in effect. Thus, at
the time of the damage, the maximum coverage per acre was $240.00. If we assume
that the hail and wind damage to the crop remaining was equal to thirty-three
and one-third per cent, plaintiff would be entitled to one-third of $240.00 per acre or$80.00 per acre multiplied by the number of acres involved, 8.5, or $680.
'The interpretation adopted by the Court is in accord with the weight of
authority. See Lee v. National Liberty Ins. Co., 35 F. Supp. 898 (N.D. Tex.
1940); Glandon v. Farmers' Mut. Hail Ins. Ass'n, 211 Iowa 60, 232 N.W. 804(1930); Fidelity Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 249 S.W. 536 (Tex. Civ. App.
1923).
' Lee v. National Liberty Ins. Co., supra note 4; Glandon v. Farmers' Mut.
Hail Ins. Ass'n, supra note 4; National Liberty Ins. Co. v. Herring Nat'l Bank,
135 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
'45 C.J.S. Invrance § 979, at 1168 (1946). See, e.g., Glandon v. Farmers'
Mut. Hail Ins. Ass'n, 211 Iowa 60, 232 N.W. 804 (1930) ; cf. Andrews v. Great
Am. Ins. Co., 223 N.C. 583. 27 S.E.2d 633 (1943).
8 248 N.C. 699, 104 S.E.2d 823 (1958).
' Home v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 62 Ga. 21, 7 S.E.2d 407 (1940) ; ef. Industrial
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Alspaugh, 112 Ind. App. 569, 44 N.E.2d 321 (1942).
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vision in a policy of insurance is susceptible of two interpretations, that
interpretation will be adopted which is most favorable to the insured."0
This case is in accord with similar precedents in both North Carolina11
and elsewhere.12
Confining Disability Benefits
In Suits v. Old Equity Life Ins. Co.,13 plaintiff was totally and per-
manently disabled as the result of an automobile accident. He was
covered by a lifetime income-protection policy issued by defendant. Part
I. of the policy provided monthly benefits for any non-confining in-
juries resulting in total disability and loss of time. Part H. of the policy
provided that "if injury ...confines the insured continuously within-
doors .. .the company will pay ... benefits at the rate of $50.00 per
month so long as such confinement remains continuous . . . ." For
several months after plaintiff's accident, defendant paid benefits under
both sections. However, when plaintiff enrolled in the University of
North Carolina, the company ceased paying benefits under Part H. Pay-
ments under Part I. have continued.
The facts disclosed that plaintiff attended the University for two
years and was awarded a Master of Arts degree. This achievement was
the result of extraordinary efforts on the part of plaintiff to benefit him-
self. Plaintiff learned to walk short distances with braces. He learned
to drive a specially equipped car; at times, he drove on long pleasure
trips. He was able to teach Sunday School. Nevertheless, except as
stated above, plaintiff was completely helpless and was definitely "totally
and permanently disabled."
The Court held as a matter of law that plaintiff was not entitled to
benefits under Part H. as he was no longer continuously confined with-
indoors as contemplated by the insurance policy. The Court pointed out
that in cases of this nature, three positions have been taken. Some
courts have adopted a literal construction of the policy provision, where-
by leaving the dwelling for almost any purpose, and for however short
a time, will deprive the insured of his benefits.' 4 Other courts, including
North Carolina, have adopted a more liberal construction which allows
a reasonable deviation from the indoors requirement without forfeiture
" Horne v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., supra note 8; Manning v. Commerce Ins. Co.,
227 N.C. 251, 41 S.E.2d 767 (1947) ; Jones v. Pennsylvania Cas. Co., 140 N.C. 262,
52 S.E. 578 (1905).
" Bolich v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 205 N.C. 43, 169 S.E. 826 (1933);
cf. Gould Morris Elec. Co. v. Atlantic Fire Ins. Co., 229 N.C. 518, 50 S.E.2d 295(1948). But cf. Gant v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 197 N.C. 122, 147 S.E.
740 (1929).
a Barnes v. Great Am. Indemnity Co., 60 Ohio App. 114, 19 N.E.2d 903 (1938).
13249 N.C. 383, 106 S.E.2d 579 (1958).
" See, e.g., Reeves v. Midland Cas. Co., 170 Wis. 370, 174 N.W. 475 (1919)(insured sat on his porch; drove regularly 4 miles to the doctor's office).
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of benefits.' 5 The Court, in adopting this as the most reasonable con-
struction, compares Parts I. and H. of the policy. The withindoors
requirement of Part H. is the only differentiation. The reasonable in-
ference, even under a liberal construction, is that the parties intended
the withindoors confinement provision to have some meaning. If not,
there was no reason for the inclusion of Part H. Finally, some courts
in effect remove the confinement provision entirely.16 The North Caro-
lina Court refuses to adopt this latter construction, reasoning that to do
so would constitute a rewriting of the policy for the parties.
In this decision, the Court distinguishes every North Carolina case
where the insured has been allowed recovery under a policy provision of
this type. In those cases, insured's outside activities were much more
restricted in time and scope than were plaintiff's here.17 This case is
in accord with well-reasoned decisions in this field.18
LIFE INsURANcE
In Goldberg v. United Life & Acc. Ins. Co.,19 it was held that in-
sured had met his death by "homicide" within the meaning of an ex-
clusion clause in a double indemnity policy where the circumstances
disclosed that the assailant, having no intent to kill, had been guilty,
at most, of involuntary manslaughter; thus, the beneficiary was pre-
cluded from recovering double indemnity benefits. A critical discussion
of this decision appears in a case note in this volume of the Law Re-
vieWzv 2 0
"Mutual Benefit Health & Acc. Ass'n v. McDonald, 73 Colo. 308, 215 Pac.
135 (1923) (drove weekly 6 miles to doctor); Duke v. General Acc., Fire &
Life Assur. Corp., 212 N.C. 682, 194 S.E. 91 (1937) (occasionally rode or took
trolley to doctor's office) ; Thompson v. Mutual Benefit Health & Acc. Ass'n, 209
N.C. 678, 184 S.E. 695 (1936) (infrequent walks of one-half to two blocks) ; Wade
v. Mutual Benefit Health & Acc. Ass'n, 115 W. Va. 694, 177 S.E. 611 (1934)(occasional walks of a few hundred yards); cf. Glenn v. Gate City Life Ins.
Co., 220 N.C. 672, 18 S.E.2d 113 (1941) ; Hines v. New England Cas. Co., 172 N.C.
225, 90 S.E. 131 (1916).
"~ Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Sammons, 224 Ark. 31, 271 S.W.2d 922 (1954)(insured took walks and rides, and regularly visited acquaintances) ; Mutual Bene-
fit Health & Acc. Ass'n v. Murphy, 193 S.W.2d 305 (Ark. 1946) (insured regularly
sold insurance while driving for fresh air as ordered by his doctor) ; Massachusetts
Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Springston, 283 P.2d 819 (Okla. 1955) (insured took daily
walks and was not treated weekly by physician, as required).
17 Duke v. General Ace., Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 212 N.C. 682, 194 S.E. 91
(1937) (occasionally rode or took trolley to doctor's office) ; Thompson v. Mutual
Benefit Health & Acc. Ass'n, 209 N.C. 678, 184 S.E. 695 (1936) (infrequent walks
of one-half to two blocks).
" See, e.g., MacFarlane v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 192 F.2d 193 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 343 U.S. 915 (1951).1'248 N.C. 86, 102 S.E.2d 521 (1958).
O See Note, 37 N.C.L. REv. 92 (1958).
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LABOR LAW
RIGHT TO WORK LAW-SUIT FOR DAMAGES FOR WRONGFUL DISCHARGE
In Willard v. Huffmranl plaintiff's evidence, taken alone, showed that
he was discharged by defendant-employer ostensibly because of drinking
on company property in violation of a posted rule. Plaintiff admitted the
drinking, but alleged that he had no knowledge of the rule forbidding it.
Plaintiff claimed that on the day before his discharge, defendant held a
meeting with all of his drivers to discuss various problems that had
arisen and that defendant had stated reasons why he would not be able
to pay union wages. Defendant is alleged to have said that he had heard
rumors of the formation of a union and that the drivers had gathered at
the plaintiff's house the night before. It was conceded that union
activity had been discussed in the meeting at plaintiff's house. Plain-
tiff claimed that he was discharged because of his union activity and
sought damages for wrongful discharge under G.S. § 95-812 and G.S.
§ 95-83.3
It was held that plaintiff had adduced sufficient evidence to take the
case to the jury. This case arises under the North Carolina Right to
Work Act,4 which declares it to be the public policy of North Carolina
that the right to work must not be denied on account of membership or
non-membership in a labor union.
It must be asked whether the Court has not taken an over-literal
view of the language of this statute. In view of the purposes of the act,
has plaintiff even stated a cause of action in this case? G.S. § 95-81 was
probably intended to declare the "yellow dog" contract illegal in North
Carolina, and was certainly intended to be the antithesis of G.S. § 95-80
which prohibits a union shop contract. It would seem that the act
was aimed solely at prohibiting contracts requiring either membership or
non-membership in a labor union as a prerequisite to obtaining or re-
taining employment. Therefore, it is very doubtful that the statute was
designed to provide a right of action for wrongful discharge in a situation
where there is no such contract, as here.
In any event the case was reversed on another point. The trial judge
instructed the jury to find for plaintiff if it determined that the sole
1247 N.C. 523, 101 S.E.2d 373 (1958). This is a case of first impression in
North Carolina, and no similar case has been found elsewhere.
This section provides that "No person shall be required by an employer to
abstain or refrain from membership in any labor union.., as a condition of...
continuation of employment."
'This section provides that "Any person who may be . . . deprived of con-
tinuation of his employment in violation of [§ 95-81] . . . shall be entitled to
recover from such employer ... by appropriate action in the courts of this State
such damages as he may have sustained by reason of such . . . deprivation of
employment."
'N.C. GEr. STAT. §§ 95-78 to -84 (1958).
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reason or one of the reasons for plaintiff's discharge was his pro-union
activity. This was held reversible error because plaintiff's discharge
must have resulted solely from his exercise of rights protected under the
act, or his exercise of such rights must have been the motivating or
moving cause for the discharge. It is not sufficient that the labor activity
be one of the reasons for the discharge.
The Court did not determine defendant's contention that state courts
have no jurisdiction over such a cause of action because of the doctrine
of federal pre-emption. 5
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
Ineligibility During Vacation Periods
In In re Southern," a one-week paid vacation was given in July as
provided in the collective bargaining agreement between the union and
the employer. Months later, the company posted notices several days in
advance that the plant would shut down for a "Christmas vacation" with-
out pay from 21 December to 1 January.
Plaintiffs, employees, maintained that they were eligible for unem-
ployment compensation for the week of the "Christmas vacation,"
alleging that it was not a vacation, but in reality a work stoppage dictated
by economic factors, namely, a shortage of orders.1 The pertinent statu-
tory provision is G.S. § 96-13:
"An unemployed individual shall be eligible to receive benefits
with respect to any week only if the Commission finds that...
(3) He is able to work, and is available for work: ... Provided
further, however, that ... no individual shall be considered avail-
able for work for any week not to exceed two in any calendar year
in which the Commission finds that his employment is due to a
vacation."
Here, the Commission did find that the Christmas work stoppage was
due to a vacation. In view of this finding and the clear statutory
language, it was held that the employees were not entitled to unemploy-
ment compensation.8
r This question, however, was considered at length in an appeal from the retrial
of this same case, Willard v. Huffman, 250 N.C. 396 (1959). The Court again
upheld the award after concluding that it had jurisdiction over the cause of
action despite the fact that the conduct of the employer may have been an unfair
labor practice as defined by the Labor Management Relations Act, and despite the
fact that the employer's business affected interstate commerce. For a discussion of
the federal pre-emption doctrine, see Note, 36 N.C.L. REv. 502 (1958).
8247 N.C. 544, 101 S.E.2d 327 (1958).
' Under the act, an employer would derive a tax benefit by having this work
classed as a vacation rather than as a layoff. This is because unemployment com-
pensation is not payable to employees out on vacation. Thus, the company's em-
ployment record would not be affected under the merit-rating system, and the
employer's tax rate during the ensuing months would not be increased. See N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 96-9(b) (1958).
' Cf. Philco Corp. v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 175 Pa. Super.
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The Court pointed out that the employer has an inherent right to
determine his vacation policy in the absence of restrictions imposed by
the collective bargaining agreement. He can give one two-week vacation
period, or two one-week periods. Also, he can stagger his employees'
vacations, or shut down the whole plant at one time. Here, the col-
lective bargaining agreement apparently did not proscribe further vaca-
tions.
The Court found that the collective bargaining agreement did not
purport to enlarge or diminish the employees' rights to compensation,
benefits, and held that it could not do so.9
If the Commission had found as a fact that the work stoppage was
caused by economic factors and was not a vacation it would seem the
employees would be entitled to unemployment compensation."0
Coverage of Employees Under Trip-Lease Agreements
In State ex rel. Employment Security Comnm'n v. Hennis Freight
Lines, Inc.," the Court rejected a suggested analogy to those familiar
situations wherein a licensed interstate carrier is held liable for the
negligence of the lessor or his employees under a trip-lease agreement.
The Commission had reasoned that these drivers should also be con-
sidered "employees" of the lessee within the meaning of the Employ-
ment Security Act. 12  The Court held, however, that the lessors were
independent contractors, and that lessors' drivers were employees of
lessors rather than of the lessee.13
402, 105 A.2d 176 (1954) ; Mottley v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review,
164 Pa. Super. 36. 63 A.2d 429 (1949).
' "Neither the employer nor the employee may enlarge upon the benefits or
conditions for eligibility under the statutes. A labor contract cannot remove a dis-
qualification expressed in the unemployment act." Neff v. Board of Review, Bureau
of Unemployment Compensation, 52 Ohio Op. 285, 288, 117 N.E.2d 533, 537 (1953).
"0 The subsequent developments in this case are of interest and importance.
Following the North Carolina decision, the union demanded arbitration of this
matter. A board of arbitrators, finding that the Christmas shutdown was in reality
economic-being due to a shortage of orders and not to a vacation-awarded the
union members $80,000 for loss of earnings during the shutdown, which they held
was in violation of the contract. When the company refused to comply with
the arbitrators' award, enforcement was sought in the federal district court on the
basis of § 301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1947).
The district court dismissed the suit, Textile Workers v. Cone Mills Corp., 166
F. Supp. 654 (D.C.N.C. 1958), 37 N.C.L. Rav. 500 (1959), on the ground that
under the case of Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employes v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437 (1955), it was without jurisdiction to enforce the arbitra-
tion award since the union, not having sustained damages itself as a separate
entity, could not sue under § 301(a) to protect the rights of individual employees
through enforcement of an arbitration award. Following the lead of the Sixth
Circuit in the case of A. L. Kornman Co. v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 264
F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1959), the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed
the district court decision. Textile Workers v. Cone Mills Corp., 267 F.2d -(4th Cir. 1959). See Bunn, "Lincoln Mills and the Jurisdiction to Enforce Col-
lective Bargaining Agreements," 43 VA. L. Rxv. 1247 (1957).11248 N.C. 496, 103 S.E.2d 829 (1958). "N.C. GEN. STAT. ch. 96 (1958).
x" No other American case passing squarely on this point has been found.
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As a result of this decision, lessors and employees of those lessors
who employ less than four men are not covered by the act. Of course,
where the lessor, himself, hires four or more men,14 he is a covered em-
ployer, and his men are entitled to unemployment compensation.
The trip-lease agreements which defendant here executed left with
the lessors a great deal of autonomy and authority. It is quite possible
that a contrary result would have been reached if the trip-lease agree-
ment involved had relegated the lessor more to the status of an agent
of the lessee. For a further discussion of this case, see AGENCY AND
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, Independent Contractors, supra.
UNINCORPORATED LABOR UNIONS-REQUIREMENTS
FOR SUABILITY UNDER STATUTE
The suability of unincorporated labor unions was before the Court in
Beaty v. International Ass'n of Asbestos Workers, 5 Beaty v. Sheet Metal
Workers,'6 and Martin v. Local 71, Teamsters Union, AFL-CIO.17 At
common law an unincorporated labor union, having no existence separate
and apart from its members, could not sue or be sued as a legal entity.18
The present right to sue such a union arises by virtue of G.S. § 1-69.1's
and G.S. § 1-97(6).20 The essential statutory prerequisite is that the
union be doing business within the state, i.e., performing acts or some
of the acts for which it was founded.21
However, cf. McCain v. Crossett Lumber Co., 206 Ark. 51, 174 S.W.2d 114
(1943). But cf. Tomlin v. California Employment Comm'n, 30 Cal. App. 2d 118,
180 P.2d 342 (Sup. Ct. 1947) ; J. Goldsmith & Sons, Co. v. Hake, 187 Tenn. 88,
213 S.W.2d 15 (1948). See also Whitlock Mfg. Co. v. Egan, 19 Conn. Supp. 71,
110 A.2d 281 (Super. Ct. 1954).
"At the time this case arose, the Act specified that a "covered employer"
was one hiring eight or more men. This was changed by the 1955 amendment to
four or more employees. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-8(6) (a) (1958).
-248 N.C. 170, 102 S.E.2d 763 (1958).
1L 248 N.C. 176, 102 S.E.2d 767 (1958).
27248 N.C. 409, 103 S.E.2d 462 (1958).
" Stafford v. Wood, 234 N.C. 622, 68 S.E.2d 268 (1951) ; Tucker v. Eatough,
186 N.C. 505, 120 S.E. 57 (1923).
"' "All unincorporated associations .... foreign or domestic,... may hereafter
sue or be sued under the name by which they are commonly known and called,
or under which they are doing business, to the same extent as any other legal entity
established by law and without naming any of the individual members comprisingit."
28 "Any unincorporated association ... desiring to do business in this State by
performing any of the acts for which it was formed, shall, before any such acts are
performed, appoint an agent in this State upon whom all processes . . . may be
served . . . . If said unincorporated association . . . shall fail to appoint the
process agent pursuant to this subsection, all . . . processes may be served upon
the Secretary of State."2 See J. A. Jones Constr. Co. v. Local 755, Intl Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL,
246 N.C. 481, 98 S.E.2d 852 (1957) ; Youngblood v. Bright, 243 N.C. 599, 91 S.E.2d
559 (1956) ; Stafford v. Wood, 234 N.C. 622, 68 S.E.2d 268 (1951). For a further
treatment of this subject, see TRIAL AND APPELLATE PRAcTicE, Process, infra.
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MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
ANNEXATION
In State ex rel. East Lenoir Sanitary District v. Lenoir,1 the Court
held that in the restriction as to annexing "some other municipality" in
G.S. § 160-4452 the word "municipality" s applies only to cities and
towns. Therefore, the city could annex territory, part of which was
within the Sanitary District, and the district's status would not be
disturbed nor its property appropriated thereby.
GOVERMENTAL IMMUNITY
Defendant's showing, in Glenn v. City of Raleigh,4 that the revenue
gained from the operation of its park was only a relatively small frac-
tion of the amount spent on parks and playgrounds did not affect an
earlier ruling that its governmental immunity was lost because the
revenue was a corporate benefit or pecuniary advantage. Although the
revenue was derived from an amusement area of the park, the Court
held that the adjacent picnic area, where plaintiff was injured by a rock
thrown from a power lawn mower, was so interrelated to the revenue
producing area that the immunity was lost throughout the whole park.
As in the former case, the Court did not clearly hold that the opera-
tion of a park was a proprietary or governmental function per se, but
rather that governmental immunity was lost in this case because of the
pecuniary advantage.6
Likewise, in Carter v. Greensboro,7 the city's claim of governmental
immunity was unavailing where the injury arose in the operation of a
low-rent housing project under a federal contract. It was held to be a
proprietary function because of the limited class of tenants who could
qualify and because of the substantial financial benefit derived therefrom.
Furthermore, the Court upheld the jury's finding that plaintiff's failure
to file a claim within six months as required by defendant's charter was
1-249 N.C. 96, 105 S.E.2d 411 (1958).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160-445 (1952): "[T]he governing body of any municipality
is authorized and empowered to adopt an ordinance extending its corporate limits
by annexing thereto any contiguous tract or tracts of land not embraced within
the corporate limits of some other municipality. .. "
'This definition is limited to the particular context, thus leaving the Court
freedom in the application of the word in other connections. As to the flexbility
of the term "municipal corporation," see LEwis, BAsic LEGAL PROBLEMS IN THE
TAXATION OF PROPERTY 46-48 (1958).
'248 N.C. 378, 103 S.E.2d 482 (1958). For discussion of timeliness of motion
for nonsuit see TRIAL PRACrIcE, Motion for Nonsuit, infra.
' Glenn v. Raleigh, 246 N.C. 469, 98 S.E.2d 913 (1957), criticized in Note, 36
N.C.L. REV. 97 (1958).
'Evidently, it was considered in this case a proprietary function. Note, 36
N.C.L. REv. 97 (1958). See also, 39 Am. JuR., Parks, Squares, and Playgrounds§ 37 (1942).7249 N.C. 328, 106 S.E.2d 564 (1959).
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due to his physical and mental incapacity, thus plaintiff was not barred
although the injury occurred in 1946.
TAXATION AND FINANCE
In Strickland v. Franklin County,8 a special act9 authorized the
creation of special bond tax districts to float bonds for school improve-
ments. Pursuant to the act, after the voters of a district approved, de-
fendant proposed to issue bonds which provided for payment exclusively
out of taxes levied in the special district. However, the special act
provides that the board of county commissioners "may" pay the obliga-
tion from county funds. That provision, plaintiffs contended in their
suit to enjoin the bond issue, would make the obligation that of Frank-
lin County and therefore unconstitutional since the bond issue greatly
exceeded the amount by which the outstanding indebtedness of the
county had been reduced during the preceding fiscal year, and no county
election had been, nor was to be held.10 The Court held that the
special act must be considered in pari materia with G.S. §§ 115-109
through -111, which provides in the cases where the constitution so re-
quires, that an election must be held in order for the lawful assumption
by a county of local district obligations. Therefore, the bonds would
be exclusively the obligation of the special tax district, unless assumed
by the county pursuant to G.S. §§ 115-109 through -111.
In Thonwsson v. Smith," it was held that plaintiff, a city taxpayer,
was not deprived of property without due process of law by the city
issuing bonds to finance the extension of water, sewer, and fire alarm
systems into adjacent territory which was to be annexed at a set future
time (December 31, 1959) because it was done for a public purpose
and pursuant to legislative authority.
UTILITIES
Owners of water lines outside the city limits had connected with the
city water mains and allowed adjacent property holders to tap in. The
city sold water to these adjacent property holders through respondents'
lines. In an action by the adjacent property holders to require owners
to improve its system, the Court held in State ex rel. Utilities Comn'n
v. New Hope Road Water Co., 12 that owners were not a public utility's
8248 N.C. 668, 104 S.E.2d 852 (1958).
'N.C. Sess. Laws 1957, ch. 1078.1oN.C. CoNsT. art. V, § 4.
1249 N.C. 84, 105 S.E.2d 416 (1958).
12248 N.C. 27, 102 S.E.2d 377 (1958). This case is also discussed in ADMIN-
isTRATrvE LAW, Euidence to Support Findings, supra.
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-65 (e)2 (1950). "The term 'public utility,' when used
in this article, includes persons and corporations, or their lessees, trustees and
receivers now or hereafter owning or operating in this State equipment or facilities
for: Diverting, developing, pumping, impounding, distributing or furnishing water
to or for the public for compensation .. ..
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and therefore not required to improve its service or to obtain a certificate
of public convenience and necessity. 14
MISCELLANEOUS
Mooresville had an ordinance regulating cemeteries, which provided,
inter alia, that the town only could set memorials in its cemetery, and
provided a charge of $40 for setting any memorial not purchased from
the town. Defendant, in State v. McGraw,15 set a grave marker without
paying the charge, and was convicted of violating the ordinance. The
Court, holding the ordinance void, found no authority either in special
acts or general statutes empowering the town to pass such an ordinance,
and doubted the constitutionality of a statute which would so authorize.
The town, having entered the business of selling and setting memorials,
could not use its authority to regulate cemeteries to monopolize the
market.
The significant case of Winston-Salem v. Southern Ry.,'6 holding
unconstitutional an ordinance and provision of the city charter which
would have required defendant to rebuild an overpass at its own expense,
is noted in this volume of the Law Review.17
American Equitable Assurance Co. v. Gold,'5 holding the Firemen's
Pension Fund Act unconstitutional, is fully discussed under TAXATION,
Insurance Policy Premiums Tax section of this Survey.
REAL PROPERTY
ADVERSE POSSESSION
A deed that insufficiently describes land cannot operate as color of
title.' Carrow v. Davis2 held judgment for the plaintiff was proper
where defendant was claiming title by adverse possession under color of
title but his deed failed to enclose a tract of land.
Where it is necessary to tack successive holdings in order to make
up the required statutory period, privity between the various holders
must be shown to exist.3 Two recent cases illustrate one of the hazards
"Jackson v. Gastonia, 246 N.C. 404, 98 S.E.2d 444 (1957), 36 N.C.L. REv.
432, 435 (1958) ; Spaugh v. Winston-Salem, 234 N.C. 708, 68 S.E.2d 838 (1952)
where the question involved compensation to the water line owners whose systems
were annexed by the cities.
249 N.C. 205, 105 S.E.2d 659 (1958). Additional comment on this case will
be found in CoNsnrJuTIoNAr. LAW, Regulation of Bstiness, supra.
18248 N.C. 637, 105 S.E.2d 37 (1958).
'Note, 37 N.C.L. REv. 187 (1959).
18249 N.C. 461, 106 S.E.2d 875 (1959).
' Powell v. Miller, 237 N.C. 582, 75 S.E.2d 759 (1953).
2248 N.C. 740, 105 S.E.2d 60 (1958).
'See, e.g., Johnston v. Case, 131 N.C. 491, 42 S.E. 957 (1902).
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that lie in wait for a plaintiff who seeks to prove title in himself
through a series of deeds. In Shingleton v. North Carolina Wildlife
Comm'n,4 one of the deeds in plaintiff's chain of title was a tax fore-
closure deed. The Court held a nonsuit proper where the judgment
roll in the foreclosure action was not introduced into evidence. Sim-
ilarly, in Sledge v. Miller,5 where one deed in a chain was a deed from
the receivers of a corporation, failure to introduce the judgment roll
in the receivership appointment was held fatal.
Color of title is defined as any writing which on its face professes
to pass title but which fails to do so, either from want of title in the
person making it or from the defective mode of conveyance employed.0
North Carolina stands alone in its peculiar exception to this rule, that
a deed made by one tenant in common cannot operate as color of
title against his cotenants.7 In Johnson v. McLamb,8 land had been
devised to nine tenants in common. The land of one was sold under
tax foreclosure to which the other tenants were not parties. The sheriff's
deed conveyed the entire lot.' The Court held this deed was color of
title even as against the other tenants in common, stating that it is the
established policy of the Court to keep the exception strictly confined
to the single class of cases to which it applies. 9 Judicial sales do not
fall within the exception, the sheriff's deed being that of a stranger.'0
The peculiar North Carolina exception to the general rule as to color
of title is firmly imbedded in our law, and there appears little chance
that it will be overturned now; but at least it appears that the excep-
tion will be strictly confined.
In Nicholas v. Salisbury Hardware & Furniture Co.," one ques-
tion was whether an easement had been acquired by prescription. An
interesting point decided by the Court was that the appointment of a
receiver for plaintiff's predecessor in title did not toll the twenty year
statute of limitations for title by adverse possession. No question of
tacking was presented since defendant claimed that he himself had held
adversely for twenty years. The Court recognized the rule that once
the statute of limitations has started to run, no subsequent disability
will stop its running.' 2 However, this is apparently the first time the
'248 N.C. 89, 102 S.E.2d 402 (1958).
-249 N.C. 447, 106 S.E.2d 868 (1959). Discussed also in TRIAL AND AP-
PELLATE PRAcxFc, Reference-Plea in Bar, infra.
' Burns v. Stewart, 162 N.C. 360, 78 S.E. 321 (1913).
Roper Lumber Co. v. Richmond Cedar Works, 165 N.C. 83, 80 S.E. 982(1914).
8247 N.C. 534, 101 S.E.2d 311 (1958).9Id. at 537, 101 S.E.2d at 313.
"0 This is in line with the majority view that instruments based on judicial pro-
ceedings are color of title. See 1 Am. Jin. Adverse Possession, § 199 (1936).
1 248 N.C. 462, 103 S.E.2d 837 (1958).
12 Id. at 471, 103 S.E.2d at 844.
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precise question concerning the appointment of a receiver has arisen
in this jurisdiction.' s From the statement of the general rule, the hold-
ing of the Court would seem necessarily to follow.
EASEMENTS
In Andrews v. Lovejoy, 14 the grantor conveyed a portion of his
land to plaintiffs and also granted them an easement across the part he
retained. This retained part was later conveyed to defendants; at that
time the grantor exercised the power to locate the previously granted
easement by particular reference and description in the deed conveying
the servient estate to defendants. In an action by plaintiffs to establish
their right to this easement, the Court held that since the grantor owned
the servient estate after the first deed, he had the power to locate the
easement granted in that deed. Plaintiffs were thus entitled to its use,
and defendants could not require them to accept another easement, or to
pay again for the one they already had.
Piedmon.t Natural Gas Co. v. Day'8 involved the claim that an ease-
ment was void for indefiniteness. Here the grantori conveyed to plain-
tiff an easement for the purpose of laying pipe lines, plaintiff having the
right to locate the pipe lines. Plaintiff subsequently did locate his pipe
lines. The property was later conveyed to defendants with an express
provision that the easement heretofore granted was an encumbrance
on the land. In answering defendants' contention that the easement was
void for indefiniteness, the Court said that where there is no express
agreement as to the location of a way granted but not located, practical
location by the grantee, acquiesced in by the grantor, sufficiently locates
the way.' 6 Defendant took subject to an easement of which he had
notice and which was located.
G.S. § 136-69 provides that a property owner has the right to have
access to a public road where he is unable to reach the road because
of the location of his land. Kanupp v. Land'7 held that the statute does
not give a land owner the right to require others to secure an easement
across his property; nor may he force owners of land away from a
public highway when it has been judicially determined that such owners
have a right to have the highway kept open.
EMINENT DOMAIN
In Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Horton,' land had been con-
demned and damages paid into court after a jury trial. In a contro-
" See O'Connell v. Chicago Park Dist., 376 Ill. 550, 34 N.E.2d 836 (1941),
which states the majority view adopted by North Carolina in this decision.1 247 N.C. 554, 101 S.E.2d 395 (1958).
1249 N.C. 482, 106 S.E.2d 678 (1959).
"- Borders v. Yarborough, 237 N.C. 540, 75 S.E2d 541 (1953).17248 N.C. 203, 102 S.E.2d 779 (1958).
18 249 N.C. 300, 106 S.E.2d 461 (1959).
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versy over the right to this fund between the owners of the fee and
the owners of reserved mineral rights, it was held proper to award the
fund to the owners of the fee where the holders of mineral rights failed
to show they sustained any loss by reason of the condemnation."0
In Topping v. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ.,20 an order had
been issued restraining defendant from giving certain construction funds
to the Hyde County Board of Education until the latter had acquired
fee simple title to an entire school site.21 Subsequently, the county
board obtained possession of the land after paying into court the dam-
ages assessed in a condemnation proceeding. Since title of the land-
owner is not divested until the condemnor obtains a final judgment and
pays to the landowner the amount of damages fixed by the judgment,22
the Court held it was error to dissolve the restaining order where it was
shown that the condemnation proceeding had been appealed to the
superior court and was awaiting a jury trial. By virtue of the con-
demnation, the county had the right to possession, but this was not
the fee simple required by the restraining order.
DE S
Boundaries
In McKinney v. Morton,23 the Court reiterated the rule that in a
processioning proceeding to determine a boundary line, the plaintiff may
not take a voluntary nonsuit.24
Coffey v. Greer25 involved a boundary controversy where plaintiff's
deed called for a corner of defendant's land as its beginning corner.
The Court said the line must be established from defendant's deed, and
the calls in plaintiff's deed cannot be used to establish the location of the
corner in defendant's deed. Plaintiff's deed is the junior deed in that
it refers to defendant's deed.
The deed in Caudill v. McNeil26 contained the following call: "then
east a sufficient distance to divide the M. D. Reeves land equally." The
deed further stated that the tract conveyed was to include "one half
of the M. D. Reeves land." The lower court, agreeing with defendant's
" The general rule for measuring damages in eminent domain proceedings is the
fair market value of the property at the date of the taking. If a person owns an
interest that has no value, then he has obviously suffered no loss by reason of the
taking. See Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Moss, 220 N.C. 200, 17 S.E.2d 10
(1941).20249 N.C. 291, 106 S.E.2d 502 (1959).
21 There was apparently no appeal from this order which is quoted verbatim in
the Court's opinion.22 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40-19 (1950); cf. Nantahala Power & Light Co.
v. Whiting Manufacturing Co., 209 N.C. 560, 184 S.E. 48 (1936).23248 N.C. 101, 102 S.E.2d 449 (1958).
'Cf. Plemmons v. Cutshall, 234 N.C. 506, 67 S.E.2d 501 (1951).2-249 N.C. 256, 106 S.E.2d 209 (1958).
20249 N.C. 376, 106 S.E.2d 475 (1959).
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contention, held that the description was insufficient, and excluded parol
evidence offered for the purpose of establishing the boundaries. On
appeal, this was held error. The Court, after stating that the grantor's
presumed intent to convey an identifiable tract of land should be given
effect, if possible, construed the description so that the land was to be
divided one-half in area rather than value. Under this construction,
the description was held sufficient since the missing line could easily be
ascertained.
Titles
In Skipper v. Yow, 2 7 plaintiffs filed a petition to have a tract of
land partitioned. The action developed into one to try title when de-
fendants claimed petitioners had no title. In order to prove title, plain-
tiffs elected to connect themselves and defendants with a common source
of title.28 Plaintiffs could win only on the strength of their own title,
and had to fit the land claimed into the description in the deed through
which title was claimed.
An interesting point was raised in this case where the grantor in one
of the deeds in plaintiffs' chain of title recited that she had inherited the
land as a collateral heir from her predecessor in title. Being an ancient
document, the deed was accepted as evidence of the fact that this grantor
was an heir of her intestate;29 thus, there was no break in plaintiff's
chain of title.
LANDLORD AND TENANT
Lessees' Incorporation During Holdover Period
In Williams v. King,30 lessees held over after their three year lease
had expired, and became incorporated during this period. It was held
that the lessees, not the corporation, were liable for the rent during
the holdover period since the lessor had never agreed or consented to
release the lessees; after holding over, the lessor had the option to treat
lessees as tenants.3 1
Statute of Frauds
In Herring v. Volume Merchandise, Inc.,3 2 plaintiffs had leased
certain property to defendants. While the lease still had more than
27249 N.C. 49, 105 S.E.2d 205 (1958).
"' This is one of the six acceptable methods of proving title as laid down in
Mobley v. Griffin, 104 N.C. 112, 10 S.E. 142 (1889).
" Death being established, there is a presumption of intestacy. Barham v.
Holland, 178 N.C. 104, 100 S.E. 186 (1919). But as to how the inheritance is
cast, this must be established by proof. Murphy v. Smith, 235 N.C. 455, 70 S.E2d
697 (1952).
-0247 N.C. 581, 101 S.E.2d 308 (1958).
" By treating defendants as tenants when they held over, a tenancy from year
to year is presumed. See Murrill v. Palmer, 164 N.C. 50, 80 S.E. 55 (1913).
" 249 N.C. 221, 106 S.E.2d 197 (1958).
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three years to run, plaintiffs and defendants orally agreed to cancel the
lease and defendants agreed to surrender possession in about three
weeks. Before the actual surrender date, defendants assigned their
interest in the lease to a third party. In an action to recover possession
of the premises, the Court held that G.S. § 22-233 applied to contracts
to surrender leases,3 4 but pointed out that this statute applies only to
executory and not consummated contracts. Once the surrender is con-
summated, then the Statute of Frauds is no bar, and the lessees would
be stopped to deny the premises were surrendered. Judgment of dis-
missal was reversed so that plaintiffs might offer evidence of an actual
surrender as distinguished from an offer to surrender.
PARTITION
It is well settled in North Carolina that a deed from one tenant in
common to a cotenant and his wife in partitioning land does not create
an estate by the entirety or enlarge the marital rights of the wife as
previously fixed by law.8 5
In Smith v. Smith,3 6 deeds of gift were exchanged between A and
B, tenants in common in certain lands. The deed from B, after reserving
a life estate, purported to convey a portion of the property to A and his
wife, "creating an estate by the entirety." Petitioner, A's wife, brouglht
partition proceedings claiming that she and A were tenants in common
in the disputed premises. The case was heard on stipulated facts and
judgment entered that A was sole owner, subject to the life estate in
B. However, the lower court had made no finding that the deeds were
intended as partition deeds. On appeal, the Court remanded, holding
that the facts were insufficient to support the judgment. The Court
pointed out, however, that if the deeds were found to be partition deeds'
petitioner would derive no title to the lands in dispute.
In Ijames v. Swainb 7 deceased left six children as his heirs at law.
One child deeded his one-sixth undivided interest to another child, but
his wife did not sign the deed. Subsequently, one of the five remaining
children brought partition proceedings. A consent judgment was entered
which recognized the sale by the one tenant of his interest, but none-
theless laid off a tract of land as this tenant's share. This is an action
by the heirs of the grantor-tenant claiming that they have title to the
tract laid off for their ancestor. The Court held the heirs had no title
" This section provides: "All contracts to sell or convey any lands ... or any
interest in or concerning them .... and all other leases and contracts for leasing
lands exceeding in duration three years from the making thereof, shall be void
unless ... put in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith, or by
some other person by him thereto lawfully authorized."
"Accord, Alexander v. Morris, 145 N.C. 22, 58 S.E. 600 (1907).
Ellege v. Welch, 238 N.C. 61, 76 S.E.2d 340 (1953).
38248 N.C. 194, 102 S.E.2d 868 (1958).
-'248 N.C. 443, 103 S.E.2d 507 (1958).
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to the land in controversy, pointing out that the only reason the grantor-
tenant's share was laid off was because his wife still had dower rights.38
The only effect of segregating this share was to make it easily identifiable
should it ever become subject to some future claim of dower.
In Davis v. Griffin,39 T's will left land to five children for life, then
to their nearest of blood kin. Two have died, leaving the other three as
their next of blood kin. These three bring a partition proceeding to have
the part they hold in fee laid off and separated from the part which
they hold as life tenants. The Court held that such a proceeding was
proper under our statutes40 and that the existence of the life estate was
not a bar.41
RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
Restrictive covenants are not favorites of the law and generally will
be strictly construed against the covenantor. 42 In Caldwell v. Brad-
ford,43 the owners of fifteen lots had, some twenty years prior to this
action, executed an agreement to restrict the lots to residential purposes
only. Plaintiffs are now the owners of two of the lots and seek to en-
join defendants from using their lots for business purposes. Defendants
introduced into evidence an agreement entered into in 1955 wherein the
owners of all fifteen of the lots, with the exception of plaintiffs, can-
celled the previous agreement. The trial court found that the character
of the property had undergone a change from residential to business prop-
erty and this, coupled with the cancellation agreement, would render it
inequitable to enforce the purported restriction. This judgment was
affirmed by the Court. The decision clearly accords with prior North
Carolina case law44 and shows the hostility of the Court to restrictions
imposed upon the use of land. Here, in addition to the change in char-
acter of the property, the restrictive covenants, in effect, had been can-
celled. The change alone would seemingly be enough to justify a refusal
to enforce the restriction. 45
WASTE
In Parrish v. Parrish,46 a civil action for waste brought by remainder-
" Since the wife had not signed her husband's deed, her inchoate right of dower
was not released. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-12 (1950).30249 N.C. 26, 105 S.E.2d 119 (1958).
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 46-1 to -44 (1950).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 46-23 (1950).
"Edney v. Powers, 224 N.C. 441, 31 S.E.2d 372 (1944).
'a248 N.C. 48, 102 S.E.2d 399 (1958).
"Cf. Shuford v. Asheville Oil Co., 243 N.C. 636, 91 S.E.2d 903 (1956), where
a full discussion of this type of restrictive covenant is set forth.
"See Shuford v. Asheville Oil Co., supra note 44, at 647, 91 S.E.2d at 912,
where the Court states that it would be inequitable and unjust to enforce such
restrictions when the character of the property had undergone a substantial change.
"-247 N.C. 584, 101 S.E.2d 480 (1958).
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men against a life tenant pursuant to G.S. § 41-11, 47 judgment was en-
tered that plantiff recover damages, that the land be sold, and that the
life tenant's share, reduced by the amount of damages awarded, be paid
to the life tenant absolutely. On plaintiff's appeal, the Court, after
pointing out that a sale under G.S. § 41-11 has no application in an
action of waste and can be ordered only in a "special proceeding" which
must be instituted before the clerk of the superior court,48 held that the
judgment was erroneous since it did not conform to the requirements of
G.S. § 1-538.49
SALES
RIGHT TO FOLLOW PRocEEs
In Carrow v. Weston,1 plaintiff sold certain logs to defendant's in-
testate in a cash transaction. Plaintiff accepted in good faith the de-
cedent's check which was dishonored for insufficient funds. Meanwhile,
the decedent had mingled these logs with others and had converted some
of them into lumber. Plaintiff, electing to treat the sale as void,2 sought
to establish a preferred claim against the decedent's insolvent estate.
The Court held that plaintiff was a mere general creditor of the
estate who could predicate his claim only in contract for recovery of
the purchase price, or in tort for conversion of the logs. If defendant
still had the logs intact, plaintiff would be entitled to recover them.
Also, if the logs had been sold for a specific and certain sum, plaintiff
would be entitled to recover that specific sum.8 Here, it could not be
," This section provides, in effect, that where there is real property subject to
a contingent remainder, and it is desired to sell the property discharged of such
contingent interests, a special proceeding may be instituted before the clerk of
the superior court; if certain procedures are followed, a full fee simple title may
be conveyed.
"Id. at 586, 101 S.E2d at 482.
" This section provides as follows: "In all cases of waste, when judgment is
against the defendant, the court may give judgment for treble the amount of the
damages assessed by the jury, and also that the plaintiff recover the place wasted,if the damages are not paid on or before a day to be named in the judgment."
' 247 N.C. 735, 102 S.E.2d 134 (1958).
'In North Carolina, when a vendor accepts a check in payment of a cash
transaction, the title does not pass until the check is paid, absent an agreement to
the contrary. The vendor has an election between two inconsistent remedies. He
may (1) consider the sale void and reclaim the chattel, or (2) affirm the sale and
sue for the contract price. Weddington v. Boshamer, 237 N.C. 556, 75 S.E.2d 530(1953). In Handley Motor Co. v. Wood, 237 N.C. 318, 75 S.E.2d 312, aff'd on
second appeal, 238 N.C. 468, 78 S.E.2d 391 (1953), it was held that in such a situ-
ation the vendor could recover even as against a bona fide purchaser for value from
the vendee if the vendor had not clothed the vendee with apparent title and power
of disposition.
'Even so, the plaintiff would only be entitled to what the logs were actually sold
for by the decedent or defendant, and not the original sale price from plaintiff to
defendant.
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determined at what price the logs were sold, if sold at all. The logs
could not be segregated, and any proceeds of sale were mingled with
general funds of the estate. Thus, both the logs and any proceeds are
now estate assets. The law in this case is in accord with that gen-
erally prevailing in other jurisdictions.4
EXPRESS WARRANTY
Damages for Breach
In Hill v. Parker,0 it was held that plaintiff's complaint stated a cause
of action for damages for breach of express warranty. It was alleged
that defendant automobile dealer expressly stated to plaintiff, as an in-
ducement to buy, that the car was in A # 1 condition and had been
used only slightly as a demonstrator. In actuality, plaintiff claims, the car
had been badly wrecked before the sale and rendered worthless as a new
motor vehicle. That such allegations state a cause of action both in
North Carolina6 and elsewhere is unquestioned.
Rescission for Breach
In Hajoca Corp. v. Brooks,8 defendant bought from plaintiff dealer
a self-contained heating-air conditioning unit which needed no installa-
tion except outside wiring. The unit was warranted to be new, in
good condition, and free from all defects. Upon being installed in de-
fendant's house early in 1956, it was discovered that the starting mech-
anism was faulty. Although the device worked fine while in actual
operation, it was vexatious because it would cut off at such times as it
should have been running, thus leaving the house cold. The machine
could only be started again mariually. Defendant made repeated de-
mands on plaintiff to repair the unit, and although plaintiff attempted to
'Richelieu Hotel Co. v. Miller, 50 I1. App. 390 (1893) ; Weyerhaeuser Timber
Co. v. First Natl Bank of Portland, 150 Ore. 172, 38 P.2d 48 (1934).
r248 N.C. 662, 104 S.E.2d 848 (1958). This case is discussed further under
CIVIL PROCEDURE (PLEADING AND PARTIES), Theory of the Pleadings, and TRLAL
AND AppEuLAza PRAcrIcE, Attorney and Client, both supra.
'Potter v. The Natl Supply Co., 230 N.C. 1, 51 S.E.2d 908 (1949) ; Walston
v. R. B. Whitley & Co., 226 N.C. 537, 39 S.E.2d 375 (1946) ; Wrenn v. Morgan,
148 N.C. 101, 61 S.E. 641 (1908).7 Cunningham Auto Co. v. Drake, 224 N.W. 48 (Iowa 1929) (tractor war-
ranted to be in good condition and capable of operating one three-bottom plow
in land being farmed by vendee); Warden v. Peck, 245 Mich. 237, 222 N.W. 101
(1928) (second-hand automobile warranted to be in A-1 condition and recently
completely overhauled); Hoffman v. Piper, 181 Minn. 603, 233 N.W. 313 (1930)
(automobile warranted to have been driven only 1200 miles by dealer personally).
See VOLD, HANDBooK OF THE LAw OF SALES § 142 (1931). "[A] buyer does not
waive his right to sue his seller for damages for a breach of warranty by the
mere acceptance and retention of goods not fulfilling the warranty." Potter v.
The Nat'l Supply Co., 230 N.C. 1, 8, 51 S.E.2d 908, 913 (1949) ; See also Huyett
& Smith Mfg. Co. v. Gray, 124 N.C. 322, 32 S.E. 718 (1899); Alpha Mills v.
Watertown Steam Engine Co., 116 N.C. 797, 21 S.E. 917 (1895) ; Love v. Miller,
104 N.C. 582, 10 S.E. 685 (1889); Lewis v. W. D. Rountree & Co., 78 N.C. 323
(1878).
8249 N.C. 10, 105 S.E.2d 123 (1958).
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do so on several occasions, he was never able to do it. In May 1956, de-
fendant told plaintiff that the unit was not reasonably suited for the use
intended, that he wanted either a new unit or his money back, and that
he would pay nothing further until this was done. From that time until
the fall of 1958, over two years later, defendant continued to use the
machine in its faulty condition.
This action was brought by plaintiff on the account due. In a coun-
terclaim, defendant, alleging a total failure of consideration, prayed for
a rescission of the contract based on breach of express warranty. The
Court held that defendant could not now maintain an action for rescis-
sion although he could recover damages for breach of warranty. Orig-
inally, defendant could have availed himself of either of two mutually
exclusive remedies: he could have (1) rescinded the contract and re-
covered the purchase price, or (2) affirmed the contract and recovered
damages for breach of warranty.9
The Court held that until May 1956, defendant's continued use and
possession of the furnace would not constitute an election so as to bar
rescission. 0 Although the Court refuses to decide whether defendant
gave notice to plaintiff of his election to rescind, they do hold that he
did not inform plaintiff that he had discontinued use of the unit and
was holding it for plaintiff; nor did he allege that he tendered posses-
sion to plaintiff.
But, the Court holds that even if defendant did give notice of his
election to rescind, his continued use of the furnace after May 1956
waived that right; for at that time defendant was fully aware that plain-
tiff had discontinued his efforts at repair and that the machine was
defective. His continued use for over two years was wholly inconsistent
with the concept that defendant's possession was as a bailee of plaintiff.
Although this decision is supported by authority, such a result seem-
ingly fails to do justice in the light of the position in which the buyer
is placed by the seller's breach of warranty. To put an end to the
bargain under which the buyer received the defective furnace that he
does not want, he must cease using it. Assuming that he can then bring
an action for rescission, what is he to do while the action takes its
course? Live in a cold house? Or buy another furnace, taking a
chance on the hazards of trial before juries and courts, and on the
' Powers v. Rosenbloom, 143 Me. 361, 62 A.2d 531 (1948); cf. Hendrix v. B.
& L. Motors, Inc., 241 N.C. 644, 86 S.E.2d 448 (1955). In Huyett & Smith Mfg.
Co. v. Gray, 124 N.C. 322, 72 S.E. 718 (1899), it was said that a buyer has a
reasonable time in which to test machinery, but once he realizes that the equipment
doesn't meet the warranty, he must then abandon the contract. Continued use is
a waiver of the right to rescind.
" Reech v. Coco, 223 La. 346, 65 So. 2d 790 (1953); Dubinsky v. Lindburg
Cadillac Co., 250 S.W.2d 830 (Mo. App. 1952); cf. Branyon & Peterson, Inc.
v. Fairfax Mfg. Co., 219 S.C. 300, 65 S.E.2d 229 (1951).
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seller's continued solvency? He would face the prospect, if either set
of hazards went against him, of having on his hands a useless extra
furnace, defective and probably unsalable.
The law would be just and realistic if it took into account that it is
the seller who saddled the buyer with an article which, for practical
purposes, he must continue to use. Rescission should be granted not-
withstanding such continued use, but with allowance made for what-
ever, if anything, the buyer has gained by having the use of the de-
fective article.
IMPLIED WARRANTY OF TITLE
In Henry Vann Co. v. Barefoot," plaintiff purchased from defendant
an automobile which had previously been used for the illegal transporta-
tion of alcoholic beverages. The car was later confiscated by federal
agents. Held, plaintiff could recover the reasonable value of the car
on the theory of breach of implied warranty of title, if he could prove
that defendant's title to the car had been divested by the federal courts
prior to the sale in question.
A note in this volume of the Law RevZew 2 discusses this case and
the question of when a cause of action for breach of implied warranty
accrues after the purchase of a precarious title.
TAXATION
PROPERTY TAx-CoNSTITUTIONALITY OF BOND ISSUE To FINANCE
EXTRATERRITORIAL MUNICIPAL IMPROVEMENTS
In Thomasson v. Smith,' the City of Charlotte issued bonds for the
purpose of financing the extension of water and sewer facilities, together
with a fire alarm system, into an area to be annexed to the city at a
fixed future date. Taxes were then levied to meet the payments of
principal and interest on the bonds. These acts were done by the city
after (1) the legislature had given its sanction by authorizing the annex-
ation,2 (2) residents of the area to be annexed had approved the annexa-
tion, and (3) the citizens of the city had approved both the annexation
and the issuance of the bonds. As against objections that such expendi-
tures constituted the taking of property without due process of law3 and
that such expenditures were not for a public purpose,4 it was held that the
-1249 N.C. 22, 105 S.E.2d 104 (1958).
12 See Note, 37 N.C.L. Rxv. 337 (1959).
249 N.C. 84, 105 S.E.2d 416 (1958).
'N.C. Sess. Laws 1957, ch. 802.
'U.S. CoxsT. amend. XIV, § 1; N.C. CoNsT. art. I, § 17.
'N.C. CoNsT. art. V, § 3.
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plan violated neither the United States nor the North Carolina Consti-
tutions. In view of the precautions taken by the city in this case, plain-
tiff, a city resident, was held not entitled to injunctive relief .
Apparently, the courts of the United States have never passed upon
this precise question previously, although some analogous decisions may
be found.6
The 1957 act authorizing the annexation does not specifically grant
to the city the power to issue bonds for the purpose of financing the ex-
tension of services, although it does specifically authorize the extension
itself. However, many laws of general application in North Carolina7
and the charters of many cities8 provide that municipalities may extend
fire, water, and sewer facilities into adjoining areas as they choose.
Thus, in view of the previously existing general powers to make ex-
tensions of services, the Court felt that the 1957 act would be meaning-
less and repetitious unless, in addition, it impliedly authorized the issu-
ance of the bonds. Without power to issue the bonds, the city could not
have proceeded immediately with the extensions which the act spe-
cifically authorized. The Court put great stress upon the fact that the
city voters approved the plan, knowing that no taxes would be paid by
the new citizens until several years later.
INCOME TAx
Method of Computing Depletion Deduction Allowance
In the case of In re Virginia-Carolina Chem. Corp.,0 taxpayer had
taken depletion allowances on certain phosphate mine operations on
the basis of percentage of gross income derived from the property rather
than on the basis of original cost or book value of the assets being de-
pleted. G.S. § 105-147, during the tax years involved, set forth no
criteria for determining depletion allowances and provided only that
taxpayers should be allowed a "reasonable allowance for depletion."
' It was held, however, that the city should be restrained from extending the
fire alarm system beyond two miles from the present city limits in view of the
provisions of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160-238 (1952).
'In re Opinion of the Justices, 264 Ala. 452, 88 So. 2d 778 (1956) ; Briggs v.
City of Raleigh, 195 N.C. 223, 141 S.E. 597 (1928); ef. Ramsey v. Rollins, 246
N.C. 647, 100 S.E.2d 55 (1957). Biit see Santa Barbara County Water
Agency v. All Persons & Parties, 47 Cal. 2d 699, 306 P.2d 875 (1957).
."A municipality may . . . maintain its own . . . water [and] . . . sewer ...
systems to furnish services ... to any person, firm or corporation desiring the same
outside the corporate limits . . . ." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160-255 (Supp. 1957);
"The governing body may provide, install, and maintain water mains, pipes, [and]
• .. hydrants . . .outside of the city limits, for protection against fire of property
outside of the city limits ... ." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160-238 (1952).
' By its charter, the City of Charlotte is authorized "to establish systems of
sewerage ... and to extend and build the same beyond the corporate limits when
deemed necessary, to permit owners of residences or industrial plants outside the
limits ... to connect to the sewerage system .. . ." N.C. Pub.-Local Laws 1939,
ch. 366, § 32(25). City of Charlotte v. Heath, 226 N.C. 750, 40 S.E.2d 600 (1946).
248 N.C. 531, 103 S.E.2d 823 (1958).
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The method utilized by taxpayer was in accord with the federal prac-
tice,20 and had been accepted by the Commissioner of Revenue of North
Carolina for several years. There was no regulation or rule in effect at
the time with respect to the method to be followed in determining a
reasonable depletion allowance. However, by amendment to the statute
in 1953,11 the legislature expressly provided that the method of deter-
mining depletion allowances in case of certain natural resources (in-
cluding phosphate mines) "shall be a certain per centum of the gross
income from the property. . . ." (Emphasis added.)
The Commissioner assessed a deficiency for the tax years ending June
30, 1952, and June 30, 1953, on the theory that the former statute did
not permit the depletion based on percentage of income, but rather
required the depletion to be made on the basis of cost. This action was
brought to recover the assessment paid under protest. Held, (1) in
the absence of a law or regulation to the contrary, taxpayer's method of
accounting was permissible under the statute in effect during the tax
years in question, and (2) the Commissioner, under these facts, was
"without power to make a retroactive regulation increasing [taxpayer's]
.. . tax. '12  The Court determined that the 1953 amendment merely
made mandatory that which formerly had been permissible. It should
be noted that changes in the statute were effected by amendment in
195513 and 1957.14
Net Income Tax on Corporations Engaged Exclusively
in Interstate Commerce
In Eastern Tennessefe & WNC Transp. Co. v. Currie,'5 it was held
that the State of North Carolina could levy a corporate income tax on
the net income of a corporation engaged exclusively in interstate com-
merce, so long as the tax was based on the company's income reason-
ably attributable to its interstate business performed within this state.
The method of apportionment of total income to North Carolina, as
prescribed by G.S. § 105-134 as it then existed,1 6 was to use the ratio
of the company's gross receipts in this state during the income year
to its gross receipts for the year both within and without the state.
11 IxT Rav. CODE OF 1954, § 613. A depletion allowance based on a percentage
of gross income from the property during the taxable year is allowed due to the
highly speculative nature of the time of exhaustion of a mineral deposit. This is
in contrast with the allowance of depreciation for buildings and equipment whose
useful life and replacement cost can be accurately estimated. United States v.
Ludey, 274 U.S. 295 (1927).
SN.C Sess. Laws 1953, ch. 1031.
1-248 N.C. at 538, 103 S.E.2d at 828.
" N.C. Sess. Laws 1955, ch. 1331.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-147(12) (1958).
15248 N.C. 560, 104 S.E.2d 403 (1958), aff'd, 359 U.S. 28 (1959). See CoNsTI-
TuTIoNAL LAW, State Tax on Income Derived from Interstate Business, supra.
"
6N.C. Pub. Laws 1939, ch. 158, § 311 (II) (3).
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The tax was sustained against attacks based on both the commerce
clause and the due process clause of the federal constitution. The Court
dismissed summarily a suggestion that the company was not "doing
business" in North Carolina so as not to be subject to taxation by the
state.
In 1957, G.S. § 105-134 was completely rewritten1 and an entirely
new method of apportionment was substituted.18
INSURANCE POLICY PREMIUMS TAX
In American Equitable Assur. Co. v. Gold,19 the Court declared un-
constitutional the 1957 act 20 creating a firemen's pension fund. One
source of revenue for the fund was a tax21 of one dollar for every one
hundred dollars in premiums derived from fire and lightning policies sold
in North Carolina in areas with fire protection. The tax was to be paid
by the fire insurance companies. However, the act specifically provided
that the premium was to be increased by the amount of the specified pay-
ment. Thus, the burden of the payment was placed directly on the
citizens purchasing insurance and not on the insurance companies. This
levy, then, was clearly a tax on the citizens buying fire insurance con-
tracts, and not a license tax imposed on the insurance companies as a
condition to writing insurance in this state.
The act was held unconstitutional because it exempted from the pro-
visions of the taxing section the so-called Farmers Mutual Fire In-
surance Associations. 22 These companies23 are not controlled or super-
vised by the North Carolina Fire Insurance Rating Bureau, and they
operate on an unlimited assessment liability plan. In many areas, these
companies were in direct competition with those insurance companies
whose policies were subject to the tax. It was held that this exemption
of the designated associations from the coverage of the act destroyed the
uniformity of the tax, thereby depriving the other insurance companies
of the equal protection of the laws and resulting in a taking of property
without due process of law. An unbroken line of decisions construes
article V, section 3 of the North Carolina Constitution as requiring that
the rule of uniformity be applied to all taxes which the legislature is
authorized to levy.
24
"
7N.C. Sess. Laws 1957, ch. 1340, art. 4(c).
1"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-134(6) (d) (1958).
19249 N.C. 461, 106 S.E.2d 875 (1959). This case is also treated in CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW, Regulation of Business, supra.
"0 N.C. Sess. Laws 1957, ch. 1420.
"
1N.C. GEN. STAT. § 118-20 (1958).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 118-37 (1958).
"
8These companies are organized under the provisions of N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 58-77(5) (d) (1950).
" C. D. Kenny Co. v. Town of Brevard, 217 N.C. 269, 7 S.E.2d 542 (1940)
(municipal privilege tax) ; Leonard v. Maxwell, 216 N.C. 89, 3 S.E.2d 316 (1939)
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The act was reenacted by the 1959 legislature with the hope that
the constitutional objections might be avoided.2 5
TORTS
NEGLIGENCE
Emergency Doctrine'
"One who is required to act in an emergency is not held by the law
to the wisest choice of conduct, but only to such choice as a person of
ordinary care and prudence, similarly situated, would have made."'2
This emergency doctrine was found to be applicable to the factual situa-
tion presented in Cocknman v. Powers.3 Plaintiff telephoned defendant
around midnight to come to see her to discuss the matter of her re-
employment with his firm. This he did with reluctance after expressing
the desire to wait until the next morning. As defendant sat under the
steering wheel of his car in plaintiff's driveway, with plaintiff seated on
the edge of the back seat, her legs extending out the open door, plaintiff's
husband unexpectedly returned in a violent mood. After the husband
"jerked plaintiff by her hand or arm," he then started for defendant, who
quickly started the car and began backing out the driveway. Plaintiff
was caught in the open door and was dragged six to eight feet, receiving
injuries for which she sought recovery. The Court affirmed the in-
voluntary nonsuit granted below, holding that the only reasonable in-
ference under the circumstances was that defendant's action was that of
a reasonably prudent man in an emergency situation.
In considering the emergency doctrine, the Court pointed out that
defendant would have been precluded from availing himself of it "if such
emergency was caused, wholly or in material part, by his own negligent
or wrongful act." (Emphasis added.) 4  Stress was placed on de-
(sales tax) ; Hilton v. Harris, 207 N.C. 465, 177 S.E. 411 (1934) (municipal fran-
chise tax) ; Roach v. City of Durham, 204 N.C. 587, 169 S.E. 149 (1933) (license
or privilege tax); Clark v. Maxwell, 197 N.C. 604, 150 S.E. 190 (1929) (truck li-
cense tax); Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Daughton, 196 N.C. 145, 144 S.E. 701 (1928)(license tax) ; State v. Williams, 158 N.C. 611, 73 S.E. 1000 (1912) (license tax) ;
Worth v. Petersburg R.R., 89 N.C. 301 (1883) (privilege or franchise tax);
Gatlin v. Town of Tarboro, 78 N.C. 119 (1878) (privilege tax).
25 N.C. Sess. Laws 1959, ch. 1212.
'For a discussion of the application of this doctrine in North Carolina see Note,
33 N.C.L. REv. 321 (1955).2 Ingle v. Cassady, 208 N.C. 497, 499, 181 S.E. 562, 563 (1935). For repetitions
and variations of this statement, see Mills v. Waters, 235 N.C. 424, 70 S.E.2d 11(1952) ; Powell v. Lloyd, 234 N.C. 481, 67 S.E.2d 664 (1951) ; Sparks v. Willis,
228 N.C. 25, 44 S.E.2d 343 (1947) ; Hoke v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 227 N.C.
412, 42 S.E.2d 593 (1947).
3248 N.C. 403, 103 S.E.2d 710 (1958).
'Id. at 407, 103 S.E.2d at 713.
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fendant's reluctance to go to plaintiff's house and the circumstances in-
dicating the innocence of the visit, the inference being that if the mid-
night visit had been improper, then the emergency doctrine might not
have been applicable. The Court concluded that though defendant's go-
ing to plaintiff's home might have been indiscreet, the emergency was
created wholly by the violence of plaintiff's husband, and not by any
wrongful act on the part of defendant.
Concurring Negligence
Plaintiff was injured as the result of an intersection collision between
an automobile driven by A, in which she was a passenger, and a vehicle
operated by B. A was driving along a dominant highway and B ap-
proached from a servient highway along which a stop sign was erected.
Plaintiff averred that the joint and concurrent negligence of A and B
was the proximate cause of her injury, while each defendant denied his
negligence and claimed the collision to be the result of the sole negligence
of the other. Both defendants' motions for nonsuits were denied and
judgment was entered on a verdict against them.5
A new trial was granted as to each defendant because of errors com-
mitted in the charge. A, in claiming that a nonsuit should have been
granted as to her, relied on the doctrine of insulating negligence. 0 The
Court cited cases 7 in which it was held that the negligence of the
driver entering the dominant thoroughfare from the servient road could
not have been foreseen and that this unforeseen intervening act insulated
the negligence of the driver on the dominant road. In the principal case
the Court refused to apply the doctrine, apparently basing such refusal
on the fact that a consideration of the evidence in the most favorable
light for plaintiff showed that defendant A failed to take prompt action
to slow down her car after she discovered or could have discovered that
defendant B was not going to stop. The Court did not cite Loving v.
Whitton," a case with strikingly similar facts. In that case the dom-
inant highway defendant's demurrer ore tenus was sustained on the
ground that his negligence was insulated even though the complaint
'Primm v. King, 249 N.C. 228, 106 S.E.2d 223 (1958).
"The test by which the negligent conduct of one is to be insulated as a matter
of law by the independent negligent act of another, is reasonable unforeseeability on
the part of the original actor of the subsequent intervening act and resultant injury."
Butner v. Spease, 217 N.C. 82, 89, 6 S.E.2d 808, 812 (1940), quoted in Moore v.
Town of Plymouth, 249 N.C. 423, 434, 106 S.E.2d 695, 703 (1959) and White v.
Dickerson, Inc., 248 N.C. 723, 731, 105 S.E.2d 51, 57-58 (1958). Intervening or
insulating negligence is the subject of Note, 33 N.C.L. Rav. 498 (1955).
'Garner v. Pittman, 237 N.C. 328, 75 S.E.2d 111 (1953) ; Reeves v. Staley, 220
N.C. 573, 18 S.E.2d 239 (1942). See also Hawes v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 236 N.C.
643, 74 S.E.2d 17 (1953), quoted in Williamson v. Randall, 248 N.C. 20, 24, 102
S.E.2d 381, 385 (1958), where it was said that one driving along a dominant high-
way is under no duty to anticipate that the driver on the servient highway will not
obey the stop sign.8241 N.C. 273, 84 S.E.2d 919 (1954).
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contained an allegation that he failed to keep a proper lookout. It was
said in the Loving case, however, that there was no allegation that the
dominant driver, "in the exercise of due care, should have observed that
[the servient driver] did not intend to stop in ample time for him [the
dominant driver] to decrease his speed or stop and avoid the collision."
Thus, it appears that the distinction between the two lines of cases
turns upon whether the driver on the dominant highway should have
realized that the servient driver was not going to stop. If so, then the
negligence of the servient driver is not unforeseeable, and the predicate
of the doctrine of insulating negligence has been undercut. While this
has a certain logical appeal, as a practical matter the distinction is tenu-
ous and hard to apply to fact situations which arise frequently. More-
over, a difficult problem of proof is presented. Yet the distinction would
appear sound where it was clear that the servient driver was not going
to stop, e.g., where he was traveling sixty-five miles per hour while
only twenty feet from the intersection. It is in the borderline situation
where the problem is acute. In any event, it would seem that the plain-
tiff would be well-advised to include an allegation in his complaint that
the dominant driver should have observed that the servient driver did
not intend to stop, if he wishes to maintain his suit against both drivers
on the theory of concurring negligence.
The doctrine of insulating negligence was found to be applicable in
Howze v. McCall." There, defendant A left his car parked on the high-
way at night with no lights and plaintiff, who applied his brakes upon
seeing the parked vehicle, was struck from behind by defendant B, who
was found to be driving negligently. The demurrer ore tenus of de-
fendant A was sustained. The Court said that there would have been
no collision had it not been for the negligence of defendant B and held
that his negligence was the sole proximate cause of the injury. It would
seem that it was foreseeable that A's act would result in injury to
someone in some way." Should A be excused because the accident oc-
curred by plaintiff's car being struck from behind, rather than by plain-
tiff's car striking the parked vehicle?
The holding in Smith v. Thompson12 that a release of the original
tortfeasor operates as a bar to a subsequent suit for malpractice against
the physician treating the original injuries was reaffirmed in Bell v.
Hankins,13 where the action which was settled was for wrongful death.
0 241 N.C. at 276, 84 S.E.2d at 922.10249 N.C. 250, 106 S.E.2d 236 (1958). This case is also discussed under
CIVIL PROCEDURE (PLEADING AND PARms), Demurrer, supra.
'See note 6 supra.12 210 N.C. 672, 188 S.E. 395 (1936). For a criticism of the result in this case,
see Note, 15 N.C.L. REV. 293 (1936).
13249 N.C. 199, 105 S.E.2d 642 (1958). The facts of this case are set out under
TRIAL PRAcricE, Judgments, Res Judicata, supra. (Although the case is men-
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Contributory Negligence
In Tew v. Runnels,14 the Court found contributory negligence as
a matter of law, and hence error in denial of defendant's nonsuit motion,
where it appeared that plaintiff's intestate was owner of the car and rode
in the seat beside the intoxicated defendant-driver, repeatedly urging him
to drive faster and "stomping" his foot on the driver's foot and pushing
down the accelerator. The decision emphasized that plaintiff's intestate,
although intoxicated, was not too drunk to know what was going on.
Although the result of the case seems sound, it should be noted that
the Court cited Harper v. Harper'5 with apparent approval. In that
case, where the owner of the car was present and someone else was
driving, it was said that the owner was deemed to be in control of the
car and the negligence of the driver was imputed to him. This rule
would appear sound where the owner is suing a third person, 1 but the
Harper case applied it in a suit by the owner against the driver. In
such a situation, the driver should not be allowed to hide behind his own
negligence. Where the doctrine of joint enterprise was involved, the
Court has taken the position that the doctrine as a defense is applicable
only as to third persons and not to parties to the enterprise. A mem-
ber of the joint enterprise is liable for negligence which results in in-
jury to another member of the joint enterprise.Y' The result of the
Harper case seems inconsistent with this view.
Evidence that plaintiff entered an intersection under a green light
without maintaining a lookout for traffic along the intersecting street was
held not to be contributory negligence as a matter of law in Currin v.
Williams.'8
Where plaintiff was driving along a city street at dawn about thirty
miles per hour with his headlights on "dim" and struck an unlighted tree
which was felled by a hurricane three days before, it was held'0 as a
matter of law that his failure to exercise due care was a proximate cause
of his injury.20
tioned here under "Concurring Negligence," the parties are actually several, notjoint, tortfeasors, with the doctor "occupying somewhat the position of a joint
tortfeasor." See 210 N.C. at 678, 188 S.E. at 398.)
11249 N.C. 1, 105 S.E.2d 108 (1958).
1t;225 N.C. 260, 34 S.E.2d 185 (1945).
"BSee PROsz, TORTS § 54 (2d ed. 1955).
Rollison v. Hicks, 233 N.C. 99, 63 S.E2d 190 (1951), cited in Note, 30
N.C.L. Rzv. 179 at 182. See also PRossm, TORTS § 65 (2d ed. 1955).
248 N.C. 32, 102 S.E.2d 455 (1958). This case is discussed in Note, 37 N.C.L.
Rxv. 215 (1959).
'- Smith v. City of Kinston, 249 N.C. 160, 105 S.E.2d 648 (1958).
20 Although the Court did not squarely treat the case as one of "outrunning"
headlights, it apparently regarded this as a factor in plaintiff's failure to exercise
due care. Mention was made of N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-129 and 20-131 (1953) and
Pike v. Seymour, 222 N.C. 42, 21 S.E.2d 884 (1942), all dealing with the headlight
problem.
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Even though defendant may have violated a statute21 and was neg-
ligent in failing to sound her horn while passing, plaintiff's failure to
give a hand signal in attempting a "U" turn with his tractor was held
to be the proximate cause of the resulting collision.22
In Walston v. Greene,2 the Court, after reviewing long lines of de-
cisions from other jurisdictions, squarely held for the first time that as a
matter of law a child under seven years of age is incapable of contribu-
tory negligence. The conclusion was reached not as an analogy to the
criminal law, but "because a child under 7 years of age lacks the dis-
cretion, judgment and mental capacity to discern and appreciate cir-
cumstances of danger that threaten its safety."2 4
Proximate Cause
The Court has repeatedly taken the position that foreseeability is a
requisite of proximate cause.2 5  It is also frequently stated that the
negligent party need not have been able to foresee the particular injury
as it in fact occurred, but only that consequences of a generally injurious
nature should have been expected.2 6  The Court's application of this
latter principle in specific fact situations does not appear to be consistent.
For example, in Adams v. State Bd. of Educ.,27 an eleven year old
child slid into the revolving, unguarded blades of a lawnmower while
playing chase on the school grounds. According to plaintiff's evidence,
he did not notice the lawnmower until he was three feet away. When
he tried to turn and avoid it, his foot slipped on the wet grass. The
Industrial Commission found that plaintiff was barred from recovery by
his own contributory negligence in failing to keep a proper lookout and
to slow down after being warned of the presence of the mower by the
noise of its motor. In holding the evidence insufficient to support this
finding the Court said: "[I]t is inferable that if the plaintiff's pivot foot
had not slipped on the wet grass, he would have made his turn in safety.
This being so, can it be said that in failing to heed the noise of the
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-149 (1953).
" Tallent v. Talbert, 249 N.C. 149, 105 S.E.2d 426 (1958). "Neither plaintiff's
age nor lack of literary capacity sufficed, in view of his positive testimony with
respect to his experience in operating tractors .. . , to relieve him from responsi-
bility for his negligence." Id. at 151, 105 S.E.2d at 427-28.
2 247 N.C. 693, 102 S.E.2d 124 (1958).
"Id. at 696, 102 S.E.2d at 126. Two dissenters pointed out that children go
to school at six (the child in the principal case lacked three months of being seven)
and that the contributory negligence of such a child should be a question of fact
for the jury taking into consideration the child's age, capacity, and experience.
" See Davis v. Carolina Power and Light Co., 238 N.C. 106, 76 S.E.2d 378(1953) and the cases there cited.
"°Boone v. North Carolina R.R. Co., 240 N.C. 152, 81 S.E.2d 380 (1954);
Hart v. Curry, 238 N.C. 448, 78 S.E.2d 170 (1953) ; Hall v. Coble Dairies, Inc.,
234 N.C. 206, 67 S.E.2d 63 (1951) ; McIntyre v. Monarch Elevator and Mach. Co.,
230 N.C. 539, 54 S.E.2d 45 (1949).
27 248 N.C. 506, 103 S.E.2d 854 (1958). See also ADmiNiSTRATIvE LAW, supra.
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motor and turn sooner, the plaintiff, eleven year old boy, should have
reasonably foreseen injurious results? We think not."128 In emphasizing
that plaintiff's foot slipped on the wet grass, the Court would seem to
be requiring that plaintiff foresee the particular injury as it in fact
occurred, rather than requiring foreseeability of generally injurious con-
sequences by reason of his failure to keep a proper lookout and to slow
down after being warned of the presence of the mower.
That the Court on occasion will require only that generally injurious
results be foreseen is indicated by Sledge v. Wagoner.2 9 There a maga-
zine rack was located in close proximity to the doorway of defendants'
restaurant. A snag protruded one half inch from the rack and four
inches above the floor. Recovery was allowed for the injury sustained
by plaintiff when his trousers cuff caught on the snag and caused him
to fall.30
Owners and Occupiers of Land
In Williams v. McSwain,8 ' the question was whether plaintiff's in-
testate was an invitee of the defendant, who maintained recreational facil-
ities on a portion of a state-owned lake. Plaintiff's intestate, who was
swimming near defendant's pier, was killed by the propeller of a motor
boat leaving the pier. Since there was no evidence that the deceased had
used, or intended to use, defendant's beach, the Court held that there
was not sufficient evidence to support the allegation that deceased was
an invitee. The result of the case appears sound, because there was no
showing that deceased could not have been reasonably expected to
know, understand, and appreciate the hazard. 82 But it seems arguable
that the very fact that plaintiff's intestate was struck in an area near
defendant's pier and in the path of the boat embarking from the pier
would be presumptive of his acceptance of defendant's invitation to use
the facilities he had provided. The evidence was also found insufficient
to establish a breach by the boat operator of his duty to maintain a
proper lookout because there was no showing that plaintiff was so situ-
ated that he should have been seen by a boat operator. The Court said:
"Without some warning to the contrary the duty of those in charge of
a boat to maintain a lookout is limited to objects on or above the surface
of navigable waters."8 8
I81d. at 516, 103 S.E.2d at 861.
'248 N.C. 631, 104 S.E.2d 195 (1958).
30 "[I]t is manifest that the plaintiff's testimony justifies the inference that the
defendants should have foreseen that consequences of a generally injurious nature
would likely result from their conduct in leaving the magazine rack so near the
door . . . ." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 636, 104 S.E.2d at 199.
' 248 N.C. 13, 102 S.E.2d 464 (1958).
On this point the Court cited and quoted from Harris v. Nachamson Dep't
Stores Co., 247 N.C. 195, 100 S.E.2d 323 (1957) and RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 343(1934).
11 248 N.C. at 19, 102 S.E.2d at 468. The evidence revealed only that the acci-
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Where plaintiff, due to the rain, hurriedly entered her place of em-
ployment through the properly designated entrance and struck her head
on a scaffold brace, it was held34 that she was an invitee, not licensee, of
defendant independent contractor who erected the scaffolding. The
duty was thus imposed on defendant to exercise the care of a reasonably
prudent person not to render the passageway dangerous. The Court
rejected the contention that plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a
matter of law and held that the question of her negligence was properly
submitted to the jury.
Owners of Animalk
"The liability of the owner of animals for permitting them to escape
upon public highways, in case they do damage to travelers or others law-
fully thereon, rests upon the question whether the keeper is guilty of
negligence in permitting them to escape."3 5 In Shaw v. Joyce,8 6 evi-
dence that the wire fence was old, that the gate was a tobacco slide, that
the mule had escaped from the pasture both on the day of and the night
before the collision, and that defendant knew these facts, was held
sufficient to warrant submission to the jury the question of defendant's
negligence in an action to recover damages to plaintiff's car resulting
from a collision with defendant's mule.
State Tort Claims Act
The State.Tort Claims Act37 permits recovery for a "negligent act,"3 8
as distinguished from a negligent omission.39 Lawson v. State Highway
Comm'n4" represents a somewhat liberal construction of what constitutes
a "negligent act." Plaintiff's intestate, a prisoner working under the
supervision of a state employee, was removing debris from the highway
after Hurricane Hazel when he was electrocuted upon coming in contact
with a live wire. The Industrial Commission made findings that the
guard was negligent in not ascertaining that the prisoners could work
in safety and in not notifying the power companies to cut off the elec-
dent occurred near a buoy, and did not negative the possibility that deceased might
have been hidden behind the buoy and swum underwater into the path of the boat.
The liability of owners or operators of motorboats for personal injury or prop-
erty damage is the subject of an exhaustive annotation in 63 A.L.R.2d 343 (1959).
" Bemont v. Isenhour, 249 N.C. 106, 105 S.E.2d 431 (1958).
"Gardner v. Black, 217 N.C. 573, 576, 9 S.E.2d 10, 11 (1940).
38249 N.C. 415, 106 S.E.2d 459 (1959).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-291 through 143-300.1 (1958).
"
8N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-291 (1958).
"' Recovery has been denied where the negligent act was failure to fill holes in
the highway since this was an act of omission and not of commission. Flynn v.
State Highway and Public Works Comm'n, 244 N.C. 617, 94 S.E.2d 571 (1956) ;
Floyd v. State Highway and Public Works Comm'n, 241 N.C. 461, 85 S.E.2d 703(1955).
40248 N.C. 276, 103 S.E.2d 366 (1958). Another aspect of this case is con-
sidered under AGENCY AND WORKMEN'S ComPENsATIoN, Rights and Remedies
Exclusive, supra.
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tricity. Its award was appealed to the superior court where it was
reversed upon a finding that the negligence of the employee consisted of
a failure to act and was thus not within the statute.
The Court reversed, holding that the employee's omissions in respect
to ascertaining the safety of the working area were but circumstances
of the true negligent act, viz., putting the prisoners to work in an area
of hidden danger. In support of its position, the Court cited Greene v.
Mitchell County Bd. of Educ.,41 where a school bus struck a child who
had just emerged from the bus, and Lyon & Sons v. State Bd. of Educ.,42
where a school bus backed into an automobile. Of these cases the Court
said: "The driver's failure to exercise due care to observe the child in
front of the bus (Greene case) or the the [sic] automobile behind the bus
(Lyon case) did not proximately cause the injury or damage. The fact
that the driver operated the bus under such circumstances was the neg-
ligent act that proximately caused the injury or damage. 43
FALSE IMPRISONMENT
In Mobley v. Broone,44 it was held that the one-year statute of limi-
tations on actions for false imprisonment starts running at the end of
the imprisonment involved and not from the time of the termination of
the proceedings in which the imprisonment occurred. In a dictum the
Court repeated a statement which has appeared in at least four previous
cases45 to the effect that false imprisonment generally includes an assault
and battery and always at least a technical assault.40 It would seem that
such language is inconsistent with that in Martin v. Houck 47 "A false
imprisonment may be committed by words alone .... It is not necessary
that the individual be ... assaulted." While it is not altogether clear
what will constitute a "technical assault," perhaps making it a requisite
of false imprisonment is indicative of a trend on the part of the Court
to restrict the scope of the tort.
AUTOmOBILES
Cases since the last SURVEY which involved motor vehicles may be
categorized as follows: eight involved collisions between vehicles at
,1237 N.C. 336, 75 S.E.2d 129 (1953).42238 N.C. 24, 76 S.E.2d 553 (1953).
43248 N.C. at 281, 103 S.E.2d at 370.
"248 N.C. 54, 102 S.E.2d 407 (1958). This case is also treated under CIVIL
PaOCEDURE (PLEADING AND PARTas), Affirmative Defenses, supra.
"'Hoffman v. Clinic Hosp., Inc., 213 N.C. 669, 197 S.E. 161 (1938) ; Parrish v.
Boysell Mfg. Co., 211 N.C. 7, 188 S.E. 817 (1936); State v. Reavis, 113 N.C. 678,
18 S.E. 388 (1893) ; State v. Lunsford, 81 N.C. 528 (1879).
" Where plaintiff was told she could not leave the hospital until her bill was
paid, an action for false imprisonment was nonsuited for failure to show a reason-
able apprehension that force would be used to detain her. Hoffman v. Clinic Hosp.,
Inc., supra note 45. The two elements of false imprisonment are involuntary re-
straint and its unlawfulness. Ibid.
'" 141 N.C. 317, 324, 54 S.E. 291, 293-94 (1906).
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intersections ;48 six arose where pedestrians or children were struck ;49
three concerned collisions where one of the vehicles was turning ;50 three
involved automobiles striking obstacles in the road ;51 two grew out of
head-on collisions;52 two involved wrecks where automobiles left the
highway ;53 one concerned a collision with a parked car;51 one was the
result of a train-car collision ;55 one involved a collision where a truck
backed into the highway from a private entrance; 56 one resulted from an
automobile-bicycle accident ;57 and one arose from an injury sustained
when a trailer tongue broke.r s
TRIAL AND APPELLATE PRACTICE
PRocEss
On several occasions in recent years the Court has had before it
the problem of jurisdiction over non-resident labor unions. Under G.S.
§ 1-97(6) a non-resident unincorporated association such as a labor
union which is doing business in North Carolina may have process
served on it by service on the secretary of state. In Youngblood v.
Bright1 and Martin v. Local 71, Teamsters Union, AFL-CIO,2 service
on the foreign labor union was attempted by serving the secretary of
state pursuant to the above statute. In each case the trial court upheld
' Primm v. King, 249 N.C. 228, 106 S.E.2d 223 (1958); Strickland v.
Williams, 249 N.C. 47, 105 S.E.2d 92 (1958); Williams v. Sossoman's Funeral
Home, Inc., 248 N.C. 524, 103 S.E.2d 714 (1958); Moody v. Massey, 248 N.C.
329, 103 S.E.2d 338 (1958) ; McEwen Funeral Serv., Inc. v. Charlotte City Coach
Lines, Inc., 248 N.C. 146, 102 S.E.2d 816 (1958) ; Wilson v. Kennedy, 248 N.C.
74, 102 S.E.2d 459 (1958); Currin v. Williams, 248 N.C. 32, 102 S.E.2d 455(1958); Williamson v. Randall, 248 N.C. 20, 102 S.E.2d 381 (1958).
"Womble v. McGilvery, 249 N.C. 418, 106 S.E.2d 483 (1959); McNeill v.
Bullock, 249 N.C. 416, 106 S.E.2d 509 (1959); Washington v. Davis, 249 N.C.
65, 105 S.E.2d 202 (1958); Hunt v. Davis, 248 N.C. 69, 102 S.E.2d 405 (1958);
Walston v. Greene, 247 N.C. 693, 102 S.E.2d 124 (1958); Hodgin v. Guilford
Tractor and Implement Co., 247 N.C. 578, 101 S.E.2d 323 (1958).
CO Tallent v. Talbert, 249 N.C. 149, 105 S.E.2d 426 (1958) ; McFalls v. Smith,
249 N.C. 123, 105 S.E.2d 297 (1958); Hutchins v. Corbett, 248 N.C. 422, 103
S.E.2d 497 (1958).1 Shaw v. Joyce, 249 N.C. 415, 106 S.E.2d 459 (1959) ; Smith v. City of Kin-
ston, 249 N.C. 160, 105 S.E.2d 648 (1958); White v. Dickerson, Inc., 248 N.C.
723, 105 S.E.2d 51 (1958).
"2 Moore v. Town of Plymouth, 249 N.C. 423, 106 S.E.2d 695 (1959) ; Tew v.
Runnels, 249 N.C. 1, 105 S.E.2d 108 (1958).
" Tatum v. Tippett, 249 N.C. 46, 105 S.E.2d 98 (1958) ; Stegall v. Sledge, 247
N.C. 718, 102 S.E.2d 115 (1958).
"'Howze v. McCall, 249 N.C. 250, 106 S.E.2d 236 (1958).
High v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 248 N.C. 414, 103 S.E.2d 498 (1958).
CO Smith v. Dick Mason Lumber Co., Inc., 249 N.C. 48, 105 S.E.2d 122 (1958).
C? Anderson v. Luther, 249 N.C. 128, 105 S.E.2d 293 (1958),
C" Webster v. Webster, 247 N.C. 588, 101 S.E.2d 325 (1958),
1 243 N.C. 599, 91 S.E.2d 559 (1956).
2248 N.C. 409, 103 S.E.2d 462 (1958). This case is briefly commented on in
LABOR LAW, Unincorporated Labor Unions, supra.
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the service, but in neither did it find as a fact that the defendant labor
union was doing business in North Carolina. Both cases were remanded
by the Supreme Court with instructions that the trial court consider evi-
dence and find the facts as to whether the defendant union was "doing
business in North Carolina by performing acts in this State for which
it was formed."
In Beaty v. International Ass'n of Asbestos Workers,3 three foreign
labor unions sought to dismiss plaintiff's action on the ground that
service on the secretary of state pursuant to G.S. § 1-97(6) was in-
effective and on the further ground that said statute was unconstitutional
as violating the requirement of due process. The trial court upheld the
service and made detailed findings of fact tending to establish the activi-
ties of the foreign "International" unions in this state, largely through
supervisory activities over the local unions. The Supreme Court held
that the facts as found by the trial judge established the "doing of busi-
ness" by the foreign unions in North Carolina. It also held that the
statute was clearly constitutional in the light of the International Shoe
Co.4 case and other United States Supreme Court decisions of the same
character. In addition, the foreign unions had failed to argue the con-
stitutionality aspect on appeal, so that ground, although deemed un-
tenable in fact, was declared abandoned pursuant to Supreme Court Rule
28.
G.S. § 1-105 provides for service on non-residents through serving
the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles for causes of action arising out of
the operation of a motor vehicle in this state by, for, or under the ex-
press or implied control of the non-resident. In Pressley v. Turner,u
the defendant foreign corporation, Parents' Institute, Inc., had engaged
the services of Geraldine Markham and put her in charge of defendant's
local office in North Carolina. She used her own car in carrying on
the business of the defendant which was selling magazines. Since com-
pensation was paid Geraldine on a commission basis, the defendant con-
tended she was not an employee but an independent contractor. At the
time of the accident Geraldine was driving her car on business of the
defendant. The Supreme Court upheld the service of process, finding
that the evidence established "agency with its inherent right to control."
In view of the fact that the defendant foreign corporation was found to be
doing business in this state, service on it could also have been made un-
der provisions of G.S. § 1-97 as well as under G.S. § 1-105.
248 N.C. 170, 102 S.E.2d 767 (1958). The case is briefly commented on in
LABOR LAW, Unincorporated Labor Unions, supra, and CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, FED-
ERAL AND INTERSTATE QuEsTIONs, supra.
• 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
=249 N.C. 102, 105 S.E.2d 289 (1958.)
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In Bulman v. Southern Baptist Convention," service was attempted
on the defendant, a corporation of Georgia, by.serving the secretary of
state pursuant to G.S. § 1-97. The trial judge found the defendant,
Southern Baptist Convention, maintained no office in this state and was
not doing business in North Carolina. He accordingly held the at-
tempted service invalid. On appeal the plaintiff attacked the lower
court's findings of fact in various assignments of error. The plaintiff
had not, however, noted any exceptions to the findings of fact in the
case on appeal. The Supreme Court, therefore, in line with its well
settled practice, refused to consider the assignments of error which
attacked the fact findings but were not supported by exceptions. It held
that since on the facts found, the Baptist Convention was not doing
business in North Carolina the attempted service was invalid.
Shepard v. Rhelem Mfg. Co. 7 again presented to the Court the ques-
tion of the constitutionality of G.S. § 55-145 (a) (3). Under that statute
a foreign corporation is subject to suit by a resident of this state, whether
or not it is transacting business in this state, on any cause of action
arising "out of the production, manufacture, or distribution of goods by
such corporation with the reasonable expectation that those goods are to
be used or consumed in this State and are so used or consumed, regard-
less of how or where the goods were produced, manufactured, marketed,
or sold or whether or not through the medium of independent contractors
or dealers." The statute had been held unconstitutional upon the facts
involved in Putnam v. Triangle Publications8 and Erlanger Mills, Inc.
v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, Inc.9
Service of process on the secretary of state pursuant to the statute
was upheld and the act found constitutional as applied to the facts in the
Shepard case. Plaintiff alleged she had suffered injuries as the result of
the explosion of a gas water heater negligently manufactured by the
defendant foreign corporation and shipped into North Carolina as a
result of sales made to wholesalers consummated outside this state but
solicited within North Carolina. While the defendant maintained no
agents or employees in this state other than the soliciting agents and
although no contracts were consummated in North Carolina, the activi-
ties of the corporation were found to fall within G.S. § 55-145 (a) (3)
and to provide a sufficient minimum contact with the state to make it
amenable to process.
8248 N.C. 392, 103 S.E.2d 487 (1958).
7249 N.C. 454, 106 S.E.2d 704 (1959). This case is also commented on in
CONSTITUTIoNAL LAW, FEDERAL AND INTERSTATE QuEsTIONs, supra.
S245 N.C. 432, 96 S.E.2d 445 (1957).
'239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956). See Note, 34 N.C.L. Rav. 546 (1957) and Com-
ment, 36 N.C.L. REv. 458 (1958).
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WAIVER OF PROCESS
In East Carolina Lumber Co. v. West,'0 a collateral attack was made
on a judgment of the superior court appointing a receiver. It was con-
tended that process on the defendant in the receivership suit had not
been served by a proper person and that accordingly there was no juris-
diction. The Court refused to pass upon the propriety of the service
and instead, found the attack failed by reason of the fact that the de-
fendant in the receivership suit had consented to various continuances
and hence had entered a general appearance waiving any alleged defect
in the service of process. The point of significance in the case is that,
while orders of continuance asserted that they were by consent, the
orders lacked the signature of either the defendant or his counsel although
they did contain the signature of counsel for the plaintiff and counsel for
a third party. In finding the defendant had consented despite the lack
of signature in his behalf, the Court said, "To recite that a party had
consented when not subject to the jurisdiction of the court would indeed
be irregular and contrary to the record of Judge Daniels who for twenty
five years served with ability as a judge of the Superior Court. It would
not'accord with the presumption that proceedings in courts of general
jurisdiction are regular."
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
In 1955 the legislature by an amendment to G.S. § 97-24 enlarged the
time within which an employee may file a claim f6r compensation to two
years from the former one year period. In McCrater v. Stone & Webster
Engineering Corp.," the injury occurred on April 7, 1955, and claim
for compensation was filed July 30, 1956, more than one year but less
than two years from the date of the injury. The Court held that the
time limitation period in the Workmen's Compensation statute was in
the nature of a condition precedent rather than the customary statute of
limitations. Further, the Court held that the time limitation as it existed
at the time of the accident was the limitation that controlled and subse-
quent amendment to the statute could not enlarge the conditional limita-
tion existing at the time of injury.
ABATEMENT
In Pittman v. Pittman,12 plaintiffs brought suit to recover certain
land and to remove a cloud on the title. They claimed to be the widow
and heirs at law of one Archie Pittman who had died intestate as the
owner of the land. They asserted that the defendant Nellie Pittman
claimed an interest in the real estate, she- contending that she was the
A-247 N.C. 699, 102 S.E.2d 248 (1958).
11248 N.C. 707, 104 S.E.2d 858 (1958).
12248 N.C. 738, 104 S.E.2d 880 (1958).
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wife of the deceased and had an estate by the entirety in the land. The
defendant Nellie filed a plea in abatement in which she alleged that she
had been appointed administratrix of the estate of Archie on the theory
that she was Archie's widow and that one of the plaintiffs herein, Cath-
erine Pittman, had brought a proceeding before the clerk to remove her
as administratrix on the ground that she, Catherine, and not Nellie was
the lawful widow of Archie. The proceeding for removal is still pend-
ing before the clerk.
The trial judge overruled the plea in abatement and was affirmed in
this action by the Supreme Court which said that the parties were not
the same in both proceedings and that the mere fact the vital issue of
who was the widow was common to both proceedings did not sanction
the plea.
CONTINUANCE
In Cleeland v. Cleeland,'3 counsel for the wife and mother in a
custody proceeding sought a continuance on the ground of the inability
of his client to appear in court because of her intoxication. The trial
judge denied the continuance and awarded custody to the father. On
appeal the action of the trial judge was affirmed, the Court finding that
there was manifestly no abuse of discretion in the denial of the continu-
ance under the circumstances. In the same case the Court held that
although an original decree in Virginia had given custody to the wife,
since that decree was subject to modification in Virginia, and since the
children were now in North Carolina, this state could reassign custody
in accordance with the present situation. Such action would not be a
denial of full faith and credit to the Virginia decree.
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT
In Hill v. Parker,4 the complaint alleged a cause of action for dam-
ages for breach of warranty. It did not state a cause of action for rescis-
sion. After the jury was empanelled and the pleadings read, plaintiff's
counsel informed the court that the action was for rescission of a condi-
tional sale contract. Thereupon, defense counsel moved for judgment
on the pleadings and his motion was granted and the action dismissed.
On appeal the Supreme Court held that where, as here, a good cause
of action for breach of warranty and damages had been stated, the fact
that plaintiff's attorney stated the suit was for rescission did not justify
a dismissal of the action.' 5
1'249 N.C. 16, 105 S.E.2d 114 (1958).
14248 N.C. 662, 104 S.E.2d 848 (1958). This case is also discussed in CivIL
PROCEDURE (PLEADINGS AND PARTIES), Theory of the Pleadings, supra, and
SALES, Express Warranty, infra.
" Compare Bailey v. McGill, 247 N.C. 286, 100 S.E.2d 860 (1957) commented
on in 36 N.C.L. Ray. 464, to the effect that a withdrawal of a well stated cause of
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REFERENCE-PLEA IN BAR
Normally, the filing of a plea in bar will prevent a reference until
the plea is itself finally adjudicated. The statute of limitations is a plea
in bar which in many instances will bar the reference. However, it is
possible that the establishment of the plea in bar of the statute of limita-
tions will itself require that complicated matters of boundary be de-
termined. Such was the situation in Sledge v. Miller.' Whether or
not title by adverse possession existed depended on a determination of
boundaries. The trial court, therefore, referred the matter. From a
judgment for the defendant the plaintiff appealed and urged as ground
for reversal the reference in the face of the defendant's plea of the
statute of limitations. Held, the reference was proper because the scope
of the alleged title by prescription could not be determined until the
boundaries had been established.
MOTION FOR NONSUIT
In Glenn v. City of Raleigh,"' counsel for the defendant offered no
evidence at the end of the plaintiff's case and did not move for a non-
suit. Pending the summation by counsel to the jury, the jury was ex-
cused and defense counsel then made a motion for nonsuit. This was
objected to by plaintiff's counsel and the court denied the motion, treat-
ing it as then made and not as though it had been made before the
summations had commenced. The Supreme Court held that the trial
judge could in his discretion entertain the motion as though made at the
end of the evidence but since he had not chosen so to do the defendant's
nonsuit motion was ineffective.
COUNTY COURT-EFFECT OF COUNTERCLAIM
In Auto Fin. Co. v. Simmon,' 8 suit was instituted in the Durham
County Civil Court which has a jurisdictional limit of $1,500. Defendant
filed a counterclaim seeking in excess of that amount. He moved the
county civil court that the case be removed to the superior court for trial
by reason of the amount claimed in the counterclaim. This motion was
refused by the county court. On appeal to the superior court that court
determined that the filing of the conterclaim in excess of the county
court's jurisdictional limits entitled the defendant to have the case re-
moved to the superior court and it was so ordered. On appeal to the
action in a complaint by an attorney is ineffective in the absence of a showing of
express authority to do so from the client.18249 N.C. 447, 106 S.E.2d 868 (1959). This case is also commented on in
REAL PROPERTY, Adverse Possession, supra.1248 N.C. 378, 103 S.E.2d 482 (1958). This case is also discussed in Mu-
NICIPAL CORPORATIONS, Governmental Immunity, supra.8 247 N.C. 724, 102 S.E.2d 119 (1958). This case is also discussed in CREDITS,
CONDITIONAL SALES; supra; CiVn PROCEDURE (PLEADING AND PARTIES), Demurrer,
upra; and CiviL PRocEDuRE (PLEADING AND PARTIES), Fact Pleading, supra.
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Supreme Court the judgment of the superior court was reversed. No
statute authorized removal to the superior court, and in the absence of
such a statute the Supreme Court held the filing of a counterclaim in the
county court in excess of the jurisdictional limit did not result in ousting
the court's jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claim. The county court
should proceed to hear the claim of the plaintiff.
That a statute authorizing removal in cases of this type is desirable
seems most apparent. 19 The difficulties, absent a statute, are best
illustrated in the ordinary automobile accident case where motorist A
sues in the county court of limited monetary jurisdiction and motorist
B, defendant in that suit, finds himself unable to prove his counterclaim
because it is in excess of the court's jurisdiction.
Let us assume A recovered a judgment in his favor in the county
court, the issue of negligence having been decided adversely to B.
Thereafter, B institutes an action against A in the superior court in
which he seeks to recover damages in excess of the jurisdictional limit
of the county court. May A, in the superior court action, plead the
county court's judgment as res judicata on the issue of negligence?
If he cannot, then conceivably B may recover against A in the superior
court and A will have recovered against B in the county court. If A can
rely on the res judicata plea, then the county court, although established
as a court of limited monetary jurisdiction, will have effectively disposed
of B's claim which was in excess of its jurisdictional amount.
ARGUMENT OF COUNSEL
In State v. Roach,20 the defendant had called various character wit-
nesses. The state called no character witnesses, but in his summation
the solicitor told the jury he could have gotten at least a hundred people
to testify as to the bad character of the defendant. The trial judge in-
structed the jury to disregard that portion of the solicitor's argument.
The Supreme Court held that the remark of the solicitor was so preju-
dicial that an instruction by the court to disregard it could not with
certainty remove the harmful effect. A new trial was ordered.
OPINION EXPRESSED BY TRIAL JUDGE
Hardly a year goes by but some trial judge is reversed because the
Supreme Court finds he expressed an opinion and thus violated G.S.
§ 1-180.21 In State v. Bertrand,22 the court at the close of the prosecu-
tion's evidence said, "Gentlemen, I shall give the jury peremptory in-
structions." The defendant offered no evidence and excepted to the
" See Note, 32 N.C.L. REv. 231 (1954), where this matter is discussed and a
draft of a suggested statute is presented.
_0248 N.C. 63, 102 S.E.2d 413 (1958).
21 See comment in 33 N.C.L. Rlv. 224 (1954).
22249 N.C. 413, 106 S.E.2d 484 (1959).
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comment of the court. Actually, the judge failed to live up to his word,
did not give peremptory instructions and charged in the manner usual
to contested criminal cases. Fifteen minutes after the jury had retired
to consider their verdict the court called them in and inquired if they
had arrived at a verdict. When advised the jury had just begun to take
a vote the court said, "Gentleman, you are to decide this case from the
evidence presented and be guided by the instructions of the court as to
the law. Go back and take your vote." The jury returned a verdict of
guilty. Judgment on the verdict was reversed by the Supreme Court
which found the court's expressed, although unexecuted, intention to
give a peremptory instruction was calculated to impress the jury "either
that the evidence failed to make out a case or that it did establish an
impregnable one." Added to this the Court was of the opinion that
calling the jury back at the end of 15 minutes' deliberation may have sug-
gested that they "had wasted enough time on the case." By virtue of
the matters just discussed the Court felt the trial judge had intimated
to the jury his opinion that the defendant was guilty.
JUDGMENTS
Res Judicata
In Bell v. Hankins,23 the plaintiff administrator had previously in-
stituted a wrongful death action against motorists involved in the acci-
dent which he alleged caused the death of his decedent. Pending the
action it was settled for some $11,800 and a consent judgment was en-
tered in that amount. Two months after the entry of the judgment the
administrator brought this action against the physician in the case
alleging he was responsible for the wrongful death by reason of his im-
proper treatment. The defendant pleaded the aforesaid consent judg-
ment as a bar. The trial court sustained the plea and its dismissal of
the action was affirmed by the Supreme Court. The wrongful death
statute, the Court stated, contemplated only one action. A release exe-
cuted in favor of the party initially responsible for the injury precludes
an action against the physician. The consent judgment was held to
constitute a general release and therefore was a bar to the plaintiff's
action against the physician.
In Crosland-Cullen Co. v. Crosland,2 4 it appeared the Philadelphia
Life Insurance Co. had issued a policy on the life of one David B. Cros-
land, president of Crosland-Cullen Co. Initially the said corporation was
named the beneficiary. Subsequently an assignment of the policy was
made to Mrs. Crosland to secure obligations of her husband under a
separation agreement. Following the death of Crosland the proceeds
-3249 N.C. 199, 105 S.E.2d 642 (1958).
='249 N.C. 167, 105 S.E.2d 655 (1958).
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of the policy were paid to his wife. Thereafter an action was instituted
in the federal court by the corporation against the insurance company
in which the corporation sought to recover the policy proceeds and
alleged the assignment to the wife was invalid. This action resulted in
a judgment in favor of the insurer, the assignment being found valid.2 5
The present action is by the corporation against the wife seeking to
recover from her the proceeds of the insurance on the basis that the
assignment to her was invalid.
Defendant wife pleaded the aforesaid judgment in favor of the in-
surance company as res judicata. The trial court sustained a demurrer
to the plea and struck out the defense. On appeal, the Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the judgment in the case against the insurance
company established the validity of the assignment in so far as the
plaintiff corporation was concerned and it mattered not that the wife was
not a party to that action. The plaintiff's argument that res judicata
should not apply because the parties were not identical is of no avail
where the issues are identical as here, namely, the validity of the assign-
ment, and the plaintiff has already litigated that issue in a suitable pro-
ceeding against the insurer.
In Gillikin v. Gillikin,26 a personal injury action was brought on
behalf of an infant. The defendant pleaded as a plea in bar a judgment
and compromise settlement of the infant's claim. Plaintiff denied de-
fendant's allegations and asserted that any alleged settlement was entered
contrary to the approved court practice. It appeared the so-called settle-
ment-judgment was entered ex parte. No evidence was offered as to
what transpired at the time nor who was to pay or who was to receive
the settlement funds. From an order dismissing the plaintiff's present
action by reason of the alleged settlement the plaintiff appealed. The
Supreme Court reversed the order of dismissal. It held that the de-
fendant must establish what transpired at the time of the alleged
settlement-judgment. He must show a legally authorized and consum-
mated compromise and settlement of the infant's claim. This he had
not done.
Jurisdictional Facts
In In re Bane,2 7 the clerk of the Durham Superior Court appointed
Henry Bane administrator of the estate of Charles Hill who died at the
Duke Hospital, Durham. Thereafter motion was made before the clerk
by the widow of Hill to vacate the said appointment on the ground that
Hill was a domiciliary of Florida and that she had been appointed his
" Crosland-Cullen Co. v. Philadelphia Life Insurance Co., 234 F.2d 780 (4th
Cir. 1956).
.8248 N.C. 710, 104 S.E.2d 861 (1958).
27247 N.C. 562, 101 S.E.2d 369 (1958).
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administratrix in the Florida court of his domicile. Bane, the North
Carolina administrator, answered that Hill died a domiciliary of this
state. No evidence was offered by Bane at the hearing and the clerk
entered judgment that the letters of administration to Bane had been
properly issued. On appeal to the superior court judge the clerk's
judgment was affirmed. Neither the clerk nor the judge had made
any finding of a fact as to the domicile of Hill at the time of his death.
In reversing the judgment and remanding the case, the Supreme
Court held that the jurisdictional fact of domicile must be determined.
If, as the widow alleged, Hill died domiciled in Florida, the Durham
County Superior Court clerk had no jurisdiction to appoint Bane ad-
ministrator. There was no question of ancillary appointment involved.
A statement by the superior court judge in his judgment to the effect
that the clerk "had jurisdiction" was not the equivalent of a finding of the
jurisdictional fact of domicile. On remand the clerk was directed to
find the fact of domicile.
ATTACHEMENT-CONSENT JUDGMENT
In Armstrong v. Aetna Ins. Co.,28 it appeared the plaintiff had insti-
tuted suit against Harris & Harris Construction Co., Inc. and had at-
tached certain property belonging to the company. The Construction Co.
filed a bond to release the attachment and attacked its validity. Answer
was filed to the complaint and thereafter a consent judgment was entered
against the Construction Co. for $2,931.15. Executions on the judgment
were returned unsatisfied and plaintiff instituted this action against the
surety on the bond furnished to release the attachment. In affirming a
judgment for the defendant surety, the Supreme Court stated that the
furnishing of a bond to release an attachment did not operate as a
waiver of any ground that may exist to attack the validity of the attach-
ment. Further, the Court held the consent judgment was the result of
a settlement of all matters in controversy. The effect of the judgment
was to give the plaintiff a simple right to the amount of money set out
in the judgment and in no way gave plaintiff the right to collect the
judgment from the surety on the bond given to release the attachment.
VACATION OF JUDGMENTS-ExCUSABLE NEGLECT
In Abernethy v. Nichols,2 9 action was brought against both husband
and wife. In due course a default judgment was entered against both
defendants. Within one year of the default the defendant wife moved
to vacate the judgment against her, setting out a meritorious defense and
asserting excusable neglect and surprise. It appeared that when she
was served with the summons she consulted her co-defendant husband
28249 N.C. 352, 106 S.E.2d 515 (1959).
29249 N.C. 70, 105 S.E.2d 211 (1958).
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and asked him why she had been sued. He told her to give the legal
papers to him and that he would relieve her of responsibility in the mat-
ter. This she did and dismissed the matter from her mind only to learn
a few months later that a default judgment had been entered against her.
The Court held that the wife's failure to answer under the circum-
stances was "excusable neglect" within the terms of G.S. § 1-220. In
so ruling the Court was supported by early precedents in this state.30
VACATION OF DIVORCE DECREE-FRAUD
In Shaver v. Shaver,31 we have the fourth appearance in the Supreme
Court of the alleged fraudulent and collusive divorce obtained by the
Shavers. The first appearance of this matter was in Carpenter v. Car-
penter32 in which Carpenter, the second husband of Mary Shaver, sought
to have his marriage annulled on the ground that a divorce between
Mary and her former husband, Floyd Shaver, had been obtained on the
basis of false swearing by the parties. Relief was denied on the theory
that Carpenter was a stranger to the divorce action and could not col-
laterally attack the divorce decree. The second case was a motion by
Carpenter in the original Shaver divorce suit.3 3 Again Carpenter was
denied relief, the Court holding that he was a stranger to the record and
had no standing to move to vacate the decree by a motion in the cause.
The third time the case appeared in the Supreme Court34 a decision of
the lower court declaring the divorce decree null and void was reversed
for lack of jurisdiction because it was made at a time when the matter
was on appeal to the Supreme Court, the Shavers having appealed the
lower court's refusal to dismiss Carpenter's motion to vacate.
In the fourth and last appearance of the Shaver case the trial court
on its own motion, now over ten years from the date of the divorce
decree, initiated proceedings to vacate the decree, appointed an amicus
curiae to aid him, and issued an order directing the Shavers to show
cause why the divorce decree should not be vacated. Service of the
order was by publication, the Shavers now being non-residents of this
state. A special appearance was entered by Mary Shaver who moved
to dismiss the proceeding for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court re-
fused to dismiss and from that ruling this last appeal was taken. The
Supreme Court reviewed the law as to when judgments may be cor-
rected or vacated by the trial court and held that since the judgment in
question was not void on its face, and the trial term had long passed,
the trial judge was without power to initiate on his own motion pro-
"See Sikes v. Weatherly, 110 N.C. 131, 14 S.E. 511 (1892) and note on the
vacation of judgments for excusable neglect in 31 N.C.L. RIv. 324 (1953).
1248 N.C. 113, 102 S.E2d 791 (1958).
" 244 N.C. 286, 93 S.E.2d 617 (1956).
88244 N.C. 309, 93 S.E.2d 614 (1956).
" Shaver v. Shaver, 244 N.C. 311, 93 S.E.2d 615 (1956).
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ceedings to vacate the judgment. Further, the appointment of an
amicus curiae did not help solve the situation for he, too, the court
stated, had no right to institute proceedings to attack a judgment.
Were the court to permit such attack by an amicus curiae the situation
might well develop that countless members of divorce decrees would be
invalidated whereupon research by the amicus curiae it is found a
fraud was committed on the court. The Supreme Court accordingly
ordered the order to show cause and all subsequent proceedings based
thereon vacated and set aside. Justice Parker dissented on the theory
that a divorce decree should always be open to attack when it appears
it was obtained as a result of the collusive action of the husband and
wife.
TRUSTS
Mast v. Blackburn' calls attention to a statute2 passed in 1953 relating
to the appointment of successor trustees. The trustees having died, a
clerk of court in 1946 purported to appoint plaintiffs as trustees. This
was held void since at the time the clerk could appoint successor trustees
only when the former trustees had resigned.3 Now, however, the Court
noted that by virtue of G.S. § 36-18.1, the clerk of court could validly
appoint successor trustees to deceased trustees.
WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION
EXECUTORS AND ADmINISTRATORS
In Woody v. Pickelsimer,;' T bequeathed corporate stock to his wife
for life, and upon her death to be divided among his heirs. The wife was
appointed executrix under the will. While the estate was still open,
the plaintiff negotiated with the wife for the sale of this stock. The
price offered was considerably more than the book value, and the plain-
tiff's evidence tended to show he was purchasing the stock outright.
This action was brought to ratify and confirm the sale made by defendant
executrix. Plaintiff appealed from a judgment of nonsuit.
Quoting from Matthews v. Griffin,2 the Court points out that where
a person has both an estate in and a power over property, an act done
will ordinarily be referred to such person's ownership; but if a convey-
1248 N.C. 231, 102 S.E.2d 812 (1958).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36-18.1 (Supp. 1957).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36-9 (1950).
'248 N.C. 599, 104 S.E.2d 273 (1958). The case is also discussed in CIVIL
PROCEDURE (PLEADINGS AND PARTIES), Amendment, supra.
- 187 N.C. 599, 122 S.E. 465 (1924).
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ance is made which cannot have full effect except by referring it to an
execution of the power, then the conveyance is referred to the power.
As to whether or not defendant had the power to make a valid sale of the
stock in question, it is well settled that private sales by an executor of
choses in action are valid if made in good faith.3 The Court, in award-
ing plaintiff a new trial, held that the complaint stated a cause of action.
The case should have been presented to the jury on the issue of the valid-
ity of the sale alleged in the complaint.
In Griffin v. Turner,4 the administrators of an estate (who were also
two of the heirs) executed an instrument purporting to give authority to
an agent to contract for the sale of certain realty belonging to decedent's
estate. Plaintiff contracted with the agent for the purchase of the
property. This action was brought seeking specific performance of the
contract against all the heirs of decedent. The Court held that only
the two heirs who were administrators could be compelled to convey.
An administrator has no power as such to sell realty, and could not bind
the heirs, absent their authorization.5 This being so, there could be no
breach of implied warranty that the other heirs would convey their
interests.6 A party dealing with an administrator is bound to know the
limits of the latter's authority. Defendant administrators acted in their
representative capacity, but nonetheless were bound to convey insofar as
their own individual interests in the land were concerned. To exclude
individual responsibility in such a situation, there must be clear and
express language.
CONSTRUCTION
In Harroff v. Harroff,7 after certain bequests of personalty to his
wife, T divided his residuary estate into two trusts. Trust A was to
include one-half of the residuary estate, undiminished by any death
taxes, and was to be used for the support of the widow. Trust B
was to be used to support T's two sons. The widow had received cer-
tain life insurance proceeds, annuity benefits, and an estate by the en-
tirety when her husband died. These did not pass under the will, but
nonetheless were included in the estate for death tax purposes. The
widow maintained that all the death taxes that had been paid, all the
non-probate assets, and the specific bequests of personalty should be
added to the residuary estate, and that she would be entitled to a sum
'Felton v. Felton, 213 N.C. 194, 195 S.E. 533 (1938).
'248 N.C. 678, 104 S.E.2d 841 (1958).
'See Parker v. Porter, 208 N.C. 31, 179 S.E. 533 (1935).
There can be no implied authority to do that which the law says cannot be
done. See Hedgecock v. Tate, 168 N.C. 660, 85 S.E. 34 (1915). The other heirs
could, of course, have authorized the administrators to sell their realty; but this
was not done here.
7247 N.C. 730, 101 S.E.2d 311 (1958).
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from the residuary estate equal to one-half of the entire estate. The
Court was unable to concur in such a view. Construing the intention of
the testator, the Court found that the non-probate assets and the per-
sonalty constituted no part of the residuary estate. However, it was T's
intention that Trust B pay all death taxes; thus all such taxes that had
been paid would have to be added to the residuary estate in order to
properly allocate one-half to Trust A.
In Finke v. First Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 8 T left surviving him
a widow and seven children. The will placed most of T's property in
trust to provide the widow with one-eighth of the net income. The
trustee was to hold the balance for the benefit of T's seven children.
The will also provided that if any child was of the age of twenty-five at
T's death, he could then demand his share of the corpus, and as each
child attained twenty-five, he could also exercise this right. At T's
death, all the children had attained twenty-five. This case involved a
demand made by one of the children, which right, it is claimed, the will
expressly gave. In disallowing the claim, the Court said the dominant
intent of the testator must be looked to, and inconsistent expressions
must yield. It was found that T's main intent was to care for his
widow, and in spite of the express language of the will, the rights of
the children would have to be subordinated to those of the widow. The
Court pointed out that under any other construction of the will, since all
the children had attained twenty-five at the time of T's death, it might be
possible to destroy the entire corpus of the trust, leaving the widow
with no means of support. Since the testator obviously did not intend
such a result, no child will be permitted to enjoy his share until the
death of the widow.
FAMILY SETTLEMENT
One decision in this area seems worthy of comment in order to
illustrate the lengths that Courts will often go to in order to protect the
rights of widows. In In re Will of Stimpson,9 T died leaving a widow
and six children. The widow filed her dissent from the will in apt
time.1 0 The will 'was then caveated, and a verdict found for the pro-
pounders. To withdraw an appeal, an agreement was entered into
among the parties relating to the distribution of the estate. It included,
among other things, a provision whereby the real estate would be sold
and the widow's dower interest would be computed and paid to her
in cash, she accepting said settlement "in relinquishment of all further
claims to the estate." The widow was among the parties signing this
8248 N.C. 370, 103 S.E.2d 466 (1958).
0248 N.C. 262, 103 S.E.2d 352 (1958).
"0 The widow has six months from the date of probate of the will in which to
file a dissent. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-1 (1950).
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agreement. In an action by the widow to establish her claim to an
intestate share of the personalty," it was held that she had not re-
linquished this right in the family settlement. The Court said this par-
ticular portion of the agreement was concerned only with real estate, its
sale, and the computation of the cash value of the respective parties' in-
terests. It was held that the provision relinquishing "all further claims
to the estate" was concerned with dower only, and that the widow's dis-
sent remained operative as to personal property. The Court thus seems
to do violence to the express language of the parties. The agreement
plainly states that all claims are released; it was obviously a compromise
settlement. The result of the Court's decision is to give the widow
exactly what she would have taken had she never signed the agreement,
and thus her reason for signing is not too apparent. Six children were
also involved, and it is quite plausible that she decided to forego her
share of the personalty in exchange for a cash settlement of her dower
rights, such rights having very little marketable, value. It is submitted
that in the area of compromise settlements, where the language is clear,
courts should enforce the agreement as written and not undertake to
write a new contract under the guise of interpretation.
REVOCATION
In re Will of Tanner,12 presented an interesting argument concern-
ing the construction of G.S. § 31-5.3. This section provides that a will
is revoked by the subsequent marriage of the maker, with certain ex-
ceptions not relevant here. In this case, T made a will and later mar-
ried. The instrument was offered for probate and a caveat filed by
the widow. Propounders urged that, under a proper construction of the
statute, the will was revoked by the marriage only to the extent neces-
sary to give the wife what she would have taken by intestate succession,
and that the remainder of the will would be valid. The Court rejected
this reasoning and concluded that the marriage ipso facto revoked the
will since the statute makes no provision for any theory of partial revo-
cation. In view of the express language of G.S. § 31-5.3, the holding
seems clearly correct.
" In the event the widow dissents from the will, she takes as if her husband
had died intestate. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-2 (1950). Where a person dies intestate
leaving a widow and two or more children, the widow and the children divide
the personal property equally. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-149(2) (1950).
' 248 N.C. 72, 102 S.E.2d 391 (1958).
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